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ABSTRACT
LABOR MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES
Sa¼glam, Bahar
Ph.D., Department of Economics
Supervisor: Asst. Prof. Selin Sayek Böke
September 2007
In this dissertation, the labor market implications of increased foreign rm ac-
tivity in the local economy are studied by using a heterogeneous matching model
framework. There are a number of unskilled and skilled job seekers, and a number of
job vacancies posted by local and foreign rms. In this set up, where all workers can
engage in on-the-job search, equilibrium conditions and Nash bargaining approach
allows derivation of wages for di¤erent types of workers and rms. Results suggest
that wages are a weighted average of labor productivity and unemployment benet,
where the weight depends on the bargaining power of the workers, labor market
tightness and the mass of local and foreign vacancies. Results suggest that levels
of wages paid by the foreign rm need not always be greater than that paid by the
local rm. In fact, the wage di¤erential is found to depend on relative costs, skill
endowment and the technological gap between local and foreign rms. An increase
in the foreign presence, measured as an increase in the extent of foreign rm vacancy
creation, can occur because of an exogenous change in cost of job creation- public
policy, technological improvements and skill upgrading. In this context, depending
on the cause of an increase in foreign presence we end up with di¤erential relative
wage e¤ects. On the other hand, skill intensity of the foreign rms and restrictions
iii
on labor mobility from foreign to local rms play a crucial role in explaining wage
di¤erentials and unemployment.
Keywords: Foreign investment, skill premium, relative wages, matching models,
labor markets.
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ÖZET
ÇOKULUSLU S¸·IRKETLER·IN ·IS¸ GÜCÜ P·IYASALARINA ETK·ILER·I
Sa¼glam, Bahar
Doktora, Ekonomi Bölümü
Tez Yöneticisi: Asst. Prof. Selin Sayek Böke
Eylül 2007
Bu tezde, artan yabanc¬rma aktivitelerinin yerel i¸s gücü piyasalar¬na etkileri
heterojen es¸les¸me modelleri kullan¬larak çal¬¸s¬lm¬¸st¬r. Yerel i¸s gücü piyasas¬nda i¸s
arayan vas¬¬ ve vas¬fs¬z i¸sçiler yerel ve yabanc¬ rmalarda aç¬lan i¸s olanaklar¬n¬
doldururlar. Bu model içerisinde sadece i¸ssizler de¼gil vas¬¬ya da vas¬fs¬z i¸s sahibi
olanlarda yeni aç¬lan i¸s olanaklar¬n¬de¼gerlendirmek isterler. Denge s¸artlar¬ve Nash
pazarl¬k bak¬¸s aç¬s¬yla yerel ve yabanc¬ rmadaki vas¬¬ ve vas¬fs¬z i¸sçi ücretleri
belirlenir. Modelin bulgular¬ ücretlerin i¸ssizlik maas¸¬ ve verimlili¼gin a¼g¬rl¬kl¬ or-
talamas¬ oldu¼gunu gösterir. Bu a¼g¬rl¬klar ise i¸sçilerin pazarl¬k gücüne, yerel ve
yabanc¬ rmalar¬n açt¬¼g¬ i¸s olanaklar¬n¬n miktar¬na göre de¼gi¸sir. Bunu yan¬s¬ra
modelin nümerik ve analitik çözümü her zaman yabanc¬rmalar¬n daha çok ücret
ödedi¼ginin do¼gru olmad¬¼g¬n¬söyler. Firmalar aras¬ndaki ücret farkl¬l¬klar¬yabanc¬
ve yerel rmada i¸s olanaklar¬açabilme maliyetine, yerel ekonomideki vas¬¬vas¬fs¬z
i¸sçilerin da¼g¬l¬m¬na, rmalar aras¬ndaki teknolojik farkl¬l¬klara ba¼gl¬d¬r. Yabanc¬r-
malar¬n yerel ekonomideki varl¬klar¬açt¬klar¬i¸s olanaklar¬yla ölçülmüs¸tür. Düs¸en i¸s
yaratma maliyetleri, teknolojik ilerleme ve vas¬¬i¸sgünü art¬¸s¬sebepleriyle artan ya-
banc¬rma i¸s olanaklar¬vas¬¬vas¬fs¬z ücretleri, yerli ve yabanc¬ücret farkl¬l¬larn¬¬,
vas¬¬vas¬fs¬z ücret farkl¬l¬klar¬n¬ve i¸ssizlik oranlar¬n¬etkiler. Ama bu etki yabanc¬
v
rman¬n i¸s olanaklar¬n¬art¬rmas¬na neden olan etkenlere göre farkl¬l¬klar gösterir.
Bunun yan¬s¬ra, yabanc¬rmalar¬n girdi¼gi sektöre göre i¸s gücü piyasas¬nda yarat-
t¬¼g¬etkilerin fark¬l¬l¬klar¬incelenmi¸stir. Ayn¬zamanda, yabanc¬rmadan yerel r-
maya giden i¸sçilere getirilen k¬s¬tlamalar¬n rmalar aras¬ndaki bilgi ak¬m¬na etkilerine
çal¬¸s¬lm¬¸st¬r.
Anahtar Kelimeler: Yabanc¬yat¬r¬mlar, nisbi ücretler, es¸les¸me modelleri, i¸sgücü
piyasalar¬.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION AND MOTIVATION
The rapid growth in international trade, investment and nancial ows over the
past two decades has been the most remarkable change in the world economy. In-
creased activities of multinational enterprises (MNEs), due to the reductions in trade
and investment barriers and the cost of moving goods and information, has lead to
relocation of capital and jobs, and re-determination of factor prices. The scale and
scope of MNE activities are best gauged by looking at their shares in economic ac-
tivity. Table 1 points out the MNEscritical role in the global economy with their
690391 a¢ liates abroad. Over the past two decades, there has been a drastic increase
in the total sales, assets and exports of foreign a¢ liates. Gross product of foreign
a¢ liates increased from $1.4 trillion in 1990 to $4 trillion in 2004. In 2004, foreign
a¢ liates of MNEs, with total sales, assets and exports amounting to $19 trillion, $36
trillion and $4 trillion, respectively, generated 57 million jobs. MNEs have become
one of the key players in extensively integrated economies since they have gained
an important ground in transmitting new technologies, managerial techniques, skills
and capital across borders.1
1See Caves (1996); Markusen and Venables, (1999); Navaratti and Venables (2004); among
others, for a discussion of the role of MNEs and their e¤ects.
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In this context, to benet from new technology, knowledge and market opportu-
nities, domestic policy makers (as well as rms) encourage foreign rms to establish
local subsidiaries2. Alongside its e¤ect on local rm productivity through technology
transfers, investments by foreign rms also have important implications for the local
labor market conditions. If one envisages the world production along a continuum of
factor intensities, the di¤ering labor requirements among the local rm, the foreign
a¢ liate and foreign parent rms would become evident3. As such, the increasing ex-
tent of foreign rms (a¢ liates) would have important e¤ects on the skill composition
of the local labor market; the relative demand for skilled and unskilled worker, hence
their unemployment rates and the relative wages of skilled and unskilled worker.
Table 1: Main Indicators of Foreign A¢ liates, 1982-2004
Value at Current Prices (Billion $)
1982 1990 2003 2004
Sales of Foreign A¢ liates 2765 5727 16963 18677
Gross Product of Foreign A¢ liates 647 1476 3573 3911
Total Assets of Foreign A¢ liates 2113 5937 32186 36008
Exports of Foreign A¢ liates 730 1498 3073 3690
Employment of Foreign A¢ liates (thousands) 19579 24471 53196 57394
Number of Foreign A¢ liates Located in Economy 170000 690391
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2005
Accordingly, empirical and theoretical debate about the impact of the MNEs
production activities on labor markets, particularly wage di¤erentials and employ-
ment, is lively and growing. While the theoretical models that investigate the e¤ect
2Throughout the text terms foreign rms and multinationals are used interchangeably.
3A foreign a¢ liate is an incorporated or unincorporated enterprise in which an investor, who
is a resident in another economy, owns a stake that permits a lasting interest in the management
of that enterprise (an equity stake of 10% for an incorporated enterprise, or its equivalent for an
unincorporated enterprise) (World Investment Report, 2006).
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of FDI on employment and the wage structures in both the source and host countries
have mostly incorporated the MNEs into the microeconomic general equilibrium
theory of international trade, such as the Heckscher-Ohlin model, a substantial body
of empirical work is based on ad hoc observations and surveys, as well as a number
of studies using econometric methods. These studies document two fundamental
issues:4 First, as the structure of the domestic production changes upon the entry of
foreign rms, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers changes (Gopinath
and Chen, 2003, Ghosh, 2003, and Markusen and Venables, 1997). Second, foreign
rms tend to pay di¤erent wages than domestic rms (Aitken et al., 1996, Feenstra
and Hanson, 1996, and Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2004).
The literature is dominated by theoretical studies that explore the rst issue
regarding the relative wages between the skilled and unskilled labor, i.e. the skill
premium, and by empirical studies exploring the second issue regarding the relative
wages paid by foreign and domestic rms, i.e. foreign rm premium. The two issues
are rarely discussed simultaneously in both the theoretical and empirical studies
on the e¤ects of MNEs, which this dissertation does. This dissertation tries to ll
the void in the literature, building a framework that explains the two observations
synchronously and allows for a detailed identication of the absolute and relative
wage implications of increased MNE activities in the host country. Furthermore,
while the literature has so far been relatively silent on the unemployment e¤ects of
foreign investment, a third issue that could be studied in this context is the e¤ect
4See Brown et al., 2002; Ghosh, 2003; Moran, 2002; Hatzius, 1998; and Eckel, 2003 for a detailed
discussion.
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of MNEs on unemployment rates. As such, the below model allows for a discussion
of not only the price e¤ects of foreign rms in the local labor markets but also their
impact on the unemployment rates.
The theoretical explorations of the skill premia e¤ects of increased MNE activities
yields ambigous results, where the common theme is that the e¤ects of foreign direct
investment (FDI) on relative wages in the source and the host countries depends on
the characteristics of the investment and the conditions in the invested environment.
Markusen and Venables (1997), Feenstra and Hanson (1996) and Ghosh (2003) nd
that the relative return to skilled labor increases in both the host and source country
upon increased MNE activities. On the other hand, Das (2002), Wu (2001) and
Sayek and Sener (2006) nd that the relative wage e¤ects depend on the competing
domestic entrepreneurs skill level and the technology gap between the host and
the source country; the technology intensity and the type of the foreign investment;
and the skill intensity of the foreign production, respectively. Lall (1995) provides an
extensive list of conditions which a¤ect the labor market e¤ects of foreign investment.
In summary, Lall (1995) suggests these conditions to include the size and the mode of
entry (greeneld or acquisition), the nature and exibility of technology in the foreign
rm, level and speed of technology upgrading, the sophistication of the technologies
used, trade orientation, the place of the a¢ liate in the global production, the levels
and types of skills needed for the operation of the a¢ liate, the extent of local design
or R&D activity, and the economic and market conditions in the host country and
the competitive capability of local rms. The important message to be taken from
this strand of the literature is that the local conditions as well as the investment
4
characteristics, which we will lump in the term "absorptive capacities" matters in
the determination of the wage e¤ects of increased foreign presence5.
Empirical evidence, documenting the two fundamental issues enlisted above,
points to the role of absorptive capacities by nding di¤erent results among de-
veloping countries. Regarding the former observation, Robbins (1994) and Wood
(1994) nd that Malaysia, Philippines, Singapore and Taiwan have experienced a
fall in the skilled-unskilled wage di¤erential, while Beyer et al. (1999) and Cragg
and Epelbaum (1996) nd that Chile and Mexico experienced the opposite after
MNEs increased their activities. As noted above, such di¤erential e¤ects could be
on account of the di¤erent local conditions and investment characteristics discussed
in the theoretical models, i.e absorptive capacities.
Studies on the second observation, regarding the di¤erential wages across domes-
tic and foreign rms, tend to echoe a similar absorptive capacity story; though the
studies mostly document higher wages being paid by foreign rms. For example,
Dri¢ eld and Girma (2003) and Conyon et al. (2002) demonstrate that even after
controlling for industry and rm e¤ects there is a signicant wage di¤erence between
foreign and domestic frms in the UK. Martins (2004) shows a positive relationship
between foreign ownership and wages, though the results suggest a negative e¤ect of
foreign acquisition on the growth rate of these wages. Aitken, Harrison and Lipsey
(1996) also document such wage di¤erences, and nd that in Mexico and Venezuela
wage di¤erentials between domestic and foreign rms persist, and in fact foreign
5The literature uses the term absorptive capacity to capture both the local market conditions
such as the availability of skilled labor (Borenzstein et al., 1998), the availability of nancial market
services (Alfaro et al., 2004 and Durham and Lensink, 2004), as well as the technology capacity of
the local rm, which we labeled as the investment characteristic above.
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rms pay higher wages than domestic rms. The authors further show that this
wage gap between the local and foreign rms widens as the foreign rms presence
increases, mostly on account of the reduction in wages paid by domestic rms.
On the contrary, studying the Indonesian manufacturing industry Lipsey and
Sjöholm (2002) conclude that though foreign-owned enterprises pay higher wages
than domestic enterprises, a higher foreign presence in an industry is associated with
higher level of wages in locally owned enterprises. Furthermore, Almedia (2004) nds
only small alterations in the skill composition and wage structure of Portugese do-
mestic rms upon foreign acquisiton. Such evidence can be interpreted as suggesting
that the relative wages between domestic and foreign rms might also di¤er depend-
ing on the absorptive capacities, either of the local market or of the rm. In fact,
Barry et al. (2005) nd that, since foreign rms use di¤erent combinations of skilled
and unskilled workers in their production depending on their sector of operation,
the wage e¤ects of increased foreign presence may di¤er across sectors. Providing
evidence from Ireland, they nd that while increased foreign presence in a sector
has a negative e¤ect on wages paid by domestic rms who are exporters it has no
e¤ect on wages paid by rms who are non-exporters. In similar fashion Girma et
al. (2001) nd no evidence of a positive relationship between foreign presence and
wage levels in domestic enterprises, with some weak evidence of a negative e¤ect of
foreign presence on domestic enterpriseswage growth.
Ruane and Ugur (2002) suggest several reasons for why MNEs may indeed o¤er
higher wages. Firstly, since MNEs are less familiar with local labor market condi-
tions, they may o¤er higher wages in order to attract better quality labor. Second,
6
MNEs pay higher wages to minimize technology spillovers to other rms via labor
mobility, that is to reduce worker turnover. Thirdly, since MNEsskill requirements
may di¤er from those of local rms, they have to pay more for those skills. Fourth,
they pay higher wages than local rms since MNEs are larger than local enterprises.
Actually, due to the productivity advantage, MNEs can a¤ord to do so. To sum
up, these conditions can all be included under the absorptive capacity that denes
the evolution of several relative wages, i.e. those between rms and those between
di¤erent types of labor.
As is detailed above, while these explanations support the empirical evidence
provided by several studies there is no formal model that explores these relation-
ships. This dissertation lls this gap in the literature, formalizing the explanations
suggested by Ruane and Ugur (2002), among others. Furthermore, the model allows
identifying a range of absorptive capacities that a¤ect not only the magnitude of the
skill and rm premia, and within rms relative wage e¤ects of increased foreign rm
presence but also, the direction of these e¤ects.
In summary, although there have been many empirical studies investigating the
labor market implications of the entry of foreign rms, evidence on labor mobility in
a theoretical set-up is scarce and far from conclusive. The purpose of this dissertation
is to ll this theoretical void, by constructing models allowing for wage di¤erences
across skilled and unskilled labor, as well as wage di¤erences across domestic and
foreign rms. As such the dissertation adds value to the literature by combining
two well-documented wage e¤ects of foreign rm activity, those on di¤erent types
of labor and those paid by di¤erent types of rms. Furthermore, models also allow
7
for studying the unemployment e¤ects alongside the wage e¤ects, providing a broad
perspective on the labor market.
Specically, e¤ects of the workersmobility by means of search models and the
matching functions are evaluated. Search and matching models have a crucial role
in explaining the labor market transitions, they provide a very suitable framework
to study the labor market uctuations following the entry of foreign rms. The rst
chapter of the dissertation is also a novelty in studying the labor market implications
of foreign rm activity; which, to the best of our knowledge, has not been studied
using matching models so far. Chapter 2 models the foreign rm working with both
skilled and unskilled workers and Chapter 3 further looks into the corner solutions,
where either skilled or unskilled labor is used in production, instead of both labor
being used in combination. In Chapter 4, examines the e¤ect of labor mobility re-
strictions from foreign to local rms on wage and unemployment rate of the workers.
Models and main ndings of these models will be discussed shortly below.
Although the basic structure of Gautier (2002), Albrecht and Vroman (2002) and
Dolado et al. (2003) is adopted to study this question, the disseration also contributes
to the modeling of labor market implications of international factor movements by
allowing for two sided on-the-job-search.6 The model can be summarized as follows:
there are a number of unskilled and skilled job seekers, who are either unemployed
or employed. Vacancies are posted by local and foreign rms looking for skilled and
unskilled workers. However, job creation through vacancy posting is not a costless
6The literature on matching models with heterogenous agents has developed over the last decade,
dating back to the inuential contributions by Pissarides (1994), McKenna (1996), Acemoglu (1999),
Mortensen and Pissarides (1999), Burdett and Coles (1999) and Shimer and Smith (2000).
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procedure. In fact, the structure of job creation costs, which di¤ers between local
and foreign rms, plays a major role in the extent of vacancy creation by the foreign
rms and has an important e¤ect on the labor market. Job seekers and rms meet
according to the matching function.
When a worker and rm meets, the wage is set in accordance with the Nash
bargaining approach. In this matching process, skilled and unskilled workers both
in the foreign and local rmscan engage in on-the-job-search. By allowing on-the-
job-search, it is possible that skilled and unskilled workers in local (foreign) rms
switch into foreign (local) rms. In addition, di¤erent productivities across rms
and workers are also allowed for. Particularly, the model presented in Chapter 2
provides a complete picture to study the e¤ects of foreign job creation on employment
and wage di¤erences and it also allows studying the e¤ects of technology and skill
upgrading on employment and the wage di¤erentials.
Accordingly, skilled and unskilled workerswage in the local and foreign rms
are found to be a weighted average of labor productivity and the workersunem-
ployment benets. Particularly, skilled and unskilled workerswages depend on job
opportunities provided by the rms, which are mainly determined by the cost of job
creation and the labor productivity. Results show that foreign rms need not always
pay more than local rms, which is supportive of the mixed evidence provided in the
empirical literature. The relative wage between the local and foreign rms is found
to depend on the share of posted vacancies by the local and foreign rms and the
technology gap between foreign and local rms; and the share of posted vacancies,
which depends on the cost of job-creation for the rms and the labor productivity,
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i.e. the absorptive capacities (as discussed in Chapter 2) and the sector of production
(as discussed in Chapter 3- where technology intensities matter) and the exibility
of labor (as discussed in Chapter 4- where the extent of labor mobility matters).
If the share of foreign vacancies increase due to the decrease in the foreign job
creation cost, then the wages in the local rm tend to decline while wages in the
foreign rm are likely to increase. This leads to a decrease in the overall skill pre-
mium and an increase in the rm premium, given the costs of the local rm and
the productivity gap are above a certain threshold. However, when di¤erent skill
requirements of the rms are considered, increased foreign rm presence create dif-
ferent wage and unemployment outcomes. If the foreign rm is relatively more skill
intensive than local rm, increased foreign rm presence decreases the wage of un-
skilled workers and increases their unemployment rate. On the other hand, if the
foreign rm is relatively less skill intensive than local rm, the wage gap between
skilled and unskilled workers in the local rm increases. Furthermore, restrictions
on labor mobility have important implications on the job creation, wage and unem-
ployment patterns. Results point out that labor mobility from foreign to local rms
decreases the skill premium in the local rm and also puts a downward pressure on
the rm premium. Findings of the model point out that the technological gap be-
tween foreign and local rms plays a vital role in the job creation and determination
of wages and unemployment.
These results are supported by a wide range of numerical exercises we complete,
to both quantify the analytic results found and to identify the e¤ects that are not
obtained in explicit form in the analytic solution. The numerical exercise shows
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that the relative wage e¤ects (both between di¤erent skill levels and between rms)
depend on the job-creation costs, the productivity levels of labor, and the imperfec-
tions in the labor market (which are mainly captured by the bargaining power of
the labor in this model). In summary, within this framework, it can be concluded
that wage dispersion across foreign and local rms stems from not only productivity
di¤erentials but also from the extent of job creation; skill intensity and the labor
mobility inuence the direction and magnitude of the wage e¤ects of increased for-
eign presence. The model also allows for a detailed discussion of the unemployment
e¤ect, across di¤erent skill level of MNE activities.
Accordingly, the chapter 2 examines the labor market implications of foreign
rms and chapter 3 studies the e¤ect of di¤erent types of foreign rms on local labor
markets and Chapter 4 deals with restrictions on labor mobility and their e¤ects on
explaining wage di¤erentials and unemployment rate.
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CHAPTER 2
LABOR MARKET IMPLICATIONS OF MNEs: AN ANALYSIS
USING HETEROGENEOUS MATCHING MODEL
2.1. Introduction
As is discussed above, the increased presence of foreign rms have important im-
pacts on the labor markets. Foreign rms create various job opportunities depending
on their activities in the host country7. Actually, to compete and prosper, both for-
eign and local rms need to restructure their activities, facilities and skills, and tailor
them to the changing technologies (Ismail and Yussof, 2003). In this context, both
rms o¤er various job opportunities for skilled and unskilled workers while restruc-
turing their activities. Foreign owned enterprises are the most dynamic ones in terms
of job creation since being free from political and social constraints, they are able
to re unproductive workers and hire new ones, destroy ine¢ cient jobs and create
e¢ cient ones, close down plants and establish new ones (Faggio and Koning, 2001).
Thus, they are able to undertake the fundamental changes necessary for restructur-
ing. In this context, it will be benecial to discuss the role played by the foreign
rms in job creation by utilizing a heterogeneous matching model. This chapter is
7We consider the foreign and local rms in the manufacturing sector.
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organized as follows: the following section presents the main characteristics of the
model, section three provides an equilibrium analysis and displays wages. This is
followed by a numerical example. The nal section summarizes and concludes.
2.1.1. Basic Assumptions
Consider a continuous time model in which workers are innitely lived and risk
neutral. In addition, the measure of workers is normalized to one. We assume that
the distribution of skills across workers is exogenous:  2 (0; 1) of the workers are
unskilled (l) while the remaining fraction, 1 , are skilled (s). There are two types
of jobs: local (L) and foreign jobs (F ). These jobs can be performed by both types
of workers. Let yij denote the ow output of a job of type i (= L; F ) that is lled by
a worker of type j (= l; s).
Assumptions on production technology can be summarized as follows8:
yFs > y
L
s and y
F
{ > y
L
{ (1)
That is, the ow output that would result from a match between a skilled worker
and a foreign rm is higher than the ow output from a match between a skilled
worker and a local rm. A similar situation applies to unskilled workers. This follows
the empirical evidence that foreign rms are more productive than local rms, which
is widely accepted in the literature (Dunning, 1993; Caves, 1996; Doms and Jensen,
1998 and Conyon et al., 2002). Clearly, as foreign rms act as a source of new
8It is important to note that any re-ordering of yFs and y
L
s has an important implications, which
are captured in the numerical simulations.
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technology, production process, managerial technique or a new organizational form
(Fosfuri et al., 2001), workers are more productive in foreign rms.
Job destruction is exogenous at rate . Whenever a job is destroyed the worker
becomes unemployed, while the job becomes vacant. During unemployment workers
receive an unemployment benet b.
On the other hand, restructuring in the labor market by means of job creation is
not a costless procedure. Firms must create a vacancy to hire new workers. Partic-
ularly, vacancies are a form of investment and rms must incur a cost to reach job
seekers and to acquire information on the characteristics of applicants. Due to the
informational frictions in the labor market, rms experience di¢ culties in matching
with suitable job seekers. To overcome the informational hurdle and to make va-
cancies visible, rms spread information about the characteristics of their vacancies
by using various recruitment methods such as public employment services, adver-
tisement and private employment agencies (Russo et al., 2005). In this context, to
hire a suitable worker, rms need to incur the cost of recruiting including the cost
of posting, advertising and screening, and the cost of initial training at all stages
of production (Fonseca et al., 2001; Hammermesh, 1993; and Russo et al., 2005).
Actually, rms use di¤erent search strategies and use di¤erent recruitment methods,
thus, they follow di¤erent job creation policies depending on the cost structures. In
this regard, when investing in a new market by means of posting job opportunities,
foreign rms need to exert additional e¤ort to locating better matching opportunities
and they have to incur a cost which includes all expenses associated with operating
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in an unfamiliar foreign environment (Fosfuri et al., 2001)9 In this respect, denoting
the costs of job creation in the local and foreign rms as cL and cF , respectively, we
assume cF > cL10.
Carlson et al. (2006), Vanhala (2004), Faggio and Koning (2001) state that as-
sumptions on job creation costs have a crucial role in terms of job reallocation and
change the potential policy recommendations of the models. As such it is crucial to
capture such costs in the model. Cost of job creation generates important uctu-
ations in the mass of vacancies, therefore, it has a crucial role on explaining labor
market dynamics, wages and unemployment rates (Booth et al., 2002). Mortensen
and Pissarides (1994) and Shimer (2003) state that the cost of vacancy creation has
an inevitable role in the Beveridge curve. Empirically, Kugler and Saint-Paul (2000)
note that job creation and job creation costs helps to explain the functioning of
European and North American labor markets.
A recent research on labor market implications of foreign rms mainly interested
on the di¤erent job creation patterns of the rm. Empirically, foreign rms in Japan
have di¤erent job creation patterns as compared to domestic rms (Kiyota and Mat-
suura, 2006). Görg and Strobl (2005b) investigate the driving factors behind the
diverse employment performances of domestic and foreign plants in Ireland by ex-
amining job creation and job destruction rates. An econometric investigation reveals
9Evidence shows that MNEs o¤er more training to workers than do local rms and undertake
substantial e¤orts in the training of local workers (Chen, 1983; Gerschenberg, 1987; ILO, 1981;
and Lindsey, 1986). In fact, Fosfuri et al. (2001) note that MNEs can use a superior technology
in a foreign subsidiary only after training a local worker. Training also has costs and these costs
are those incurred not only for recruitment but until labor becomes of any use to the rm. Thus,
the cost of job generation is higher than that of the local rms, that is, they incur higher costs to
generate jobs.
10If the cost is incurred by the workers, that is, searching workers incur the search cost, then the
wage that rms need to pay the worker increases.
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that the net gain of the foreign sector in Irish manufacturing employment was due
to a slightly higher job creation rate.
Moreover, we also allow for on-the-job-search by skilled and unskilled workers
performing local and foreign jobs. Increased heterogeneity of posted vacancies, due
to the increased activities of foreign rms, encourages on-the-job-search. Better
matching opportunities arise to workers through on-the-job-search. As in Wolinsky
(1987), workers can commit to search when they realize that there are better partners
out there in the market place. Actually, employed workers search either because of a
deterioration of the satisfaction with their job or an improvement in outside options
(Krause and Lubik, 2006). In fact, this change in satisfaction could induce the
workers to voluntarily take a wage-cut while changing jobs, as noted by Postel-Vinay
and Robin (2002). Empirical evidence on the mobility of workers in an environment
with both local and MNEs states that foreign rms try to overcome their lack of
information about the local market by attracting experienced skilled and unskilled
workers currently performing local jobs. In turn, local rms may hire the workers
doing foreign jobs to benet from technological spillovers. For instance, Gerschenberg
(1987), Bloom (1992) and Pack (1993) nd evidence of labor movement from MNEs
to local rms in Kenya, South Korea and Taiwan, respectively. This evidence is
suggestive of the importance of allowing two-sided on-the-job search option in the
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theoretical analysis.
2.1.2 Matching
Suppose that there are vacancies posted by local and foreign rms looking for
skilled and unskilled workers. Workers and vacancies meet according to the matching
function q{ (:) and qs (:), which is increasing in the relevant amount of job seekers and
vacancies. Specically, the total number of matches between a worker and a rm is
determined by the standard Cobb-Douglas matching function,
q{ [vL + vF ; ul + e{L + e{F ] = (ul + e{L + e{F )
 (vL + vF )
1 
qs [vL + vF ; us + esL + esF ] = (us + esL + esF )
 (vL + vF )
1 
where vL denotes the mass of local vacancies and vF is the mass of foreign vacan-
cies; ul is the mass of unemployed unskilled workers; us is the mass of unemployed
skilled workers, e{L and esL stand for the number of unskilled and skilled workers
performing local jobs, e{F and esF are number of unskilled and skilled workers in the
foreign rm; and  corresponds to the elasticity of matching with respect to the mass
of job seekers. The number of unemployed workers in the host country is denoted
by u which is the sum of ul and us.
The labor market tightness for unskilled and skilled workers is represented by
{ =
vL+vF
ul+e{L+e{F
and s = vL+vFus+esL+esF , which is the ratio of total job vacancies to total
unskilled and skilled job seekers, respectively. In tight (slack) labor markets the pool
of job seekers shrinks (enlarges) and the degree of competition among rms intensies
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Figure 1: WorkersMobility
(lessens) (Russo et al., 2005; Burgess, 1993; and Blanchard and Diamond, 1994). In
summary, an increase in { or s implies increased job market tightness; which is
from the perspective of the employer. Accordingly, the rate at which rms meet an
unskilled job seeker is equal to q{ ({) = q{(1; 1{ ) = 
 
{ and the matching rate at
which rms meet a skilled worker is equal to qs (s) = qs(1; 1s ) = 
 
s while the rate
at which unskilled and skilled workers meet a vacant job is equal to {q{ ({) = 
1 
{
and sqs (s) = 
1 
s , respectively. Given the properties of the matching function, the
matching rate of rms q{ ({) and qs (s) is decreasing in { and s, that is, q
0
{ ({)  0
and q
0
s (s)  0, while the matching rate of workers {q{ ({) and sqs (s) is increasing
in { and s, respectively. In tight labor markets, the matching rate of rms decreases
while the matching rate of workers increases. It is also convenient to dene a variable


 = vL
vL+vF

, which represents the share of local vacancies in total vacancies.
Figure 1 illustrates the labor market mobilityfrom unemployment to employ-
ment, from job to job and back to unemployment. That is, unemployed unskilled and
skilled workers move into local and foreign rms and workers in local and foreign
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rms may fall into the unemployment pool and the workers in the local (foreign)
rms may switch into the foreign (local) rms. The steady state conditions require
that the ows into and out of unemployment for both types of workers be equal.
Accordingly, the steady state conditions are given as follows:
1 { u{ =  (  u{) (2)
1 s us =  (1    us) (3)
where equation (1) reects the ow conditions for the unskilled labor. That is, a ow
1 { of unskilled unemployed workers nd employment in rms, which equals to the
ow of unskilled workers into unemployment due to the job destruction,  (  u{).
Similarly, the latter equation, equation (2), is the ow condition for the skilled
workers. The same ow conditions for the movement in and out of the local and
foreign rms are depicted in equations (3) through (6).
1 {  (u{ + e{F ) =
 
 + 1 { (1  )

e{L (4)
1 { (1  ) (u{ + e{L) =
 
 + 1 { 

e{F (5)
Since we allow for on-the-job-search for both workers in the local and foreign
rms, we have equations for local and foreign rms stating that in the steady
state the ow of unskilled workers into local rms, 1 {  (u{ + e{F ) is equal to
the ow of unskilled workers out of local rm,
 
 + 1 { (1  )

e{L. The ow
1 { (1  ) (u{ + e{L) of currently employed unskilled workers into the foreign rm
equals the ow out of foreign rms,
 
 + 1 { 

e{F . The same is valid for the skilled
workers, which are captured in equations (5) and (6).
1 s  (us + esF ) =
 
 + 1 s (1  )

esL (6)
1 s (1  ) (us + esL) =
 
 + 1 s 

esF (7)
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2.1.3 Bargaining and Wages
The Nash wage bargaining model is widely used in matching models of the labor
market (Albrecht and Vroman, 2002; Dolado et al., 2003; Gautier, 2002; Pissarides,
2000 and Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999). As such, the wage is determined by using
the Nash bargaining framework. When a worker and rm meet, the wage is set in
accordance with the Nash bargaining solution; that is, workers explicitly negogiate
over wages with their employers. Wage o¤ers are treated as endogenous outcomes
of job movement decisions made by the workers and rms, who populate the models
(Mortensen and Pissarides, 1999).
In equilibrium, we consider four types of matching: skilled workers in foreign and
local jobs and unskilled workers in local and foreign jobs, respectively. The surplus
of the match between rms and workers is shared according to the asymmetric Nash
bargaining solution. The surplus of a match, S (i; j), between a job of type i (= L; F )
and a worker of type j (= l; s) is given as follows:
S (i; j) =W (i; j) + J (i; j)  V (i)  U (j)
where W (i; j) denotes the value of employment for a worker of type j in a job of
type i, J (i; j) is the value for the rm of lling a job of type i by a worker of type
j, V (i) is the value of the vacant job and U (j) denotes the value of unemployment.
Matches are consumated whenever the joint surplus S (i; j) is nonnegative, that is,
W (i; j) + J (i; j)  V (i) + U (j)
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When a match is formed, the wage wij is given by the Nash bargaining condition
W (i; j)  U (j) =  [W (i; j) + J (i; j)  V (i)  U (j)] (8)
where  2 (0; 1) is the exogenous surplus share of workers11.
2.1.4 Asset Values
We next develop expressions for the various value functions. In doing this, let r
denote the discount rate, which is assumed to be the same for both individuals and
rms.
Workers
The asset value of an unskilled unemployed worker, U (l), satises
rU (l) = b+ 1 {  (W (L; l)  U (l)) + 1 { (1  ) (W (F; l)  U (l)) (9)
where the rst term on the right hand side is the unemployment benet, b, and the
second term refers to the change in the value of unskilled unemployed worker when
(s)he becomes employed in the local rm. The third term is the value gained by
being employed in the foreign rm.
Similarly, given the assumption that skilled workers accept both types of jobs,
local and foreign, the asset value of unemployed skilled workers, U (s), veries
11 reects the bargaining power of workers.
21
rU (s) = b+ 1 s  (W (L; s)  U (s)) + 1 s (1  ) (W (F; s)  U (s)) (10)
The second and third terms in equation (9) denote the change in the value of skilled
worker if (s)he is employed in local and foreign rms, respectively.
The value of an unskilled worker employed in local and foreign rms satises the
following equations
rW (L; l) = wLl +  (U (l) W (L; l)) + 1 { (1  ) (W (F; l) W (L; l)) (11)
rW (F; l) = wFl +  (U (l) W (F; l)) + 1 {  (W (L; l) W (F; l)) (12)
where the rst terms in equations (10) and (11) are the unskilled workerswage in
the local and foreign rms, respectively, and the second terms are the value loss
of becoming unemployed, and the third terms are the expected return from being
successful in on-the-job search for unskilled workers.
The asset values of skilled workers in local and foreign rms, respectively, verify
the following conditions:
rW (L; s) = wLs +  (U (s) W (L; s)) + 1 s (1  ) (W (F; s) W (L; s)) (13)
rW (F; s) = wFs +  (U (s) W (F; s)) + 1 s  (W (L; s) W (F; s)) (14)
where wLs and w
F
s denote the skilled workerswage in the local and foreign rms,
respectively and the second terms are the value loss of becoming unemployed, and
the last terms correspond to the expected return for the skilled workers from being
successful in on-the-job search.
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Firms
The values of local and foreign vacancies are given, respectively, by
rV (L) =  cL +  { A (J (L; l)  V (L)) +  s B (J (L; s)  V (L)) (15)
rV (F ) =  cF +  { C (J (F; l)  V (F )) +  s D (J (F; s)  V (F )) (16)
where A

= ul+e{F
ul+e{L+e{F

stands for the share of unskilled workers applying for a local
job in the total job seekers, B

= us+esF
us+esL+esF

stands for the share of skilled workers
applying for local job in the total job seekers, C

= ul+e{L
ul+e{L+e{F

andD

= us+esL
us+esL+esF

are the share of unskilled and skilled workers applying for a foreign job in the total
job seekers, respectively. Values, given in equations (14) and (15), of local and foreign
vacancies reect the assumption that both worker types are capable of performing
the local and foreign jobs, but the value of lling the local or a foreign job with
a skilled or an unskilled worker di¤ers. A rm who posts a vacancy must pay a
recruitment cost of ci, where i = L; F . Given free entry, all prot opportunities from
posting vacancies are exploited, hence, in equilibrium, V (L) = V (F ) = 0:
The values to the rm of lling these vacancies with unskilled and skilled workers
verify
rJ (L; l) = yLl   wLl +
 
 + 1 { (1  )

(V (L)  J (L; l)) (17)
rJ (F; l) = yFl   wFl +
 
 + 1 { 

(V (F )  J (F; l)) (18)
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rJ (L; s) = yLs   wLs +
 
 + 1 s (1  )

(V (L)  J (L; s)) (19)
rJ (F; s) = yFs   wFs +
 
 + 1 s 

(V (F )  J (F; s)) (20)
where the terms, yLl  wLl , yFl  wFl , yLs  wLs and yFs  wFs represent the output of
a worker minus the wage paid to the worker. The last term in each equation captures
the value loss in case of exogenous job destruction or transferring into local/foreign
rms.
Next, we concentrate on the steady state equilibrium which satises the following
conditions:
1. Match formation is mutually advantageous relative to the alternative of con-
tinuing search. In other words, the workersand rmschoices constitute a
Nash equilibrium in the sense that they are value maximizing, taking as given
the actions of the other agents (Albrecht and Vroman, 2002).
2. Firm vacancy creation satises zero value conditions. That is, the values of
maintaining local and foreign vacancies are zero in the steady state.
3. The appropriate steady state labor market ow conditions are satised. That
is, ow into and out of unemployment, local and foreign rms will be equal,
respectively. In addition, the share of local vacancies in total vacancies, ,
should fall within the range [0; 1] and labor market tightness should satisfy
{ > 0, s > 0.
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2.2 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is determined by two job creation conditions, plus, steady state con-
ditions equalizing the ows into and out of unemployment, local and foreign rms,
for both types of workers are satised. Given exogenous variables that capture the
productivity of labor
 
yij

, the bargaining and matching environment (; ), the job
destruction rate () and job creation costs (cL; cF ), the share of unskilled workers in
total population () and the interest rate (r), we will solve for the mass of vacancies,
vL and vF ; wages, i.e. wLl , w
F
l , w
L
s and w
F
s ; the labor market tightness { and s;
and unemployment rates; u{ and us.
Recall equations (1) and (2) captured the ow conditions of workers. We can
solve for the unemployment rate of unskilled and skilled workers, u{ and us, as a
function of labor market tightness ({) and (s), and the exogenous variables,  and
. This yields
u{ =
 
 + 1 {
 (21)
us =
 (1  ) 
 + 1 s
 (22)
The unemployment rate of skilled workers us
1  =

(+1 s )
and unskilled workers
ul

= 
(+1 { )
are derived by re-arranging the terms in equations (20) and (21).
Given  and , unemployment rate of skilled workers is decreasing in the labor
market tightness of the skilled workers, s, while the unemployment rate of unskilled
workers is decreasing in the labor market tightness of the unskilled workers {.
Since equilibrium requires that V (L) = 0 and V (F ) = 0, equations (14) and
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(15) could be written as follows
cL
 {
= A

yLl   wL{
r +  + 1 { (1  )

+


1  
 
B

yLs   wLs
r +  + 1 s (1  )

(23)
cF
 {
= C

yFl   wF{
r +  + 1 { 

+


1  
 
D

yFs   wFs
r +  + 1 s 

(24)
The total amount of vacancies and their allocation across markets are determined
by these conditions given above. Actually equations (22) and (23) are dened as job
creation conditions. These conditions equate the benet to the rm of lling vacant
positions with the suitable candidate and the cost of opening vacancies. In other
words, both equations relate the expected cost of a posted vacancy to the expected
benet of a lled job. For instance, if the left hand side of either equation is smaller
than the right hand side, then entry to labor market by opening a vacant position is
protable, so that the number of vacancies posted increases. This leads to a rise in
the labor market tightness of unskilled and skilled workers until the benets of job
creation are consumed.
2.2.1 Wages
A Nash bargaining approach to wage setting is used to derive equilibrium wages.
Substituting (8), (10), (14), (16) into (7) and imposing the free-entry condition for
local vacancies, V (L) = 0, we obtain the wage rate from matching of an unskilled
worker with a local rm:
wL{ = $
L
{bb+$
L
{yy
L
{ (25)
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Figure 2: Unskilled workerswage in the local rm
where$L{b =
(1 )(r++1 { (1 ))
r++1 { (1 +) and$
L
{y =
(r++1 { )
r++1 { (1 +) , are the weights attached
to the unemployment benet and labor productivity, respectively. The wage of
unskilled workersemployed in the local rm is determined by the weighted average
of the unemployment benet, b and the output of unskilled worker in the local
rm, yLl . Particularly, w
L
{ depends on the bargaining power of workers, , share of
local vacancies,  and the labor market tightness of the unskilled workers, {. Figure
2 presents wL{ as a function of { and . It is clear that unskilled wages in the local
rm increase as the share of local vacancies rises in total, but falls as the share of
foreign rms in total vacancies increases. Although we plot wages against , we are
aware that  is endogenous, so in the numerical exercises we will look into a change
in the exogenous parameters, i.e. the cost of opening local and foreign vacancies, cL
and cF on . Here, for simplicity, we ignore the reason behind the change in , and
indirectly on the wages.
Substituting (8), (11), (15), (17) into (7) and imposing the free-entry condition
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for foreign vacancies, V (F ) = 0, we obtain the wage from a matching of an unskilled
worker with a foreign rm:
wF{ = $
F
{bb+$
F
{yy
F
{ (26)
where $F{b =
(1 )(r++1 { )
r++1 { (+ ) and $
F
{y =
(r++1 { )
r++1 { (+ ) are the weights attached
to unemployment benet and labor productivity, respectively. Similarly, the wage
of unskilled workersworking in the foreign rm is determined by the weighted av-
erage of unemployment benet, b and the output of unskilled worker in the foreign
rm, yFl . Specically, bargaining power of workers, , the share of local vacancies, 
and the labor market tightness of the unskilled workers, {, play a vital role in the
determination of unskilled workerswage in foreign rm. As pointed out in Figure
3, wF{ , as a function of { and , increases as the share of foreign vacancies rises.
Figure 3: Unskilled workerswage in the foreign rm
Substituting (9), (12), (14), (18) into (7) and imposing the free-entry condition for
local vacancies, V (L) = 0, we obtain the wage of a skilled worker in the local rm,
which is given as follows
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Figure 4: Skilled workerswage in the local rm
wLs = $
L
sbb+$
L
syy
L
s (27)
where$Lsb =
(1 )(r++1 s (1 ))
r++1 s (1 +) and$
L
sy =
(r++1 s )
r++1 s (1 +) are the weights attached
to unemployment benet and labor productivity, respectively. Skilled workerswage
in the local rm mainly depends on the share of local and foreign vacancies, bargain-
ing power of workers and the labor market tightness of the skilled worker. Figure 4
presents wLs as a function of s and . It is clear that wages of the skilled workers in
the local rm increase as the share of local vacancies rises, but falls as the share of
foreign rms in total vacancies increase.
Substituting (9), (13), (15), (19) into (7) and imposing the free-entry condition
for foreign vacancies, V (F ) = 0, yields a wage of a skilled worker in the foreign rm,
which is expressed as follows:
wFs = $
F
sbb+$
F
syy
F
s (28)
where$Fsb =
(1 )(r++1 s )
r++1 s (+ ) and$
F
sy =
(r++1 s )
r++1 s (+ ) are the weights attached to
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unemployment benet and labor productivity, respectively. Skilled workerswage in
foreign rm depends on the share of local vacancies, , bargaining power of workers,
, unemployment benet, b and the ow output of skilled worker in foreign rm, yFs .
Figure 5 shows that wFs increases as foreign rms provide more job opportunities.
In the essence of equations (24)-(27), the mass of local and foreign vacancies and
the productivity of workers play a vital role in the wage determination. Actually,
wages of both unskilled and skilled workers in the local and foreign rms depend on
labor market tightness, share of local (foreign) vacancies and the bargaining power
of the workers, but to a di¤erent extent. This is due to the fact that the values to
the rms of lling those vacancies with the suitable worker depends on the mass of
vacancies created by the rms and the productivity of workers, which di¤ers across
workers and rms.
Given its central role in wage-determination it is important to identify factors
that a¤ect the mass of vacancies created by both types of rms. The mass of vacan-
cies created by local and foreign rms are determined by the job creation conditions,
which are obtained by substituting wage equations given in (24)-(27) into the equi-
librium conditions given in (22)-(23):
cL =
(1  )

u{+e{F


 {

yL{  b
r++1 { (1 +)

+
(1  ) (s={)  (us+esF1  ) y
L
s  b
r++1 s (1 +)
(29)
cF =
(1  )

u{+e{L


 {

yF{  b
r++1 { (+ )

+
(1  ) (s={)  (us+esL1  )

yFs  b
r++1 s (+ )
 (30)
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Figure 5: Skilled workerswage in the foreign rm
Job creation conditions for foreign and local rms di¤er according to the costs of
creating new jobs and productivities of the workers and this gives rise to equilibrium
wage di¤erentials in the presence of labor market frictions. Equations (28) and (29)
can infact be rewritten as two equations with two unknowns, vF and vL, since both
js and  are function of vF and vL, as are uj and eij.
2.2.2 Explaining the Relative Weights and Absolute Wages
In summary, wages of the skilled and unskilled workers in the local and foreign
rms, equations (24)-(27), are a weighted average of the workers reservation value
(or unemployment benet), b, which is treated as a constant and the output in the
current match. To understand the overall story behind the wage determination and
to realize the e¤ect of the entry of foreign rm (by creating vacancies) on wages, the
corresponding weights for unemployment benet
 
$L{b; $
F
{b; $
L
sb; $
F
sb

and the output
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produced by the match between a worker and a rm
 
$L{y; $
F
{y; $
L
sy; $
F
sy

need to be
examined. Weights of unemployment benet and the output in determining local
and foreign wages depend on the bargaining power of the workers12 and the mass
of local and foreign vacancies, which are captured in the labor market tightness
measures (L; F ) and the share of local vacancies (). Most importantly, the mass
of vacant positions o¤ered by local and foreign rms play a key role in explaining
wage di¤erentials. Also, wage di¤erentials arise since we assumed an asymmetric
technologythe output from a match between a worker and a local job is not the
same as the output that would result from a match between a worker and a foreign
job. Furthermore, the share of unskilled and skilled workers in the population and
the job creation costs also play an important role in the wage gap between unskilled
and skilled workers both in the local and foreign rms through their e¤ect on vacancy
creation. In fact, if one were able to analytically solve the model, the wages would be
found to be pure functions of the cost of job creation and the respective productivities
of workers, i.e. both exogenous factors.
The bargaining power of the workers raises the weight of the respective labor
productivity, while decreasing the weight assigned to the unemployment benet. As
workers become more powerful in the negotiation process, the e¤ect of the return to
unemployment on wages will be marginal since workers are willing to end up with
higher wages. Particularly, they are likely to widen the gap between unemployment
benet and the wage by demanding higher wages in the bargaining process. On
12Bargaining power of workers has an important role in wage determination. Thus, one also
needs to devote a special attention to bargaining power of workers.
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the other hand, due to an increase in the bargaining power of the workers, the link
between output and the wages will be stronger. That is, the weight of the output
produced by a worker tends to increase as workers become more powerful in the
bargaining process. Within this set up, it is clear that better bargaining position of
the workers puts an upward pressure on wages, i.e.
d$Lsb
d
< 0,
d$Lsy
d
> 0;
d$Fsb
d
< 0,
d$Fsy
d
> 0 and therefore
dwL{
d
> 0; dw
L
s
d
> 0; dw
F
{
d
> 0; dw
F
s
d
> 0.
The mass of vacancies created by local and foreign rms play a major role in wage
determination. Actually, job creation acts a source of competition between local and
foreign rms. Once rms o¤er job opportunities, they try to pay more than the
average wage level to ll that position with the appropriate worker. Also, a rise in
job opportunities increases labor market tightness, that is, it makes it di¢ cult for the
rms to ll the job while job seekers are better o¤ due to the new vacant positions in
the rms. In our model, since we allow for on-the-job-search in both local and foreign
rms, vacant positions created by foreign (local) rms also have an important impact
on the local (foreign) wages. In this context, it becomes clear that wage di¤erentials
between local and foreign rms are extensively dependent upon the job creation by
both rms, where job creation is strictly linked to available technologies to the rms
and the cost of creating vacant positions. Below, we analyze the e¤ect of increased
foreign (local) rm activity through provision of new job opportunities on absolute
wages. An increase in the mass of local vacancies raises the wages of both skilled
and unskilled labor in the local rm. This could be explained by the fact that as the
33
value of lling the vacant positions increases, local rms are willing to pay more to
ll the position 13.
The relative weights assigned to the unemployment benet and the output of
the match are extensively inuenced from new job opportunities o¤ered by local
and foreign rms. Particularly, since the probability of being matched with a local
rm increases for the unemployed workers, the weight assigned to the return to
unemployment decreases, thus the e¤ect of unemployment benet on local wages
is likely to become weaker in this case. An increase in the mass of local vacancies
strengthens the weight assigned to output produced by the worker in the local rm
and this puts an upward pressures on local wages. Moreover, the new positions
o¤ered by local rms decrease the wages in the foreign rm since they improve the
outside option value of workers, that is, the probability of being successful in the on-
the-job-search increases for the workers employed in the foreign rm. In other words,
foreign rms anticipate that workers will quit job whenever local rms start to post
new vacancies, so they tend to pay less14. Contrary to the case of wages paid by local
rms, in this case, the weight of the unemployment benet increased due to a rise
in the local job opportunities. In this context, the e¤ect of unemployment benet
on wages, which is positive, will be more powerful. On the other hand, the weight
of the output produced in the foreign rm is likely to decline in response to a rise in
13As the mass of vacancies increase, rms pay more than they need to in order to ll that position.
Following the Carmichael (1990), this is due to the fact that a higher wage attracts applicants of
higher quality- the selection theory.
14In the search literature, wage is a function of the outside option of the workers, where the outside
option of the workers depends on the mass of vacancies posted by an other rm. Thus, increased
likelihood of leaving the rm requires workers to accept lower wage and since rms anticipate their
higher quit rate, reducing the match surplus, they tend to pay less (See Gautier, 2002 and Krause
and Lubik, 2006).
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the local job opportunities. The extent of the e¤ect of output on foreign wages will
become negligible as the number of vacancies o¤ered by local rms increase. Thus,
we end up with two opposite e¤ects on the wage of the workers, that is, a rise in
local job opportunities tends to raise the wage of local workers, while reducing the
wage of the workers in the foreign rm.
d$Lsb
dvl
< 0,
d$Lsy
dvl
> 0;
d$Fsb
dvl
> 0,
d$Fsy
dvl
< 0 and therefore
dwL{
dvl
> 0; dw
L
s
dvl
> 0; dw
F
{
dvl
< 0; dw
F
s
dvl
< 0
Earnings of the workers in the foreign rm increase due to the job opportunities
created by the foreign rm since they have to pay enough to ll those vacant positions.
Also, as more foreign vacancies are posted, the matching rates of workers increases
and the increased availability of foreign jobs decrease the weight assigned to the
unemployment benet. In addition, the weight of the output produced by the worker
in the foreign rm increases due to an increase in foreign job creation, and therefore
the impact of productivity of workers in a foreign rm on wages will be more powerful.
On the other hand, new job opportunities created by the foreign rm increases
the outside option of unemployed and employed workers. Thus, since local rms
anticipate that workersprobability of being successful in on-the-job search increases,
which reduces the match surplus, they tend to pay less for the workers. In this
context, the e¤ect of unemployment benets on local wages, which is positive, will be
more powerful, due to a rise in the foreign job opportunities. Unemployed workers
can accept the local job since they know that they are allowed to change their
employee if the foreign rm o¤ers new positions. Also, the weight assigned to output
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produced from a match between a local rm and a worker decreases, this makes the
e¤ect of productivity on wages negligible since local rms anticipate that the worker
may benet from the foreign job opportunities. In short, wages of the local workers
decrease while the earnings of the workers of the foreign rm increase due to the
increased foreign rm activity which is captured by foreign job creation.
d$Lsb
dvf
> 0,
d$Lsy
dvf
< 0;
d$Fsb
dvf
< 0,
d$Fsy
dvf
> 0 and therefore
dwL{
dvf
< 0; dw
L
s
dvf
< 0; dw
F
{
dvf
> 0; dw
F
s
dvf
> 0
Within this framework, wage di¤erentials arise mainly due to the job distribu-
tion. If the mass of local (foreign) vacancies increase, the wages of both unskilled
and skilled workers are likely to rise in local (foreign) rms, but new jobs available
in foreign (local) rms reduce the wages of both workers in the local (foreign) rm.
Briey, as in Krause and Lubik (2006), uctuations in vacancies o¤ered by local and
foreign rms become a key component in explaining labor market dynamics, partic-
ularly, wage di¤erentials. In addition, however, productivity di¤erentials across rms
play a basic role in explaining wage dispersion and the extent of creation of vacant
positions. In this regard, we are in the line with the literature in which a vast amount
of studies note that higher wages paid by MNEs is largely attributable to productiv-
ity di¤erences. On the other hand, we are able to show that wage di¤erentials arise
in part due to the on-the-job-search. That is, as the likelihood of nding a foreign
job increases (the number of vacancies posted by foreign rms increase), wages paid
to the workers in the local rm decreases since the increased likelihood of leaving
the rm requires workers to accept a lower wage as a compensating di¤erential for
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workers.
Determination of the absolute wages paid to both the skilled and unskilled labor
by both the local and foreign rms allows a discussion regarding the skill as well as
rm premia. Skill premium in local and foreign rms is captured by (wLs =w
L
{ ) and
(wFs =w
F
{ ) and rm premium for the skilled and unskilled labor, which stands for the
wage gap between foreign and local rms are denoted by (wFs =w
L
s ) and (w
F
{ =w
L
{ ),
respectively. The rst insight in this framework allows a discussion regarding the
extent of rm premia in wages. We are able to discuss whether the foreign rm
premia is greater than one; i.e. whether foreign rm always pay more than local
rms for a skilled or unskilled labor. This leads to proposition 1.
Proposition 1 Skilled (unskilled) workers in the foreign rm are not always paid
more than skilled (unskilled) workers in local rm. The rm premium depends on
the mass of vacancies created by the rms and the labor productivity.15
Proof. Skilled and unskilled workers in foreign rms may earn more than that of
the local rms, that is, w
F
s
wLs
> 1 and w
F
{
wL{
> 1 depending on the labor market frictions,
in terms of posted vacancies, and the productivity of the workers in di¤erent rms.
(1 )(r++1 s )b+(r++1 s )yFs
(r++1 s (+ ))
T (1 )(r++
1 
s (1 ))b+(r++1 s )yLs
(r++1 s (1 +))
(1  ) 1 s (2   1) b+
 
r +  + 1 s (1   + )

yFs   
r +  + 1 s ( +    )

yLs T 0
Since yFs > y
L
s , it is clear that the second term in the above inequality is positive
and the sign of the rst term is determined by the share of vacancies created by the
15Here, we provide the proof for skilled workers, the one for unskilled workers could be easily
replicated.
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rms. Clearly, if the productivity gap between foreign and local rms is su¢ ciently
large, foreign rms end up with higher wages even when labor market imperfections
are taken into account.
In the empirical literature, it is argued that foreign rms pay more since the
they are more productive than local rms (Aitken et al., 1996; Feenstra and Hanson
1996; Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2002; and Ruane and U¼gur, 2002). Furthermore, these
studies also point out that MNEs pay more to minimize labor mobility and to attract
better workers. While these stylized facts are supported by our model, we are able to
show the range of conditions that could alter the foreign rm premium. Specically,
we show that if the productivity gap is negligible, foreign rms do not pay more
than local rms. In this framework, the wage gap between local and foreign rms
also depends on the allocation of vacancies created by the rms, which are implicitly
determined by the job creation conditions. This is in line with Matsuoka (2001), who
argues that wage di¤erentials between foreign and local rms should be explained
by labor market imperfections.
Determination of the absolute wages also allows discussion of both the economy-
wide skill premium and rm premium. It furthermore allows a discussion of within
rm and within skilled/unskilled labor-groups relative wages. While the model sug-
gests that the two factors mainly contributing to the evolution of wages upon the
entry of foreign rm or domestic rm are the imperfections in the local labor mar-
ket and the relative labor productivity of the foreign and local rms, we can not
analytically show the e¤ect of foreign (local) vacancies on alternative relative wages.
The literature denotes relative wages as the gap between skilled and unskilled
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Figure 6: Skill Premium
wages. Here, the model allows us to examine the wages both within rm and between
rm. W sp represents the overall skill premium which is calculated as the ratio of the
weighted average of skilled workerswage in the foreign and local rms to unskilled
workerswage in the local and foreign rms whereasW fp is the overall rm premium
which is calculated as the ratio of weighted average of wages paid by the foreign
rm to wages paid by the local rm. Since the signs of the derivatives of skill
premium and rm premium with respect to local and foreign vacancies is ambiguous,
numerical solution is needed to see the e¤ects of increased foreign rm activities on
these relative wages. Accordingly, we study the absolute and relative wage e¤ects of
increased foreign rm activities in detail by providing a numerical example. In the
next section, that is the numerical example, it will also be possible to see the e¤ects
of change in the productivity levels and job creation cost and on both absolute and
relative wages.
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Figure 7: Firm Premium
2.3 Numerical Example
In this section, we provide a numerical example to illustrate the properties of the
model. Numerical example allows us to capture e¤ects of an exogenous increase in
the cost of job creation on the extent of foreign rm activity in the local economy, and
in turn its e¤ects on absolute and relative wages, and unemployment. It furthermore
allows a discussion of the relationship between skill upgrading and technological
progress and absolute and relative wages, and unemployment. The example uses
the matching function, q ({) = 
 
{ and q (s) = 
 
s together with the baseline
parameter values, r = 0:05,  = 0:5,  = 0:1, b = 0:1, cL = 0:5, cF = 0:7,  = 0:8,
 = 0:5, yFs = 1:9, y
L
s = 1:7, y
F
{ = 1:5, y
L
l = 1:3. All these parameter values
are reasonable and in line with the other studies including Albrecht and Vroman
(2002), Gautier (2002) and Dolado et al. (2003). In the baseline example, the share
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of unskilled workers in the population, , is assumed to compose the 80 percent of
the total population and the productivity gap between foreign and local rms,
yFj
yLj
is assumed to be 10% 16Also, skilled and unskilled workers in the foreign rm are
more productive than the ones in local rm and skilled workers are more productive
than the unskilled workers (Caves, 1996; Conyon et al., 2002; Dunning, 1993; Doms
and Jensen, 1998; and Fosfuri et al., 2001). The interest rate is 5 percent and job
destruction rate is 0:1. It seems reasonable to assume that foreign jobs are more
costly to create than local jobs, where cL = 0:5 and cF = 0:7 (Carlson et al, 2006;
Faggio and Koning, 2001; Fonseca, 2001; Hammermesh, 1993; Russo et al., 2005;
and Vanhala, 2004). The unemployment benet level is set at 0:1. Under this choice
of parameters, Table 2 presents the baseline solutions.
2.3.1. Benchmark case
<Insert Table 2>
The examination of the baseline solution shows that the share of foreign vacancies
is 42% of the total vacancies. The unemployment rate of unskilled workers and
skilled workers are 9:6% and 5%, respectively and the overall unemployment rate is
8%. The wage of skilled (unskilled) workers in the local rm is lower than the skilled
(unskilled) workers wage in the foreign rm. Unskilled workers get paid less than
skilled workers both in the local and foreign rms. Table 2 shows that the wage
gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the local rm is higher than the wage
16The productivity gap between foreign rm and local rm uctuates between 10% to 100%.
(Aitken and Harrison, 1998; Karpaty, 2005, Doms and Jensen, 1998; Kimura and Kiyota, 2004;
Conyon et al., 2002 and Davies and Lyons, 1991)
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gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the foreign rm. In other words, the
skill premium in the local rm is higher than the skill premium in the foreign rm.
Results also show that rm premium of unskilled workers is higher than that of the
skilled workers. While these within-group relative values allow for identication of
important di¤erences between labor-types and rms, it is important to talk about an
overall skill and rm premium. The benchmark ndings suggest that economy-wide
skill premium is more than the overall rm premium. One should also note that, at
these parameter values, we nd that the rm premium is greater than one17.
< Insert Table 3 >
2.3.2 Changes in the Cost Structure
Job creation costs play a vital role in explaining wage dynamics and unemploy-
ment. Actually, governments lower job creation costs to encourage foreign rm entry
and to benet from increased foreign rm activity. However, while in some cases,
government could lower the costs for both local and foreign rms, in other cases, the
reduction in costs only applies to foreign rms. We undertake exercises regarding
both possibilities. Results presented in Table 3 study the latter public policy envi-
ronment where only the costs incurred by the foreign rm are altered, while results
in Table 4 show the former case where a symmetric cost change occurs for both the
local and foreign rms.
17The higher wages o¤ered by rms also devoted to the e¢ ciency wage argument. The e¢ ciency
wage hypothesis argues that wages are not only determined by supply and demand, but also, rms
may pay more than the market-clearing wage to increase productivity or e¢ ciency.
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Panel A and panel B in Table 4 shows the e¤ects of an exogenous decrease in the
job creation cost of foreign rms on vacancy creation and relative wages, keeping the
cost incurred by the local rm constant. As the job creation cost of foreign rms
falls, the cost gap between local and foreign rms melt down and this stimulates
foreign job creation leading to changes in wages paid by the foreign rm and the
local rm.18
The skill premium in the local rm decreases from 1:33 to 1:31 and the skill
premium in the foreign rm increases from 1:26 to 1:28, when the foreign job creation
costs fall from 0:9 to 0:5. While the skill premium within rms move in opposite
directions, the increase in foreign presence by 160% (from 0.18 to 0.47) leads to a
6% fall in the economy-wide skill premium.
The premium of working for a foreign rm increases for both skilled and unskilled
workers and the economy-wide rm premium rises from 0:94 to 1:21 in response
to increased foreign rm presence. This phenomenon could be explained by the
fact that as foreign rms o¤er more vacant positions, the outside options of the
workers performing local jobs increases, decreasing the value of lling local jobs
with a suitable worker, thereby reducing all wages paid by the local rm. In this
context, foreign rms pay more to attract skilled and unskilled workers from both
the unemployment pool and the local rms since lling new vacant positions will
increase the value of lling a foreign job with suitable workers. Briey, as the cost
di¤erential for creating foreign and local jobs becomes lower, the wage gap between
18Note that the reduction in costs are by increment of 01, which one could easily convert into
those in %.
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skilled and unskilled workers in the local rm falls and the premium of working in a
foreign rm increases. The overall skill premium tends to decrease in response to the
fall in the cost of job creation in the foreign rm. The results also show supporting
evidence for proposition 1. At levels of foreign vacancy job creation cost that exceeds
0.7, the foreign rm pays less than the local rm, i.e. the rm premium is less than 1
for both skilled and unskilled labor, as well as economy-wide. This is reversed when
the foreign job creation cost falls to and below 0.7. One should keep in mind that
the threshold level we nd foreign job creation cost, 0.7, depends on the parameter
values. However, regardless of the parameter values the results show support for
proposition 1, which suggests that the labor market conditions (costs of vacancy
creation and productivity di¤erentials) determine the size of the wage premia.
Panel C in Table 3 shows the e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the share of
foreign rm vacancies on unemployment. Increased availability of foreign vacancies
decreases the unemployment rate of unskilled workers from 10% to 8% and the
skilled workers from 5% to 4%. Overall unemployment rate decreases from 9% to
7% following the new job opportunities, particularly, in response to 160% increase in
the mass of foreign vacancies. This result is suggestive that the increased presence
of foreign rms could indeed contribute to reducing unemployment rates for both
unskilled and skilled workers, under certain conditions.
<Insert Table 4>
We next study a change in job creation cost with no change in the playing eld,
i.e. no special treatment to foreign rms. Table 4 shows the e¤ects of an exogenous
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decrease in the job creation cost of both foreign and local vacancies. When the job
creation costs of foreign and local rms fall by the same absolute amount and the
cost gap between local and foreign rms stays same, the share of foreign vacancies
in total vacancies does not increase, it even decreases. In this case, the share of local
vacancies tends to increase leading to a rise in local and a fall in the foreign rm
wages paid. If the cost of job creation in local and foreign rms becomes 0.3 and
0.5, respectively, then the share of local vacancies form 65% of the total and thereby,
local rms start to pay more than foreign rms. Once again, this is in line with
propositon 1 noting that foreign rms do not always pay more as the wage di¤erence
between local and foreign rms depends on the job opportunities provided by local
and foreign rms, which are extensively determined by the cost of job creation and
productivity of workers.
As opposed to the ndings where the playing eld was changed, such that the
costs of foreign rms were reduced keeping those of local rm constant, the skill
premium in the local rm increases from 1:32 to 1:33 and the skill premium in
the foreign rm decreases from 1:27 to 1:25 in response to the fall in the cost of
job creation in both rms. Overall, this leads to a rise in the economy-wide skill
premium.
As the share of local vacancies in total vacancies rises, the premium of working
for a foreign rm decreases for both skilled and unskilled workers, and the economy
wide rm premium falls due the reduction of job creation costs for both local and
foreign rms. One should therefore note that labor market e¤ect of foreign rms,
particularly those on wages, are inuenced by the cost decision of the policy makers.
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If the cost gap between foreign and local rms are kept constant, than the skill
premium increases and rm premium decreases. On the contrary, when the cost
gap between foreign rm and local rm narrows, the skill premium falls and rm
premium rises.
Panel C in Table 4 shows the e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the share of
local rm vacancies due to the decrease in the job creation cost of both rms on
unemployment. The unemployment rate of unskilled workers decreases from 11% to
5% and the unemployment rate of skilled workers decreases from 5% to 3%. Overall
unemployment rate decreases from 10% to 5% following the new foreign and local
job opportunities, given both cL and cF decreases.
To sum up, it is clear that the numerical example results supports our theoretical
predictions that the response of the overall skill and rm premium as well as the
response of the absolute wages to changes in the extent of labor market imperfec-
tions and foreign presence depends on several conditions in the market. Briey, this
experiment reveals that, the labor market imperfections and foreignersshare in the
labor market have important non-linear e¤ects on the wages of unskilled and skilled
workers 19.
In the above case, we examine the labor market implications of the change in the
cost structure of rms. An alternative way of interpreting those results would be
through imputations of elasticities of relative wages and unemployment rates.
In this respect, Table 6 presents these elasticities -calculated by the help of the
19Note that when we consider the case where the ratio of foreign and local job creations costs
are constant, there will be no change in the ndings of the model.
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Table 3- with respect to the cost of foreign job creation20. While the signs of the
elasticities suggest that increased foreign presence in the economy decreases the skill
premium and increases the rm premium, there are di¤erences in the direction of
impact on the within rm skill premia. Increased foreign presence decreases the skill
premium paid by local rms, while increasing the skill premium paid by foreign rms.
The foreign rm premium however changes in the same direction for both skilled and
unskilled labor. However, this table not only reiterates the results rearding the direc-
tion of changes but also allows for a discussion regarding the magnitude of changes.
The elasticity of skill premium is lower than the elasticity of foreign rm premium
with respect to the increased foreign rm activity. Particularly, a 60% increase in the
foreign vacant positions leads to a 1% decrease in the economy-wide skill premium,
while an 11% increase in the economy-wide rm premium. Furhermore, the mass of
foreign vacancies is highly elastic to the cost of foreign job creation. In other words,
foreign job generation is highly sensitive to the cost.
< Insert Table 6 >
2.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis
Absolute wages, skill premium and rm premium extensively depend on the rate
of vacany creation of the rms, which are inuenced directly by the job creation cost
and the labor productivity of the rms and indirectly by the skill endowment of the
20Elasticity is measured by the percentage change in vacancies (wages, unemployment) divided
by the percentage change in the cost of job creation.
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population. If their respective cost of job creation decreases, foreign rms increase
their activity by o¤ering various job opportunities for skilled and unskilled workers
and they pay more for skilled and unskilled workers than the domestic rm pays.
Yet, note that the productivity gap between local and foreign rms also play a crucial
role in explaining wage di¤erentials as mentioned in proposition 1. Therefore, we
next analyze the impact of a rise in the output gap between foreign and local rms
(which in part could be due to technological progress) and evaluate the e¤ect of the
consecutive decrease in job creation cost on absolute and relative wages when the
output of foreign job is su¢ ciently higher than that of the local job. Along the same
lines, we also test the sensitivity of the results to the skill endowment parameter.
< Insert Table 7 >
Technological Upgrading
Due to the technological upgrading, foreign rms become more productive, in-
creasing the gap between yFj and y
L
j . As the output gap between foreign and local
rms increases, foreign rms start to o¤er more positions for workers, hence, the
share of vacancies posted by foreign rms increase. While foreign jobs are relatively
scarce to start with, in particular, because the cost of opening foreign vacancies is
higher than the cost of opening local vacancies, the supply of foreign jobs exceeds
the local jobs due to the technological upgrading. In this context, in response to a
rise in the foreign job opportunities, wages of the local rm decrease and wages of
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the foreign rm increase (the results are compared to our benchmark case, where the
technology gap21 is given as 10%).
Here, we should also note that an increase in the share of foreign vacancies due to
the improvement in foreign rm technology puts an upward pressure on the overall
skill premium and rm premium. While an increase in the share of foreign job
o¤erings due to the technological progress (i.e., productivity advantage of the foreign
rm rises) lowers the skill premium in the local rm, it raises the skill premium in the
foreign rm. Actually, Panel B in the Table 7 reveals that technological progress in
the foreign rm increases the premium of working for a foreign rm for both unskilled
and skilled workers. This is due to the fact that an increase in the productivity
advantage of the foreign rms directly generates an increase in the foreign wages, in
particular for the skilled wages, but also its e¤ect on wages become more powerful
since it increases the jobs created by foreign rms.
According to Panel C in Table 7, overall unemployment decreases in response to
technological progress (technology gap increases from 10% to 25%). This could be
explained by the fact that the technological progress facilitates job creation and to
this end foreign rms provide new job opportunities.
< Insert Table 8 >
We re-examine the e¤ects of a fall in the job creation cost of foreign rms on
wages and unemployment by assuming the productivity gap between foreign and
local rms is su¢ ciently large (yFj =y
L
j = 2:00). As is shown in Panel A and Panel B
21yFj =y
L
j is technology gap, which is dened as the productivity advantage of the foreign rm.
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in Table 8, a decrease in the cost gap between local and foreign rms and increase
in the productivity gap between foreign and local rms makes it protable to create
foreign jobs and search for the appropriate candidates. Due to the decrease in the
cost gap and the improvement in technology not only are more jobs created, but
the job composition shifts towards more productive foreign jobs. As such both the
skill and rm premium tend to increase. In other words, an increase in the share
of foreign jobs due to the widened productivity di¤erentials and narrowed cost gap
puts an upward pressure on foreign wages and overall relative wages while lowering
the wages of the workers in the local rm. However, results presented in Table 3
where the
yFj
yLj
is assumed to be 10% suggest that a decrease in the job creation cost
of the foreign rm leads to a fall in the economy-wide skill premium and a rise in the
economy-wide rm premium. Further, when Panel C of Tables 3 and 8 are compared,
increased foreign presence, in response to a decline in the job creation cost, leads to a
decrease in the unemployment rates, both for the skilled and unskilled workers. But if
technological upgrading accompanies declining costs, the decrease in unemployment
rates will be higher than the case presented in Panel C of the Table 3.
Skill Upgrading
Given the baseline parameter values, we focus on the skill upgrading and the case
where the share of skilled workers increase from 20% to 40%, that is,  = 0:6. Table 9
presents the e¤ect of skill upgrading on vacancy creation, wages and unemployment.
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< Insert Table 9 >
When skilled work force constitutes 40% of the total population, the mass of local
and foreign vacancies record a signicant rise. According to the Panel B in Table
9, skill premium in the local rm fall from 1.32 to 1.30 and skill premium in the
foreign rm decrease slightly from 1.30 to 1.28 due to the skill upgrading when the
results are compared to the Table 2. Earnings of the skilled workers fall slightly in
the foreign and local rms. Also, both the skill and rm premium decreases due to
the skill upgrading. Acemoglu (1998) notes that skill upgrading decreases the skill
premium. He suggests that the rapid increase in the proportion of college graduates
in the United States may be the one of the reasons behind the decline in the college
premium during the 1970s. Panel C in Table 9 notes that while unemployment rate
for skilled workers increase and unemployment rate for unskilled workers decrease.
< Insert Table 10>
Table 10 examines the e¤ect of a decrease in the cost of foreign job creation
when one considers the skill upgrading. Given the share of skilled workers as 40 %
of the population, foreign rms create new job opportunities in response to a fall
in the foreign job creation cost. This leads to a decline in the economy-wide skill
premium and a rise in the economy-wide rm premium. Particularly, an increase in
the share of skilled workers does not change results presented in Table 3 as in the
case of technological upgrading, specically for the economy-wide skill premium and
rm premium. Particularly, Panel C in Table 10 shows that overall unemployment
rate decreases due to a fall in the cost gap between foreign and local rms. Further,
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when the Panel C of the Tables 3 and 10 are compared, increased foreign presence, in
response to a decline in the job creation cost, leads to a decrease in the unemployment
rates, both for the skilled and unskilled workers. But if skill upgrading accompanied
declining costs, the decrease in unemployment rate for the skilled workers will be
higher than the case presented in Panel C of the Table 3. Table 8 and Table 10
reveal that impact of a decrease in the cost of foreign job creation on overall relative
wages depends on the technology available in the foreign rm and the share of skilled
workers in the local labor market
2.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we examined the role of foreign rms in job creation as well as
their role in changing the structure of employment and explaining wage inequalities
in the local market by using a heterogenous matching model. There are a number
of skilled and unskilled workers both in the unemployment pool and in the local
and foreign rm looking for jobs posted by rms. Given this framework, wages
are determined by the Nash bargaining approach and equilibrium conditions. In
particular, the model not only presents absolute wages but it also allows us to study
within rm (local and foreign) and within group (skilled and unskilled) relative
wages.
Our results suggest that wages are a weighted average of labor productivity and
unemployment benet, where the weight depends on the bargaining power of the
workers, labor market tightness and the mass of local and foreign vacancies. In fact,
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the mass of vacant positions in the foreign rm depends on the job-creation costs
and relative labor productivities. This model allows us to nd:
1. Levels of wages paid by foreign rms need not always be greater than that paid
by local rms. We call this the rm premium, so results suggest that the foreign
rm premium could be greater or smaller than one depending on relative costs
of job creation, skill endowment and the technological gap between local and
foreign rm.
2. An increase in foreign presence, dened as the share of foreign vacancies in
total vacancy, can occur because of:
(a) an exogenous change in cost of job creation (a public policy exercise)
which could be of the following nature:
(i) level eld change making it worse for both local and foreign rms,
leading to a rise in economy-wide skill and a fall in the rm premium.
(ii) special treatment to the foreign rm, leading to a decline in economy-
wide skill premium and increase in rm premium.
(b) technological improvements (foreign rm biased) increases both economy-
wide skill and rm premium.
(c) skill upgrading decreases economy-wide skill premium and rm pre-
mium.
Therefore, depending on the cause of an increase in foreign presence we end up
with di¤erential relative wage e¤ects, both of the skill and rm premia.
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Table 2: Baseline Solution
Benchmark Parameters
r = 0:05,  = 0:5,  = 0:1, b = 0:1, cL = 0:5, cF = 0:7
 = 0:8,  = 0:5, yFs = 1:9, y
L
s = 1:7, y
F
{ = 1:5, y
L
l = 1:3
Labor Market: Job Opportunities and Unemployment
vL vF  u ul us
0:41 0:29 0:58 0:08 0:09 0:05
Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wF{
wF{
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
0:90 0:95 1:19 1:21 1:32 1:27 1:05 1:01 1:30 1:04
Table 3: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign Firm and its Labor Market
Implications
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:408 0:18 0:68
cF= 0:8 0:413 0:23 0:64
cF= 0:7 0:410 0:29 0:58
cF= 0:6 0:397 0:37 0:51
cF= 0:5 0:367 0:47 0:43
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wF{
wF{
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
cF= 0:9 0:94 0:90 1:27 1:14 1:339 1:268 0:95 0:90 1:318 0:94
cF= 0:8 0:92 0:92 1:23 1:17 1:333 1:271 0:99 0:95 1:310 0:98
cF= 0:7 0:90 0:95 1:19 1:21 1:326 1:274 1:05 1:01 1:304 1:04
cF= 0:6 0:87 0:98 1:15 1:26 1:320 1:278 1:12 1:09 1:298 1:11
cF= 0:5 0:84 1:02 1:10 1:32 1:312 1:284 1:22 1:19 1:295 1:21
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
cF= 0:9 0:094 0:104 0:054
cF= 0:8 0:090 0:100 0:052
cF= 0:7 0:086 0:096 0:050
cF= 0:6 0:083 0:092 0:048
cF= 0:5 0:079 0:088 0:046
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Table 4: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign and Local Firms and its Labor
Market Implications
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:7; cF= 0:9 0:28 0:23 0:54
cL= 0:5; cF= 0:7 0:41 0:29 0:58
cL= 0:3; cF= 0:5 0:69 0:37 0:65
cL= 0:1; cF= 0:3 1:71 0:36 0:82
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wF{
wF{
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
cL= 0:7; cF= 0:9 0:88 0:96 1:16 1:23 1:326 1:279 1:09 1:05 1:304 1:08
cL= 0:5; cF= 0:7 0:90 0:95 1:19 1:21 1: 326 1:274 1:05 1: 01 1:304 1:04
cL= 0:3; cF= 0:5 0:94 0:92 1:25 1:17 1: 328 1:267 0:98 0:93 1:307 0:97
cL= 0:1; cF= 0:3 1:06 0:86 1:42 1:08 1: 335 1:256 0:80 0:76 1:324 0:79
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
cL= 0:7; cF= 0:9 0:099 0:11 0:058
cL= 0:5; cF= 0:7 0:082 0:09 0:050
cL= 0:3; cF= 0:5 0:064 0:07 0:041
cL= 0:1; cF= 0:3 0:046 0:05 0:030
Table 5: Gap Between Job Creation Cost of Foreign and Local Firms and its Labor
Market Implications
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL=cF= 1 0:36 0:47 0:43
cL=cF= 2 0:39 0:14 0:73
cL=cF= 3 0:33 0:05 0:86
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wF{
wF{
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
cL=cF= 1 0:84 1:02 1:10 1:32 1:31 1:28 1:22 1:19 1:29 1:21
cL=cF= 2 0:96 0:89 1:30 1:12 1:345 1:26 0:91 0:86 1:32 0:90
cL=cF= 3 1:03 0:84 1:41 1:05 1:369 1:25 0:81 0:74 1:35 0:79
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
cL=cF= 1 0:072 0:08 0:04
cL=cF= 2 0:09 0:10 0:05
cL=cF= 3 0:108 0:12 0:06
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Table 6: Cost Elasticity of Vacancies, Wages and Unemployment
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
Baseline cF = 0:9
%11 decrease in cF  0:10  2:30 0:63
%22 decrease in cF  0:02  2:65 0:69
%33 decrease in cF 0:08  3:06 0:75
%44 decrease in cF 0:23  3:54 0:82
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wF{
wF{
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
Baseline cF = 0:9
%11 decrease in cF 0:21  0:20 0:25  0:22 0:04  0:08  0:47  0:49 0:05  0:46
%22 decrease in cF 0:23  0:23 0:27  0:25 0:04  0:05  0:50  0:55 0:05  0:51
%33 decrease in cF 0:24  0:26 0:28  0:29 0:04  0:04  0:56  0:63 0:04  0:57
%44 decrease in cF 0:26  0:30 0:30  0:33 0:04  0:04  0:64  0:72 0:04  0:66
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
Baseline cF = 0:9
%11 decrease in cF 0:33 0:33 0:33
%22 decrease in cF 0:33 0:33 0:33
%33 decrease in cF 0:33 0:33 0:33
%44 decrease in cF 0:34 0:33 0:35
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Table 7: Technological Upgrading and its impact on the Labor Market
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
Baseline technology gap (%10) 0:41 0:29 0:58
Changes from baseline
technology gap %25 0:40 0:33 0:54
technology gap %50 0:38 0:43 0:46
technology gap %75 0:35 0:51 0:40
technology gap %100 0:31 0:61 0:33
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wF{
wF{
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
Baseline technology gap (%10) 0:90 0:95 1:19 1:21 1:32 1:27 1:05 1: 01 1:30 1:04
Changes from Baseline
technology gap %25 0:88 1:03 1:17 1:36 1: 32 1:33 1:16 1:17 1:32 1:16
technology gap %50 0:85 1:27 1:12 1:69 1: 31 1:33 1:48 1:50 1:32 1:49
technology gap %75 0:82 1:52 1:08 2:03 1:31 1:34 1:83 1:87 1:33 1:84
technology gap %100 0:80 1:86 1:04 2:49 1:30 1:33 2:32 2:37 1:33 2:33
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
Baseline technology gap (%10) 0:086 0:096 0:05
Changes from Baseline
technology gap %25 0:083 0:094 0:04
technology gap %50 0:080 0:090 0:04
technology gap %75 0:077 0:087 0:04
technology gap %100 0:076 0:085 0:04
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Table 8: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign Firm and its Impact on
Vacancies and Wages (Technological Upgrading)
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:36 0:47 0:43
cF= 0:8 0:34 0:54 0:38
cF= 0:7 0:31 0:61 0:33
cF= 0:6 0:27 0:69 0:27
cF= 0:5 0:22 0:78 0:22
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wF{
wF{
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:84 1:75 1:10 2:33 1:31 1:33 2:08 2:11 1:32 2:09
cF= 0:8 0:82 1:80 1:07 2:40 1:30 1:33 2:19 2:23 1:32 2:20
cF= 0:7 0:80 1:86 1:04 2:49 1:30 1:33 2:32 2:37 1:33 2:33
cF= 0:6 0:78 1:93 1:02 2:59 1:30 1:34 2:46 2:53 1:33 2:48
cF= 0:5 0:76 2:00 0:99 2:69 1:29 1:34 2:62 2:72 1:34 2:64
Panel C: Unemployment
cL= 0:5
u ul us
cF= 0:9 0:079 0:088 0:046
cF= 0:8 0:077 0:086 0:045
cF= 0:7 0:076 0:085 0:044
cF= 0:6 0:075 0:083 0:043
cF= 0:5 0:073 0:081 0:042
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Table 9: Skill Upgrading and its Impact on Labor Market
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
 = 0:6 0:4402 0:3109 0:5860
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wF{
wF{
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
 = 0:6 0:90 0:95 1:18 1:20 1:30 1:26 1:05 1:01 1:28 1:03
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
 = 0:6 0:076 0:08 0:06
Panel D: Baseline Solution
Job Opportunities and Unemployment
vL vF  u ul us
 = 0:8 0:41 0:29 0:58 0:086 0:09 0:05
Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wF{
wF{
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
 = 0:8 0:90 0:95 1:19 1:21 1:32 1:27 1:05 1:01 1:30 1:04
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Table 10: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign Firm and its Impact on
Vacancies and Wages (Skill Upgrading)
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:43 0:19 0:68
cF= 0:8 0:44 0:24 0:64
cF= 0:7 0:44 0:31 0:58
cF= 0:6 0:42 0:39 0:51
cF= 0:5 0:39 0:50 0:44
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wF{
wF{
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:95 0:90 1:25 1:14 1:31 1:25 0:94 0:91 1:29 0:93
cF= 0:8 0:93 0:93 1:22 1:17 1:30 1:25 0:99 0:95 1:29 0:97
cF= 0:7 0:90 0:95 1:18 1:20 1:30 1:26 1:05 1:01 1:28 1:03
cF= 0:6 0:87 0:98 1:14 1:25 1:30 1:26 1:12 1:09 1:28 1:10
cF= 0:5 0:84 1:03 1:10 1:30 1:29 1:26 1:21 1:18 1:27 1:20
Panel C: Unemployment
cL= 0:5
u ul us
cF= 0:9 0:082 0:088 0:073
cF= 0:8 0:079 0:085 0:070
cF= 0:7 0:076 0:082 0:068
cF= 0:6 0:072 0:078 0:065
cF= 0:5 0:070 0:075 0:062
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CHAPTER 3
DOES THE TECHNOLOGY INTENSITY OF THE FIRM
MATTER?
This chapter analyzes the labor market e¤ects of the presence of MNEs for low-
technology and high-technology industries separately.
3.1 Introduction
This chapter examines the unemployment and wage implications of increased
foreign rm activity by considering di¤erent skill requirements of foreign and local
rms. Particularly, it investigates that whether the di¤erent skill intensities generate
di¤erent labor market outcomes. As is evidenced in Chapter 2, increased activities of
foreign rms, which is modeled as the number of vacancies opened by foreign rms,
have important impact on employment and relative wages. But, one needs to note
that foreign rms may have di¤erent skill intensities from local rms and they may
employ di¤erent technologies, therefore they may hire di¤erent types of workers by
posting di¤erent vacancies (Te Velde and Morrissey, 2004 and Yeaple, 2005). On
the other hand, it should be considered that foreign rms create various job oppor-
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tunities depending on the sector they locate in the host country. To this end, this
chapter extends the previous analysis (Chapter 2) by focusing on the di¤erent skill
requirements of the rms and it adds a new avour to the analysis of labor market
implications of the foreign rms. Chapter 3 allows us to understand unemployment
and wage patterns of unskilled and skilled workers in the local economy when the
foreign rm hires only skilled (unskilled) workers as it is more (less) skill intensive
than the local rm. So that, this chapter points out the role of sector of production,
in particular di¤erent technology intensity of the rms even in the same sector, on
the labor market implications of the increased foreign rm presence.
The sectoral distribution of MNEs di¤ers across countries and, therefore, the im-
pact of MNEs on local economies depend on the sectoral characteristics. According
to the UNCTAD (2005), the sectoral distribution of FDI has followed di¤erent pat-
terns for di¤erent countries. In 2004, Table 11 reveals that $4625 billion is devoted
to service sector in developed countries, while approximately one fourth of this is
devoted to service sector in developing countries. Actually the role of manufacturing
sector in deveoped countries is greater than that of the developing countries. The
most noticeable trend in the sectoral distribution of FDI inward stocks is the increase
in the service sector. Since the sectoral distribution of FDI is di¤erent across coun-
tries, a number of studies examine the e¤ect of FDI on local economies for di¤erent
sectors. On the other hand, another strand of the literature demostrates that even
in the same sector the technology intensity of foreign and local rms di¤ers.
Several empirical studies have shown di¤ering wage and employment e¤ects across
di¤erent sectors. Girma and Görg (2003), Wu (2001) and Dri¢ eld and Girma (2003),
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Table 11: Sectoral Composition of Inward FDI Stock, billions of dollar
1990 2004
Developed Developing World Developed Developing World
Countries Countries Countries Countries
Primary 140 24 164 268 152 440
Manufacturing 586 144 730 2406 614 3020
Services 717 152 868 4625 1224 5883
Source: UNCTAD, World Investment Report, 2005
takeovers by MNEs from di¤erent industries should be expected to have di¤erential
e¤ects on employment and wages across di¤erent sectors22. Girma and Görg (2003)
nd that high wages are positively related to outsourcing, particularly, in the chem-
ical and engineering sectors. Wu (2001) notes that FDI in di¤erent sectors have
di¤erent impacts on the relative return to skill and nds that FDI with relatively
labor biased technology will decrease the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers, while FDI with relatively skilled biased technology will increase the wage
gap between skilled and unskilled workers. Dri¢ eld and Girma (2003) examine the
impact of FDI on both skilled and unskilled workerswages in domestically owned
establishments by focusing on the UK electronics industry. They nd that entry by
foreign rms, paying on average higher wages, generates spillovers causing wages in
the domestic sector to be bid up, but spillovers are largely conned to skilled rather
than unskilled workers, implying that benets of FDI are unevenly distributed.
Girma and Görg (2007) examine the wage e¤ects in the two broad sectors: the
skill-intensive electronics sector and the low-tech food sector. They nd that in both
22In the case of Czech Republic by using a panel dataset disaggregated on 18 sectors, Kippenberg
(2005) nds that sectoral composition of FDI- whether it is capital-intensive or labor-intensive- plays
a crucial role in explaining the impact of FDI on domestic economy. Sayek and Aykut (2007) nd
empirical evidence that sectoral composition of FDI plays a key role in growth. They note that FDI
in the primary sector is expected to generate negative e¤ects while manufacturing sector generates
positive e¤ects.
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sectors unskilled workers receive on average higher wages as a result of their plants
newfound status as a subsidiary of a multinational company and note that the ab-
sence of a robust statistically signicant e¤ect of foreign ownership on skilled wages
within both sectors which is due to lower test power when dividing the observations
into subsamples. Barry et al. (2005) estimate the e¤ects of FDI on wages and pro-
ductivity in domestic rms in Ireland both theoretically and empirically (using plant
level data for 1990 to 1998). They assumed that foreign rms employ only skilled la-
bor, while domestic exporters employ a mix of skilled and unskilled labor to capture
the skill di¤erences across rms. The use of di¤erent types of workers in di¤erent
proportions in foreign and domestic rms lead to negative labor market crowding
out e¤ects. They nd that foreign presence has a negative e¤ect on productivity and
wages in domestic exporters, but no e¤ect on domestic non-exporters in the same
sector, where domestic non-exporters employ only unskilled workers. Das (2002)
demonstrates that FDI in skill intensive sectors lowers the relative wage and points
out that the greater the technology gap the higher the magnitude of the negative
impact of FDI on the relative wage. Feliciano and Lipsey (2006) for the US, Girma
et al. (2001) for the UK and Lipsey and Sjöholm (2004) for Indonesia control for
some observable rm and industry characteristics.
On the other hand, in addition to the sectoral di¤erences, di¤erent technology in-
tensities between foreign and local rms within a sector play a key role in explaining
the labor market implications of foreign presence. Even in the same sector, foreign
and local rms have di¤erent techniques in production. Actually, a number of stud-
ies seeks to examine di¤erences in technological intensities between foreign and local
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rms and they note that depending on the di¤erences on the machinery and equip-
ment, improved inventory control systems, training methods and R&D strategies,
foreign rms enjoyed higher technological intensities than local rms (Rasiah, 2005;
Te Velde and Morrissey, 2004 and Yeaple, 2005). Therefore, one needs to consider
the technology gap between the foreign and local rms within a sector. Some part of
the empirical work reveals that the di¤erent technology intensities across rms have
important e¤ects on the wage and productivity spillovers in the host countries in re-
sponse to increased foreign rm presence (Aitken et al., 1996; Sayek and S¸ener, 2006;
Feenstra and Hanson, 1996; Markusen and Venables, 1997; Girma, 2001; Larudee
and Koechlin, 1999; Conyon et al., 2002). Therefore, this chapter not only studies
the sectoral di¤erences but also di¤erent technology intensities between foreign and
local rms in the same sector.
In this context, chapter 3 captures such di¤ering e¤ects by modelling the dening
characteristic of the sector as its "skilled labor intensity". Two extreme sectoral
classications can be thought of in this sense, one which is skilled labor intensive;
such as the electronic or auto industry, while the other is unskilled labor intensive,
such as the textile or food industry etc. We focus on these two particular industries
for two reasons. First, foreign-owned rms are important players in both sectors,
accounting for about 19% of employment in electronics and 10% of employment
in the food industry in 1996 (Gri¢ th and Simpson, 2003, Table 4). Second, the
two sectors could be di¤erent in their technology usage, and hence, there may be
di¤erences on their e¤ects on skilled and unskilled wages and unemployment rates.
In addition, foreign and local rms pay di¤erent wages for textiles and electronic
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sectors (Barry et al., 2005, Table 1).
As foreign rms may have di¤erent skill intensities from domestic rms, this
chapter asks whether the skill intensity matters in examining the labor market im-
plications of MNEs, particularly, wage and unemployment rates for di¤erent types
of workers. Rather than the sectoral di¤erences, this chapter implicitly focuses on
the di¤erent technology intensities across foreign and local rms within the same
sector. The main purpose of this chapter is to evaluate, theoretically, the e¤ect of
di¤erent skill requirements of the foreign rms on wages and unemployment rates of
unskilled and skilled workers by the help of search model. Even though empirical
studies have recently stressed the importance of the di¤erent skill requirements of
the foreign rms depending on the sector they are located, theoretical work on this
issue is scarce. Therefore, this study constitutes an attempt to ll this gap in the
literature. The main di¤erence between the Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 is that foreign
rms o¤er positions only for skilled workers if it is more skill intensive than the local
rm while foreign rms create vacancies for only unskilled workers if it is less skill
intensive than the local rm. To this end, it is possible to capture di¤erent skill
intensities of the rms. In other words, Chapter 2 models the foreign rm working
with both skilled and unskilled workers and Chapter 3 further looks into the corner
solutions, where either skilled or unskilled labor is used in production, instead of
both labor being used in combination.
In the rst part of this chapter, the skill intensive foreign rm employs only
skilled workers and o¤er positions for the skilled workers while local rms still employ
both unskilled and skilled workers. This allows us to answer the question that how
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the earnings of the skilled and unskilled workers change if the foreign rm is more
skill intensive than the local rm- hiring only skilled workers. In the second part
of this chapter, foreign rm employs only unskilled workers while local rms still
employ both unskilled and skilled workers. Similarly, this allows us to examine the
position of skilled and unskilled workers if the low-tech foreign rms open vacancies
for only unskilled workers. The main rationale behind this is just to capture the
di¤erent technology intensities of the rms and to clarify the impact of the di¤erent
technology intensity of rms on the position of unskilled and skilled workers in the
local rm23. The main contribution of this chapter is to analytically identify the fact
that skill intensity matters in examining the response of wage and unemployment
e¤ets of increased foreign rm presence. Thus, this chapter provides a support for the
recent empirical studies that developed around labor market implications of foreign
rms by controlling for the sectoral and skill di¤erences across rms.
In the rst part of Chapter 3, the skilled labor intensive sector is introduced. The
accompanying part studies the unskilled labor intensive sectors and how the labor
23In this model, we can not assume that rms use skilled and unskilled workers in di¤erent
proportions since the employment of skilled and unskilled workers in foreign and local rms is not
exogenously given in the model.
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market is a¤ected when foreign presence in those sectors.
3.2 High-Tech Foreign Firms
3.2.1 Model
As di¤erent skill intensities of rms change the composition of vacancies, one can
say that skilled labor intensive foreign rms create job opportunities only for the
skilled workers, while local rms still employ both type of workers, thus, creating
jobs for both workers. Since the vacancies posted by local and foreign rms are
di¤erent, the matching function of unskilled workers and skilled workers are given as
follows, reecting that foreign rms o¤er positions for only skilled workers:
q{ [vL; ul] = (ul)
 (vL)
1 
qs [vL + vF ; us + esL + esF ] = (us + esL + esF )
 (vL + vF )
1 
The labor market tightness for unskilled and skilled workers is represented by
{ =
vL
ul
and s = vL+vFus+esL+esF , which is the ratio of total job vacancies to total
unskilled and skilled job seekers, respectively.
Figure 8 illustrates the labor market mobilityfrom unemployment to employ-
ment, from job to job and back to unemployment considering the di¤erent skill
requirements of the rms. Accordingly, the steady state conditions are given as
follows:
1 { u{=  (  u{) (31)
1 s us=  (1    us) (32)
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Figure 8: WorkersMobility under High-tech Foreign Firms
1 s  (us + esF )=
 
 + 1 s (1  )

esL (33)
1 s (1  ) (us + esL)=
 
 + 1 s 

esF (34)
Since we allow for on-the-job-search for both skilled workers in the local and
foreign rms, we have equations for local and foreign rms stating that in the
steady state the ow of skilled workers into local rms, 1 s  (us + esF ) is equal
to the ow of skilled workers out of local rm,
 
 + 1 s (1  )

esL. The ow
1 s (1  ) (us + esL) of currently employed skilled workers into the foreign rm
equals the ow out of foreign rms,
 
 + 1 s 

esF .
Workers
The asset value of an unskilled unemployed worker, U (l), satises
rU (l) = b+ 1 { (W (L; l)  U (l)) (35)
where the rst term on the right hand side is the unemployment benet, b, and the
second term refers to the change in the value of unskilled unemployed worker when
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(s)he becomes employed in the local rm.
Similarly, given the assumption that skilled workers accept both types of jobs,
local and foreign, the asset value of unemployed skilled workers, U (s), veries
rU (s) = b+ 1 s  (W (L; s)  U (s)) + 1 s (1  ) (W (F; s)  U (s)) (36)
The second and third terms in equation (35) denote the change in the value of skilled
worker if (s)he is employed in local and foreign rms, respectively.
The value of an unskilled worker employed in local rm is given in equation (36)
capturing the fact that foreign rms do not o¤er positions for unskilled workers:
rW (L; l) = wLl +  (U (l) W (L; l)) (37)
The value of skilled worker employed in local and foreign rms satises the following
equations:
rW (L; s) = wLs +  (U (s) W (L; s)) + 1 s (1  ) (W (F; s) W (L; s)) (38)
rW (F; s) = wFs +  (U (s) W (F; s)) + 1 s  (W (L; s) W (F; s)) (39)
where the rst terms in equations (37) and (38) are the skilled workerswage in
the local and foreign rms, respectively, and the second terms are the value loss of
becoming unemployed, and the third terms, i.e. 1 s (1   ) (W (F; s) W (L; s))
and 1 {  (W (L; s) W (F; s)) are the expected return from being successful in
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on-the-job search for skilled workers.
Firms
The values of local and foreign vacancies are given, respectively, by
rV (L) =  cL +  { (J (L; l)  V (L)) +  s A (J (L; s)  V (L)) (40)
rV (F ) =  cF +  s B (J (F; s)  V (F )) (41)
where A = us+esF
us+esL+esF
and B = us+esL
us+esL+esF
stands for the share of skilled workers
applying for a local job and a foreign job in the total job seekers, respectively. Values,
given in equations (39) and (40), of local and foreign vacancies reect the assumption
that both worker types are capable of performing the local jobs and but only skilled
workers manage to perform foreign jobs. A rm who posts a vacancy must pay a
recruitment cost of ci, where i = L; F . Given free entry, all prot opportunities from
posting vacancies are exploited, hence, in equilibrium, V (L) = V (F ) = 0:
The values to the rm of lling these vacancies with unskilled and skilled workers
verify
rJ (L; l) = yLl   wLl +  (V (L)  J (L; l)) (42)
rJ (L; s) = yLs   wLs +
 
 + 1 s (1  )

(V (L)  J (L; s)) (43)
rJ (F; s) = yFs   wFs +
 
 + 1 s 

(V (F )  J (F; s)) (44)
where the terms, yLl   wLl , yLs   wLs and yFs   wFs represent the output of a worker
minus the wage paid to the worker. The last term in each equation captures the value
loss in case of exogenous job destruction or transferring into local/foreign rms.
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Next, we concentrate on the steady state equilibrium as in chapter 2.
3.2.2. Equilibrium
Equilibrium is determined by two job creation conditions, plus, steady state con-
ditions equalizing the ows into and out of unemployment, local and foreign rms,
for both types of workers are satised. Given exogenous varibles that capture the
productivity of labor
 
yij

, the bargaining and matching environment (; ), the job
destruction rate () and job creation cost ( cL; cF ), the share of unskilled workers in
total population () and the interest rate (r). We will solve for the mass of vacancies,
vL and vF ; wages, i.e. wLl , w
L
s and w
F
s ; the labor market tightness { and s; and
unemployment rates; u{ and us. The solution follows the steps followed in Chapter
2. This yields
u{ =
 
 + 1 {
 (45)
us =
 (1  ) 
 + 1 s
 (46)
Given  and , unemployment rate of skilled workers is decreasing in the labor
market tightness of the skilled workers, s, while the unemployment rate of unskilled
workers is decreasing in the labor market tightness of the unskilled workers {.
Since equilibrium requires that V (L) = 0 and V (F ) = 0, equations (39) and
(40) which are also known as job creation conditions, could be written as follows:
cL = 
 
{

yLl   wL{
r + 

+  s A

yLs   wLs
r +  + 1 s (1  )

(47)
cF = 
 
s B

yFs   wFs
r +  + 1 s 

(48)
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3.2.3. Wages
Wages are determined by the Nash bargaining condition
W (i; j)  U (j) =  [W (i; j) + J (i; j)  V (i)  U (j)] (49)
where  2 (0; 1) is the exogenous surplus share of workers.
Substituting (34) (36) (39) (41) into (48) and imposing free entry condition for
local vacancies V (L) = 0, we obtain the wage rate from matching of an unskilled
worker with a local rm:
wL{ = $
L
{bb+$
L
{yy
L
{ (50)
where $L{b =
(1 )(r+)
r++1 {
and $L{y =
(r++1 { )
r++1 {
, are the weights attached to the
unemployment benet and labor productivity, respectively. The wage of unskilled
workers employed in the local rm is determined by the weighted average of the
unemployment benet, b and the output of unskilled worker in the local rm, yLl .
Particularly, wL{ depends on the bargaining power of workers,  and the mass of local
vacancies, which is captured in the labor market tightness of the unskilled workers,
{. Although we examine the e¤ect of the mass of local vacancies on wages, we are
aware that the mass of local vacancies is endogenous, so in the numerical exercises
we will look into a change in the exogenous parameters, i.e. the cost of opening local
and foreign vacancies, cL and cF on the mass of local vacancies. Here, for simplicity,
we ignore the reason behind the change in the mass of local vacancies.
In this context, it is convenient to argue that unskilled wages in the local rm
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increase as the mass of local vacancies rises. That is, if the local vacancies per
unemployed unskilled workers, i.e, labor market tightness, is large, then workers
outside options are good and they can ask for a higher wage. Firms are willing to
pay this high wage to avoid having to look for another worker as it is costly to wait
for a suitable worker. But, if the local vacancies are scarce relative to unemployed
unskilled workers, which means workers have limited outside options, then workers
may accept lower wages to avoid a long spell of unemployment. Even we can not
show analytically, if the share of foreign vacancies for skilled workers increase in
part due to the technological upgrading, the outside option of the unskilled workers
deteriorates (note that an increase in the foreign vacancies depresses the increase in
local vacancies) and, therefore, the earnings of the unskilled workers fall24.
Further, better bargaining position of the workers puts an upward pressure on
wages, i.e.
dwL{
dvl
> 0; dw
L
{
d
> 0
Substituting (35) (37) (39) (42) into (48) and imposing free entry condition for
local vacancies V (L) = 0, we obtain the wage rate from matching of an skilled
worker with a local rm:
wLs = $
L
sbb+$
L
syy
L
s (51)
where$Lsb =
(1 )(r++1 s (1 ))
r++1 s (1 +) and$
L
sy =
(r++1 s )
r++1 s (1 +) are the weights attached
to the unemployment benet and labor productivity, respectively. Skilled workers
24On the other hand, job opportunities posted by foreign rms for the skilled workers have an
indirect impact on the wage of unskilled workers since there is a link between the mass of local
and foreign vacancies given job creation equations. But, it is hard to elaborate this relationship
analytically, so the e¤ect of foreign job creation on unskilled workerswage will be more clear in
the numerical example.
74
wage in the local rm mainly depends on the share of local and foreign vacancies,
bargaining power of workers and the labor market tightness of the skilled worker.
An increase in the mass of local (foreign) vacancies raises (decreases) the wages in
the local rm. This could be explained by the fact that as the value of lling the
vacant positions increases, local rms are willing to pay more to ll the position.
Due to an increase in the local vacancies, the more likely the worker is matched with
a local job and the workers may ask for a higher wage and rms are willing to pay
this wage to avoid having to look for another worker and to incur the cost of not to
lling the vacancy.
An increase in the new positions o¤ered by foreign rms raises the probability
of matching with a foreign job, and the earnings of the workers doing foreign job
increases. On the other hand, the probability of being successful in the on-the-job-
search increases for the workers employed in the local rm in response to foreign job
creation. In this regard, local rms anticipate that workers will quit job whenever
foreign rms start to post new vacancies, so they tend to pay less. Actually, the
Figure 9 indicates that wages of the skilled workers in the local rm increase as the
share of local vacancies rises, but falls as the share of foreign rms in total vacancies
increase. Similarly, the bargaining power of workers raises the wages, i.e.
dwLs
dvl
> 0; dw
L
s
dvf
< 0; dw
L
s
d
> 0
Substituting (35) (38) (40) (43) into (48) and imposing free entry condition for
foreign vacancies V (F ) = 0, we obtain the wage rate from matching of an skilled
worker with a foreign rm:
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Figure 9: Skilled workerswage in the local rm
wFs = $
F
sbb+$
F
syy
F
s (52)
where$Fsb =
(1 )(r++1 s )
r++1 s (+ ) and$
F
sy =
(r++1 s )
r++1 s (+ ) are the weights attached to
unemployment benet and labor productivity, respectively. Skilled workerswage in
foreign rm depends on the share of local vacancies, , bargaining power of workers,
, unemployment benet, b and the ow output of skilled worker in foreign rm, yFs .
Earnings of the skilled workers in the foreign rm increases as foreign rms provide
more job opportunities since they have to pay enough to ll those vacant positions
and not to be wait for another match. On the other hand, new job opportunities
created by the local rm increases the outside option of the workers who are are
performing on-the-job search in the foreign rm. Thus, since foreign rms anticipate
that workersprobability of being successful in on-the-job search increases, which
reduces the match surplus, they tend to pay less for the workers. Also Figure 10
shows that wages of the skilled workers in the foreign rm decrease as the share of
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Figure 10: Skilled workerswage in the foreign rm
local vacancies rises, but increase as the share of foreign rms in total vacancies rises.
dwFs
dvf
> 0; dw
F
s
dvl
< 0; dw
F
s
d
> 0
Equations (49)-(51) reveal that the mass of local and foreign vacancies which are
captured in the labor market tightness and the share of local vacancies in total, and
the productivity of workers play a crucial role in determination of skilled wages in
the foreign and local rms. If the mass of local vacancies increase, the wages of both
unskilled and skilled workers are likely to rise in local rms, but new jobs available in
foreign rms reduce the wages of skilled workers in the local rm. Also, the earnings
of the skilled workers in the foreign rm increase (decrease) in response to a rise in
the mass of foreign (local) vacancies. This is the result indicated in Chapter 2. That
is, skill intensity does not matter for the skilled workers employed in foreign and
local rms.
Due to the skill intensity of the foreign rm, there is no job creation for the
unskilled workers. The earnings of the unskilled workers increase in response to a
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rise in the mass of local vacancies. But, if the foreign vacancies increase, than this
could have implicitly a¤ect the unskilled workerswages, which will be more clear in
the numerical example. Nevertheless, one can say that if the share of local vacancies
decrease as foreign rms constitute the greater portion of the jobs, then this will
deteriorate the position of unskilled workers. This will decrease the likelihood of
matching with a local rm for unskilled workers, if the match takes place between
unskilled workers and the local rm, unskilled workers need to accept lower wages
o¤ered by local rms not to fall or to wait in the unemployment pool.
The mass of vacancies created by local and foreign rms are determined by the job
creation conditions, which is obtained as in the Chapter 2 by substituting (49)-(51)
into equations (46)-(47):
cL=
(1  )  {

yL{  b
r++1 { )

+
(1  ) (s)  (us+esF1  ) y
L
s  b
r++1 s (1 +)
(53)
cF=(1  ) (s)  (us + esL
1   )

yFs   b
r +  + 1 s ( +    )

(54)
Job creation conditions for foreign and local rms di¤er according to the costs of
creating new jobs and productivities of the workers and this gives rise to equilibrium
wage di¤erentials in the presence of labor market frictions. Equations (52) and (53)
can in fact be rewritten as two equations with two unknowns, vF and vL, since both
js and  are function of vF and vL, as are uj and eij.
On the other hand, this framework allows us to examine the wage gap between
foreign and local rms for the skilled workers. We are able to discuss whether the
foreign rm premia is greater than one; i.e. whether foreign rm always pay more
than local rms for a skilled worker. This leads to proposition 2.
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Proposition 2 Skilled workers in the foreign rm are not always paid more than
skilled workers in local rm. The rm premium depends on the mass of vacancies
created by the rms and the labor productivity.
Proof. Skilled workers in foreign rms may earn more than that of the local rms,
that is, w
F
s
wLs
> 1 depending on the labor market frictions, in terms of posted vacancies,
and the productivity of the workers in di¤erent rms.
(1 )(r++1 s )b+(r++1 s )yFs
(r++1 s (+ ))
T (1 )(r++
1 
s (1 ))b+(r++1 s )yLs
(r++1 s (1 +))
(1  ) 1 s (2   1) b+
 
r +  + 1 s (1   + )

yFs  
 
r +  + 1 s ( +    )

yLs T
0
Since yFs > y
L
s , it is clear that the second term in the above inequality is positive
and the sign of the rst term is determined by the share of vacancies created by the
rms. Clearly, if the productivity gap between foreign and local rms is su¢ ciently
large, foreign rms end up with higher wages even when labor market imperfections
are taken into account.
The proposition 2 is the same as the proposition 1 and therefore both of these are
in line with the empirical literature (Aitken et al., 1996; Feenstra and Hanson 1996;
Lipsey and Sjöholm, 2002; and Ruane and U¼gur, 2002). While these stylized facts are
supported by our model, we are able to show the range of conditions that could alter
the foreign rm premium. Thus, regardless of the di¤erent skill intensities between
foreign and local rms, the wage gap between local and foreign rms depends on
the allocation of vacancies created by the rms, which are implicitly determined
by the job creation conditions. So, we can argue that wage di¤erentials between
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foreign and local rms should be explained by labor market imperfections in terms
of job creation and also the productivity of workers. Moreover, since we can not
analytically show the e¤ect of foreign (local) vacancies on skill and rm premia, we
carry out a numerical example. As a consequence of di¤erent skill requirements, i.e.
foreign rm is more skill intensive than the local rm, the e¤ect of increased foreign
rm presence on skilled workersearnings does not record a signicant change, but
its e¤ect on the unskilled workers is ambiguous analytically. To this end, we need a
numerical example to examine whether the skill intensity matters.
3.2.4 Numerical Example: High-Tech Foreign Firms
This section presents a numerical example to understand the properties of the
model. Numerical example allows us to examine e¤ects of an exogenous increase in
the cost of job creation on the extent of foreign rm activity in the local economy, and
in turn its e¤ects on absolute and relative wages, and unemployment. It furthermore
allows a discussion of the relationship between skill upgrading and technological
progress and absolute and relative wages, and unemployment. The example uses
the matching function, q ({) = 
 
{ and q (s) = 
 
s together with the baseline
parameter values given in Chapter 2. Under this choice of parameters, Table 12
presents the baseline solutions25.
< Insert Table 12 >
The examination of the baseline solution reveals that the share of local vacancies
25Real gures from Ireland are presented in note 1.
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is 81% of the total vacancies. The unemployment rate of unskilled workers and
skilled workers are 4:4% and 9%, respectively and the overall unemployment rate
is 5%. Given the job creation costs, the wage of skilled workers in the foreign rm
is lower than the skilled workers wage in the local rm. In this benchmark case,
given the cost of job creation, the share of skilled workers in the local economy and
the technology gap between the foreign and local rms (10%), the share of foreign
vacancies in total is 19%: Given the number of vacancies o¤ered by foreign rms,
workers who matched with the foreign rm accept the lower wages not to wait to
match with an other rm or not to wait in the unemployment pool. On the other
hand, unskilled workers get paid less than skilled workers in the local rm since
unskilled workers are not productive as skilled workers. In addition, the vacancies
posted for unskilled workers is limited as only local rm employs unskilled workers.
Since the foreign rm introduced in this chapter is skill-intensive, the vacancies
posted by foreign rms are for the skilled workers. Therefore, the main competition
between foreign and local rms takes place in the case of lling the vacant positions
for the skilled workers. Given the skill intensity of the foreign rm and the job
creation costs, the share of local vacancies is higher in this case compared to the most
general case in Chapter 2. Actually, the mass of foreign vacancies is considerably very
low when it is compared to the mass of local vacancies and this creates a downward
pressure on foreign wages leading to a rm premium which is less than 1.
The main explanation behind the lower wages o¤ered by foreign rms is the lower
job creation rates. The mass of foreign vacancies are lower than the vacancies posted
by the local rms. Therefore, the greatest portion of the job creation is dominated
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by the local rms. In this context, one needs to consider the reasons behind the
lower vacancies o¤ered by foreign rms. The vacancy creation is mainly determined
by the gap between the value of opening a vacancy and a cost of vacancy creation.
Particularly, the share of skilled workers which is given as 20%, the technology gap
between the foreign and local rms (10%) and the cost of job creation where cL = 0:5,
cF = 0:7 lowers the mass of vacancies o¤ered by the foreign rms. In this context,
labor market will be too tight for the foreign jobs. As the foreign vacancies are scarce
relative to job seekers, workers who matched with a foreign rm are willing to accept
low wages not to fall into the unemployment pool.
On the other hand, one of the explanations for the higher wages o¤ered by foreign
rms is that they increase the labor demand but in this case the vacancies posted
by foreign vacancies compose only 19% of the total vacancies, indicating that the
demand for hiring a worker for the foreign rm is limited. In this context, Martins
(2004) for Portugal and Barry et al. (2001) for Ireland note that wages paid by
foreign rms are in part depend on the labor market conditions, thus, foreign rms
do not always pay more than the local rms.
< Insert Table 13 >
As it is mentioned in Chapter 2, job creation costs have a crucial role in explaining
wage dynamics and unemployment. Results presented in Table 13 study the case
where the costs incurred by the foreign rm are altered. As the job creation cost of
foreign rmsfalls, the cost gap between local and foreign rms melt down and this
stimulates foreign job creation leading to changes in wages paid by the foreign rm
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and the local rm. The skill premium in the local rm decreases from 1:16 to 1:00
when the foreign job creation costs fall from 0:9 to 0:5. In the local rm, while the
earnings of the skilled workers fall from 1:42 to 1:23 as the share of local vacancies fall
from %91 to %67, wages of the unskilled workers remain slightly same, that is, 1:22.
The premium of working for a foreign rm increases for skilled workers in response
to increased foreign rm presence. As the share of local vacancies decreases, workers
matched with the local rm accept low wages rather then to wait for another match.
This is in the same line with the analytical ndings of the previous section.
Actually, regardless of the skill intensity of the rms, that is in accord with the
second Chapter, skilled wages decrease in the local rm and increase in the foreign
rm in response to a rise in foreign vacancies. When we consider the Chapter 2
where both rms o¤er positions for unskilled and skilled workers, unskilled workers
wage in the local rm decreases while there is no considerable improvement in the
wages of the unskilled workers when we consider a skill-intensive foreign rm. Since
both rms o¤er job opportunities for skilled workers, skilled workers have relatively
better position than unskilled workers. As unskilled workers can not perform on-
the-job-search therefore doing only local jobs, there is no signicant change on their
wages in response to the job creation of rms.
Regardless of the skill intensity of the foreign rms, an increase in foreign presence
leads to a fall in the economy-wide skill premium while a rise in the economy-wide
rm premium. The results also show supporting evidence for proposition 2, that is,
foreign rms do not always pay more than the local rms. On the other hand, in
this case productivity gap between foreign and local rm is 10%, so that wages in
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the foreign rm are not higher than the wages in the local rm which is in accord
with the proposition 2. Actually, proposition 2 says that wage di¤erentials could be
extensively explained by the productivity di¤erentials and the mass of local vacancies
and and the mass of foreign vacancies. In this setup, foreign rms have limited job
opportunities given the cost structure, the skill endowment and also foreign rms
o¤er positions for only skilled workers due to their skill-intensity in the production.
So that, even though the share of local jobs decreases when the cost gap between
local and foreign rms melt down, in absolute terms, the mass of local jobs is higher
than the mass of foreign vacancies.
Panel C in Table 13 shows the e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the share of
foreign rm vacancies on unemployment. Increased availability of foreign vacancies
decreases the overall unemployment rate from 6% to 5%. This result says that
the increased presence of foreign rms could reduce unemployment rates for skilled
workers regardless of the di¤erent skill intensities of rms.
< Insert Table 14 >
Table 14 shows the e¤ects of an exogenous decrease in the job creation cost of
both foreign and local vacancies. When the job creation costs of foreign and local
rms fall by the same absolute amount and the cost gap between local and foreign
rms stays same, the share of local vacancies in total vacancies increases. This leads
to a rise in local and a fall in the foreign rm wages paid to the skilled workers.
Once again, this is in line with proposition 2 noting that foreign rms do not always
pay more as the wage di¤erence between local and foreign rms depends on the job
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opportunities provided by local and foreign rms, which are extensively determined
by the cost of job creation and productivity of workers.
In contrast to the ndings of the Table 13, the skill premium in the local rm
increases from 1:10 to 1:15 and the premium of working for a foreign rm decreases
from 0:80 to 0:70 in response to the fall in the cost of job creation in both rms.
Overall, this leads to a rise in the economy-wide skill premium and a fall in the
economy-wide rm premium. On the contrary, when the cost gap between foreign
rm and local rm narrows, the economy-wide skill premium falls and economy-
wide rm premium rises. The main reason of this opposite e¤ect is that when the
job creation costs of foreign and local rms fall by the same absolute amount, local
rms will also benet from cost reduction and post new vacancies and, therefore, the
share of local vacancies in total increase so they pay more to ll that vacancies to
avoid having to look for other workers and incur the cost of vacant position.
When we consider a foreign rm which is relatively more skill intensive than
the local rm, the e¤ect of a decrease in job creation costs has similar implications
on wages and unemployment rate of skilled workers, but its e¤ect on the unskilled
workers is quite di¤erent once we found in the Chapter 2. Actually, skill intensity
matters when we are studying the wage gap between skilled workers in the foreign
and local rms, that is, rm premium.
Given the job creation costs, productivity gap between foreign and local rms
(10%) and the skill endowment (only 20 percent of the population is skilled), the mass
of foreign vacancies is very low leading to a decrease in the foreign rm premium.
Stated di¤erently, if the presence of skill-intensive rms is limited which is proxied
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by the vacancies, we can conclude that foreign rms do not pay more than the local
rms.
Figure 11: Skill Premium
Particularly, Figures 11 and 12 reveal the fact that how the mass of local and
foreign vacancies a¤ect the pattern of skill and rm premia. Briey, this experiment
reveals that, the labor market imperfections and foreignersshare in the labor market
have important non-linear e¤ects on the wages of unskilled and skilled workers,
specically on economy-wide skill premium and economy-wide rm premium. Note
that the overall skill premium is calculated as the ratio of the weighted average of
skilled workerswage in the foreign and local rms to unskilled workerswage in
the local and foreign rms whereas the overall rm premium is calculated as the
ratio of weighted average of wages paid by the foreign rm to wages paid by the
local rm. The weightes are formed by the mass of workers employed by the local
and foreign rms. The non linearity in the economy-wide skill premium and rm
premium arise since the number of unskilled and skilled workers performing local job
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and the number of skilled workers doing foreign job are determined by the mass of
foreign and local vacancies.
Figure 12: Firm Premium
Table 16 presents these elasticities -calculated by the help of the Table 13- with
respect to the cost of foreign job creation26. While the signs of the elasticities suggest
that increased foreign presence in the economy decreases the skill premium paid by
the local rm and increases the premium of working in the foreign rm, there are
di¤erences in the direction of impact on the within rm skill premia. Regardless
of the skill intensity, increased foreign presence decreases the economy-wide skill
premium, while increasing the economy-wide rm premium. However, wages of the
unskilled workers performing local jobs are not sensitive to increased foreign rm
presesence if we consider a skill-intensive foreign rm. So that, while the wages
of skilled workers in foreign and local rms follow the same pattern in response to
increased foreign rm presence in spite of the di¤erent skill intensities of the rms,
26Elasticity is measured by the percentage change in vacancies (wages, unemployment) divided
by the percentage change in the cost.
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skill intensity matters in terms of unskilled workers. That is, increased foreign rm
presence has no signifcant impact on the earnings of the unskilled workers if the
foreign rm is more skill intensive than the local rm.
< Insert Table 16 >
Tables 17-20 provide a sensitivity analysis to understand whether the technolog-
ical gap between foreign and local rms matters and also try to analyze the role of
skill distribution in studying labor market implications of foreign rms.
Table 17 analyzes the impact of a rise in the output gap between foreign and local
rms (which in part could be due to technological progress) since the productivity gap
between local and foreign rms also play a crucial role in explaining wage di¤erentials
as mentioned in proposition 2. As the output gap between foreign and local rms
increases, foreign rms start to o¤er more positions for workers, hence, the share
of vacancies posted by foreign rms increase. Since foreign rm is relatively more
skill intensive than local rm, posted vacancies in the foreign rm for skilled workers
increase. In this context, in response to a rise in the foreign job opportunities,
wages of the local rm decrease and wages of the foreign rm increase (The results
are compared to our benchmark case, where the technology gap27 is given as 10%).
Panel B in the Table 17 reveals that technological progress in the skill-intensive
foreign rm increases the premium of working for a foreign rm for skilled workers,
but lowers the skill premium in the local rm.
The ndings of the Table 17 indicates that the productivity gap between the skill
intensive foreign rm and the local rm increase, that is 50%, foreign rms pay more
27yFj =y
L
j is technology gap, which is dened as the productivity advantage of the foreign rm.
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than the local rms for the skilled workers making foreign rm premium greater
than 1. On the other hand, if the productivity gap is larger than the 50%, unskilled
workers wage in the local rm decreases in response to increased presence of foreign
rms. In this context, one can conclude that skill intensity matters if there is a
considerable productivity gap, such as 50%, between foreign and local rms.
An extensive array of studies explain the rising wage inequality and declining
trend in the unskilled workerswage by the skill-biased technological change (SBTC)
which conrms our ndings. An evidence on this issue says that the adoption of mod-
ern technologies in the production process as well as the growth of international ows
leads to a rise in the demand for skilled workers and a decrease in the demand for
unskilled workers. In this context, skill-biased technological change have emerged as
alternative explainations for the increasing wage inequality. Ekholm and Midelfart
(2005) nds that technological progress in the skill intensive sector leads to an in-
crease in the relative return to skilled labor, which also supports our ndings that the
economy-wide skill premium rises (when the technological gap between the foreign
and local rms is 50% or over).
According to Panel C in Table 17, overall unemployment decreases in response
to technological progress (technology gap increases from 10% to 25%). This could
be explained by the fact that the technological progress facilitates job creation and
to this end foreign rms provide new job opportunities for the skilled workers. But,
since the job opportunities are for the skilled workers, unemployment rate of unskilled
workers start to increase slightly if the productivity gap between foreign and local
rms is larger than the 50%. That is, skill intensity matters in determining the
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unemployment rate of unskilled workers if the technology gap is given as 50%.
< Insert Table 17 >
Table 18 re-examines the e¤ects of a fall in the job creation cost of foreign rms
on wages and unemployment by assuming the productivity gap between foreign and
local rms is su¢ ciently large (yFs =y
L
s = 2:00). As is shown in Panel A and Panel
B in the Table 18, a decrease in the cost gap between local and foreign rms and
increase in the productivity gap between foreign and local rms makes it protable
to create foreign jobs and search for the appropriate skilled candidates. Due to the
decrease in the cost gap and the improvement in technology not only are more jobs
created, but the job composition shifts towards more productive foreign jobs. As
such while the skill premium in the local rm decreases, the premium of performing
foreign jobs tend to increase. In other words, an increase in the share of foreign jobs
due to the widened productivity di¤erentials and narrowed cost gap puts an upward
pressure on foreign wages and economy-wide skill premium and rm premium while
lowering the wages of the skilled workers in the local rm. In this case, we have
the similar results for the wages of skilled workers in the foreign and local rms.
Considering the more intensive use of skilled workers by the foreign rms, increased
foreign rm presence leads to a decline in the unskilled workerswage.
However, skill intensity matters when we are examining unemployment rates.
That is, increased foreign presence, in response to a decline in the job creation
cost, leads to an increase in the unemployment rate of unskilled workers if the skill
intensity of the foreign rm is larger than the local rm. But, in Chapter 2, when
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we do not consider the skill intensity of the rms, we nd that unemployment rate
of unskilled workers decrease in response to increased presence of foreign rms.
< Insert Table 18 >
Table 19 presents the e¤ect of skill upgrading on vacancy creation, wages and
unemployment. Given the baseline parameter values, we focus on the skill upgrading
and the share of skilled workers increase from 20% to 40%, that is,  = 0:6. When
skilled work force constitutes 40% of the total population, the mass of local and
foreign vacancies record a signicant rise. According to the Panel B in Table 19,
skill premium in the local rm fall from 1:09 to 0:96 and the premium of working
for a foreign rm increases from 0:80 to 0:94 due to the skill upgrading when the
results are compared to the benchmark case, that is Table 12. Earnings of the skilled
workers fall in the local rms and increase in the foreign rm. Skill intensity matter
when we consider the skill upgrading. That is, skill upgrading raises the economy-
wide rm premium if we consider a skill intensive foreign rm, while reduces the
economy-wide rm premium if we do not consider the skill intensity of the foreign
rms.
< Insert Table 19 >
Panel C in Table 19 notes that while unemployment rate for skilled workers
slightly increase and unemployment rate for unskilled workers decrease, similar to
the ndings of the Chapter 2.
< Insert Table 20 >
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Table 20 examines the e¤ect of a decrease in the cost of foreign job creation
when one considers the skill upgrading. Given the share of skilled workers as 40%
of the population, foreign rms create new job opportunities in response to a fall
in the foreign job creation cost. This leads to a decline in the economy-wide skill
premium and a rise in the economy-wide rm premium. Particularly, an increase in
the share of skilled workers does not change results specically for the economy-wide
skill premium and rm premium when we consider a skill intensive foreign rm.
Particularly, Panel C in Table 20 shows that overall unemployment rate decreases
due to a fall in the cost gap between foreign and local rms. Further, increased foreign
presence, in response to a decline in the job creation cost, i.e. if the job creation costs
are equalized, leads to an increase in the unemployment rate of unskilled workers
when we consider the skill intensity.
In sum, numerical example reveals that impact of an increased foreign rm pres-
ence on overall relative wages and unemployment rates depends on the skill intensity
of the rm, the technology available in the foreign rm and the share of skilled work-
ers in the local labor market. Depending on the technology available in the foreign
rm, increased foreign rm presence decreases the skilled and unskilled wages in the
local rm and increases the skilled wages in the foreign rm. Also, increased pres-
ence of skill-intensive foreign rm lowers the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers. On the other hand, most importantly, again considering the technological
gap between the foreign and local rm, increased foreign rm presence may increase
the unemployment rate of unskilled workers.
Actually, ndings of this chapter supports the empirical evidence where Das
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(2002) notes that FDI in skill intensive sectors lowers the relative wage and points
out that greater the technology gap the higher the magnitude of the negative im-
pact of FDI on the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the local rm.
Dri¢ eld and Girma (2003) examine the impact of FDI on both skilled and unskilled
workerswages in domestically owned establishments by focusing on the UK elec-
tronics industry and nd that increased presence of foreign rms in the electronics
industry deteriorates the position of unskilled workers.
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Table 12: Baseline Solution for High-Tech Foreign Firms
Benchmark Parameters
r = 0:05,  = 0:5,  = 0:1, b = 0:1, cL = 0:5, cF = 0:7
 = 0:8,  = 0:5, yFs = 1:9, y
L
s = 1:7, y
L
l = 1:3
Labor Market: Job Opportunities and Unemployment
vL vF  u u{ us
0:165 0:037 0:81 0:053 0:044 0:090
Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
1:22 1:34 1:07 1:09 1:80 1:053 0:865
Table 13: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign Firm and its Labor Market
Implications
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:151 0:013 0:91
cF= 0:8 0:158 0:023 0:87
cF= 0:7 0:165 0:037 0:81
cF= 0:6 0:171 0:056 0:75
cF= 0:5 0:174 0:085 0:67
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
cF= 0:9 1:2213 1:42 1:03 1:163 0:726 1:137 0:805
cF= 0:8 1:2243 1:38 1:05 1:129 0:761 1:095 0:828
cF= 0:7 1:2269 1:34 1:07 1:092 0:804 1:053 0:856
cF= 0:6 1:2289 1:29 1:11 1:051 0:859 1:014 0:891
cF= 0:5 1:2302 1:23 1:15 1:006 0:931 0:983 0:935
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
cF= 0:9 0:058 0:0478 0:099
cF= 0:8 0:055 0:0459 0:094
cF= 0:7 0:053 0:0442 0:090
cF= 0:6 0:051 0:0428 0:085
cF= 0:5 0:050 0:0420 0:080
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Table 14: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign and Local Firms and its
Labor Market Implications
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:7; cF= 0:9 0:128 0:027 0:826
cL= 0:5; cF= 0:7 0:165 0:037 0:816
cL= 0:3; cF= 0:5 0:239 0:051 0:823
cL= 0:1; cF= 0:3 0:476 0:047 0:909
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
cL= 0:7; cF= 0:9 1:21 1:33 1:071 1:104 0:80 1:06 0:86
cL= 0:5; cF= 0:7 1:22 1:34 1:0782 1:092 0:80 1:05 0:85
cL= 0:3; cF= 0:5 1:24 1:36 1:0768 1:092 0:79 1:05 0:84
cL= 0:1; cF= 0:3 1:27 1:46 1:0390 1:155 0:70 1:12 0:78
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
cL= 0:7; cF= 0:9 0:06 0:05 0:10
cL= 0:5; cF= 0:7 0:05 0:04 0:09
cL= 0:3; cF= 0:5 0:04 0:03 0:07
cL= 0:1; cF= 0:3 0:03 0:01 0:05
Table 15: Gap Between Job Creation Cost of Foreign and Local Firms and its Labor
Market Implications
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL=cF= 1 0:63 0:56 0:53
cL=cF= 2 0:58 0:15 0:78
cL=cF= 3 0:47 0:04 0:90
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
cL=cF= 1 1:27 1:16 1:25 0:91 1:07 0:94 0:99
cL=cF= 2 1:27 1:36 1:09 1:06 0:80 1:02 0:84
cL=cF= 3 1:27 1:46 1:03 1:15 0:70 1:12 0:78
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
cL=cF= 1 0:017 0:012 0:039
cL=cF= 2 0:020 0:013 0:049
cL=cF= 3 0:024 0:016 0:058
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Table 16: Cost Elasticity of Vacancies, Wages and Unemployment
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
Baseline cF = 0:9
%11 decrease in cF  0:42  6:77 0:47
%22 decrease in cF  0:41  8:09 0:50
%33 decrease in cF  0:39  9:83 0:55
%44 decrease in cF  0:34  12:16 0:61
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
Baseline cF = 0:9
%11 decrease in cF  0:022 0:24  0:18 0:26  0:43 0:34  0:26
%22 decrease in cF  0:021 0:25  0:20 0:27  0:48 0:33  0:28
%33 decrease in cF  0:019 0:27  0:23 0:29  0:55 0:32  0:32
%44 decrease in cF  0:016 0:29  0:26 0:30  0:63 0:31  0:36
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
Baseline cF = 0:9
%11 decrease in cF 0:39 0:36 0:39
%22 decrease in cF 0:38 0:34 0:40
%33 decrease in cF 0:38 0:32 0:41
%44 decrease in cF 0:37 0:27 0:42
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Table 17: Technological Upgrading and its impact on the Labor Market
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
Baseline technology gap (%10) 0:165 0:037 0:81
Changes from baseline
technology gap %25 0:169 0:05 0:76
technology gap %50 0:174 0:08 0:68
technology gap %75 0:175 0:10 0:61
technology gap %100 0:174 0:13 0:56
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
Baseline technology gap (%10) 1:2269 1:34 1:07 1:09 0:80 1:05 0:85
Changes from Baseline
technology gap %25 1:2278 1:30 1:23 1:06 0:94 1:04 0:98
technology gap %50 1:2306 1:24 1:52 1:01 1:22 1:08 1:23
technology gap %75 1:2303 1:20 1:83 0:97 1:52 1:17 1:50
technology gap %100 1:2300 1:16 2:15 0:94 1:84 1:30 1:76
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
Baseline technology gap (%10) 0:053 0:0442 0:090
Changes from Baseline
technology gap %25 0:051 0:0431 0:086
technology gap %50 0:0498 0:0420 0:081
technology gap %75 0:0482 0:0430 0:077
technology gap %100 0:0489 0:0439 0:074
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Table 18: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign Firm and its Impact on
Vacancies and Wages (Technological Upgrading)
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:174 0:088 0:66
cF= 0:8 0:175 0:109 0:61
cF= 0:7 0:174 0:136 0:56
cF= 0:6 0:171 0:169 0:50
cF= 0:5 0:167 0:213 0:43
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 1:2302 1:23 2:03 1:00 1:65 1:22 1:65
cF= 0:8 1:2303 1:20 2:09 0:97 1:74 1:25 1:70
cF= 0:7 1:2300 1:16 2:15 0:94 1:84 1:30 1:76
cF= 0:6 1:2291 1:13 2:22 0:92 1:96 1:36 1:83
cF= 0:5 1:2276 1:09 2:30 0:89 2:10 1:44 1:91
Panel C: Unemployment
cL= 0:5
u ul us
cF= 0:9 0:0496 0:0420 0:080
cF= 0:8 0:0489 0:0419 0:077
cF= 0:7 0:0484 0:0421 0:074
cF= 0:6 0:483 0:0427 0:071
cF= 0:5 0:484 0:0437 0:067
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Table 19: Skill Upgrading and its Impact on Labor Market
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
 = 0:6 0:23 0:12 0:65
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
 = 0:6 1:23 1:21 1:15 0:96 0:94 0:95 0:93
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
 = 0:6 0:038 0:024 0:095
Panel D: Baseline Solution
Job Opportunities and Unemployment
vl vf  u ul us
 = 0:8 0:165 0:037 0:81 0:05 0:04 0:09
Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
 = 0:8 1:22 1:34 1:07 1:09 0:80 1:05 0:85
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Table 20: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign Firm and its Impact on
Vacancies and Wages (Skill Upgrading)
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:228 0:070 0:76
cF= 0:8 0:234 0:092 0:71
cF= 0:7 0:237 0:122 0:65
cF= 0:6 0:237 0:162 0:59
cF= 0:5 0:230 0:215 0:51
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
s
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 1:2371 1:28 1:10 1:02 0:85 0:98 0:86
cF= 0:8 1:2381 1:25 1:12 0:99 0:89 0:96 0:89
cF= 0:7 1:2387 1:21 1:15 0:96 0:94 0:95 0:93
cF= 0:6 1:2386 1:17 1:19 0:93 1:01 0:94 0:97
cF= 0:5 1:2375 1:13 1:24 0:90 1:09 0:94 1:02
Panel C: Unemployment
cL= 0:5
u ul us
cF= 0:9 0:040 0:0249 0:103
cF= 0:8 0:039 0:0243 0:099
cF= 0:7 0:038 0:0240 0:095
cF= 0:6 0:037 0:0240 0:090
cF= 0:5 0:036 0:0247 0:086
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3.3 Low-Tech Foreign Firms
This section questions the labor market implications of the presence of low-tech
foreign rms, such as textile or food industry. It is worth to study the case where
the foreign rm locates in a low-skill intensive sector. Specically, within the manu-
facturing sector, low-tech industries such as textiles, clothing, footwear, food, drink
and tobacco constitute the 20% of the total FDI ow in the world (UNCTAD, 2006).
Runiewicz (2004) note that most of the manufacturing FDI is in low-tech indus-
tries in Baltic countries. In particular, low-technology industries, such as textiles,
clothing, footwear, food, drink and tobacco have di¤erent skill requirements. In this
context, to di¤erentiate the impact of di¤erent sectors, recent studies start to classify
sectors as low-tech and high-tech and, even, they point out that foreign and local
rms have di¤erent technology intensities within sectors (Girma and Görg, 2007).
In this chapter, we also capture technological di¤erences between local and foreign
rms within a sector.
3.3.1 Model
Consider a foreign rm locating in an unskill-intensive sector. They create job
opportunities only for the unskilled workers, while local rms still employ both type
of workers. Since the vacancies posted by local and foreign rms are di¤erent, the
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Figure 13: WorkersMobility under Low-tech Foreign Firms
matching function of unskilled workers and skilled workers are given as follows, re-
ecting that foreign rms o¤er positions for only unskilled workers:
q{ [vL; us] = (us)
 (vL)
1 
qs [vL + vF ; u{ + e{L + e{F ] = (u{ + e{L + e{F )
 (vL + vF )
1 
The labor market tightness for unskilled and skilled workers is represented by
{ =
vL+vF
u{+e{L+e{F
and s = vLus , which is the ratio of total job vacancies to total
unskilled job seekers, respectively.
Figure 13 illustrates the labor market mobilityfrom unemployment to employ-
ment, from job to job and back to unemployment. Accordingly, the steady state
conditions are given as follows:
1 s us =  (1    us) where 1   = us + esL (55)
1 { u{ =  (  u{) where  = u{ + e{L + e{F (56)
1 {  (u{ + e{F ) =
 
 + 1 { (1  )

e{L (57)
1 { (1  ) (u{ + e{L) =
 
 + 1 { 

e{F (58)
Since we allow for on-the-job-search for both workers in the local and foreign
rms, we have equations for local and foreign rms stating that in the steady
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state the ow of unskilled workers into local rms, 1 {  (u{ + e{F ) is equal to
the ow of unskilled workers out of local rm,
 
 + 1 { (1  )

e{L. The ow
1 { (1  ) (u{ + e{L) of currently employed skilled workers into the foreign rm
equals the ow out of foreign rms,
 
 + 1 { 

e{F .
Workers
The asset value of an unskilled unemployed worker, U (l), satises
rU (l) = b+ 1 {  (W (L; l)  U (l)) + 1 { (1  ) (W (F; l)  U (l)) (59)
where the rst term on the right hand side is the unemployment benet, b, and the
second and third terms in equation (58) denote the change in the value of skilled
worker if (s)he is employed in local and foreign rms, respectively.and the third
term represents the change in the value of unskilled unemployed worker when (s)he
becomes employed in the foreign rm.
Similarly, given the assumption that skilled workers accept only local jobs, the
asset value of unemployed skilled workers, U (s), veries
rU (s) = b+ 1 s (W (L; s)  U (s)) (60)
The second term refers to the change in the value of skilled unemployed worker when
(s)he becomes employed in the local rm
The value of an skilled and unskilled workers employed in local and foreign rms
satises the following equations
rW (L; s) = wLs +  (U (s) W (L; s)) (61)
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rW (L; l) = wL{ +  (U (l) W (L; l)) + 1 { (1  ) (W (F; l) W (L; l)) (62)
rW (F; l) = wF{ +  (U (l) W (F; l)) + 1 {  (W (L; l) W (F; l)) (63)
Firms
The values of local and foreign vacancies are given, respectively, by
rV (L) =  cL +  { A (J (L; l)  V (L)) +  s (J (L; s)  V (L)) (64)
rV (F ) =  cF +  { B (J (F; l)  V (F )) (65)
where A = u{+e{F
u{+e{L+e{F
and B = u{+e{L
u{+e{L+e{F
stands for the share of unskilled workers
applying for a local job and a foreign job in the total job seekers, respectively. Values,
given in equations (63) and (64), of local and foreign vacancies reect the assumption
that both worker types are capable of performing the local jobs and but only unskilled
workers manage to perform foreign jobs. Given free entry, all prot opportunities
from posting vacancies are exploited, hence, in equilibrium, V (L) = V (F ) = 0. The
values to the rm of lling these vacancies with unskilled and skilled workers verify
rJ (L; s) = yLs   wLs +  (V (L)  J (L; s)) (66)
rJ (L; l) = yL{   wL{ + ( + { (1  )) (V (L)  J (L; l)) (67)
rJ (F; l) = yF{   wF{ +
 
 + 1 { 

(V (F )  J (F; l)) (68)
where the terms, yLl   wLl , yLs   wLs and yF{   wF{ represent the output of a worker
minus the wage paid to the worker. The last term in each equation captures the value
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loss in case of exogenous job destruction or transferring into local/foreign rms.
3.3.2. Equilibrium
The steady state equilibrium follows the steps in chapter 2. The unemployment
rate of skilled workers us
1  =

(+1 s )
and unskilled workers ul

= 
(+1 { )
are derived
by re-arranging the terms in equations (54) and (55). Given  and , unemployment
rate of skilled workers is decreasing in the labor market tightness of the skilled
workers, s, while the unemployment rate of unskilled workers is decreasing in the
labor market tightness of the unskilled workers {.
Since equilibrium requires that V (L) = 0 and V (F ) = 0, equations (63) and
(64) could be written as follows which are also known as job creation conditions:
cL = 
 
{ A

yLl   wL{
r +  + 1 { (1  )

+  s

yLs   wLs
r + 

(69)
cF = 
 
s B

yF{   wF{
r +  + 1 { 

(70)
3.3.3. Wages
Wages are determined by the Nash bargaining condition
W (i; j)  U (j) =  [W (i; j) + J (i; j)  V (i)  U (j)] (71)
where  2 (0; 1) is the exogenous surplus share of workers.
Substituting (59) (60) (63) (65) into (72) and imposing free entry condition for
local vacancies V (L) = 0, we obtain the wage rate from matching of an unskilled
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worker with a local rm:
wLs = $
L
sbb+$
L
syy
L
s (72)
where $Lsb =
(1 )(r+)
r++1 s
and $Lsy =
(r++1 s )
r++1 s (1 +) are the weights attached to
unemployment benet and labor productivity, respectively. Skilled workerswage in
the local rm is determined by the weighted average of the unemployment benet,
b and the output of unskilled worker in the local rm, yLs . Particularly, w
L
s depends
on the bargaining power of workers,  and the mass of local vacancies, which is
captured in the labor market tightness of the skilled workers, s. It is convenient to
argue analytically that skilled wages in the local rm increase as the share of local
vacancies rises in total and better bargaining position of the workers puts an upward
pressure on wages.
On the other hand, if the job composition shifts through the unskilled intensive
jobs, the outside option of the skilled workers will be limited hence when they match
with a local rm, they will accept the lower wages to avoid a long spell of unemploy-
ment. Therefore, we can implicitly say that an increase in the presence of unskill
intensive foreign rm deteriorates the position of skilled workers.
dwLs
dvl
> 0; dw
L
s
d
> 0
Substituting (58) (61) (63) (66) into (72) and imposing free entry condition for
local vacancies V (L) = 0, we obtain the wage rate from matching of an unskilled
worker with a local rm:
wL{ = $
L
{bb+$
L
{yy
L
{ (73)
where $L{b =
(1 )(r++1 { (1 ))
r++1 { (1 +) and $
L
{y =
(r++1 { )
r++1 {
, are the weights attached to
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Figure 14: Unskilled workerswage in the local rm
the unemployment benet and labor productivity. The wage of unskilled workers
employed in the local rm is determined by the weighted average of the unemploy-
ment benet, b and the output of unskilled worker in the local rm, yLl . Particularly,
wL{ depends on the bargaining power of workers,  and the mass of foreign and local
rms which is also captured in labor market tightness of the unskilled workers, {
and the share of local vacancies in total vacancies, . An increase in the mass of
local (foreign) vacancies raises (decreases) the unskilled wages in the local rm. Ac-
cording to the Figure 14, it is clear that wages of the unskilled workers in the local
rm increase as the share of local vacancies rises, but falls as the share of foreign
rms in total vacancies increase. Similarly, the bargaining power of workers raises
the wages, i.e.
dwL{
dvl
> 0; dw
L
{
dvf
< 0; dw
L
{
d
> 0
Substituting (58) (62) (64) (67) into (72) and imposing free entry condition for
foreign vacancies V (F ) = 0, we obtain the wage rate from matching of an unskilled
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Figure 15: Unskilled workerswage in the foreign rm
worker with a foreign rm:
wF{ = $
F
{bb+$
F
{yy
F
{ (74)
where $F{b =
(1 )(r++1 s )
r++1 s (+ ) and $
F
{y =
(r++1 s )
r++1 s (+ ) are the weights attached
to unemployment benet and labor productivity, respectively. Unskilled workers
wage in foreign rm depends on the share of local vacancies, , bargaining power
of workers, , unemployment benet, b and the ow output of unskilled worker in
foreign rm, yF{ . Figure 15 shows that w
F
{ increases as foreign rms provide more
job opportunities. Similarly, bargaining power of workers and a rise in the mass of
foreign jobs raises wages in the foreign rm whereas an increase in the local vacancies
lowers the eranings of the unskilled workers in the foreign rm.
dwF{
dvf
> 0; dw
F
{
dvl
< 0; dw
F
{
d
> 0
According to equations (71)  (73), the mass of local and foreign vacancies and
the productivity of workers have a crucial role in determining the wages of the un-
skilled workers. Also, the skilled workers wage in the local rm is also determined
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by the productivity of workers, yet, the role of the mass of foreign vacancies is neg-
ligible. Implicitly, wages of unskilled workers in the local and foreign rms and the
earnings of the skilled workers in the local rm are determined by job creation costs,
bargaining power of workers, the share of local vacancies in total, but to a di¤erent
extent. Actually, the behaviour of the unskilled wages in the foreign and local rm
does not change if it is compared with the case introduced in Chapter 2. The skill
intensity matters in the wages of skilled workers, and this will be reected to the
relative wages, which will be more clear in the numerical example.
The mass of vacancies created by local and foreign rms are determined by the
job creation conditions, which are obtained by substituting wage equations given in
(71)-(73) into the equilibrium conditions given in (70)-(71):
cL =
(1  )  s

yLs  b
r++1 s )

+
(1  ) ({)  (u{+e{F ) y
L
{  b
r++1 { (1 +)
(75)
cF = (1  ) ({)  (u{ + e{L

)

yF{   b
r +  + 1 { ( +    )

(76)
Job creation conditions for foreign and local rms di¤er according to the costs of
creating new jobs and productivities of the workers and this gives rise to equilibrium
wage di¤erentials in the presence of labor market frictions. Equations (76) and (77)
can be rewritten as two equations with two unknowns, vF and vL, since {, s and 
are function of vF and vL, as are u{, u{, e{F , e{L and esL.
We are able to discuss whether the foreign rm premia for the unskilled workers
is greater than one; i.e. whether foreign rm always pay more than local rms for
an unskilled labor. This leads to proposition 3.
Proposition 3 Unskilled workers in the foreign rm are not always paid more than
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unskilled workers in local rm. The rm premium depends on the mass of vacancies
created by the rms and the labor productivity.
Proof. Unskilled workers in foreign rms may earn more than that of the local
rms, that is, w
F
{
wL{
> 1 depending on the labor market frictions, in terms of posted
vacancies, and the productivity of the workers in di¤erent rms.
(1 )(r++1 { )b+(r++1 { )yF{
(r++1 { (+ ))
T (1 )(r++
1 
{ (1 ))b+(r++1 { )yL{
(r++1 { (1 +))
(1  ) 1 { (2   1) b+
 
r +  + 1 { (1   + )

yF{   
r +  + 1 { ( +    )

yL{ T 0
Since yF{ > y
L
{ , it is clear that the second term in the above inequality is positive
and the sign of the rst term is determined by the share of vacancies created by the
rms. Clearly, if the productivity gap between foreign and local rms is su¢ ciently
large, foreign rms end up with higher wages even when labor market imperfections
are taken into account.
As for the unskilled workers, regardless of the skill intensity of the sectors, the
wage gap between local and foreign rms depends on the allocation of vacancies
created by the rms, which are implicitly determined by the job creation conditions.
So, we can argue that wage di¤erentials between foreign and local rms should
be explained by labor market imperfections in terms of job creation and also the
productivity of workers. Moreover, since we can not analytically show the e¤ect
of foreign (local) vacancies on skill and rm premia, the next section provides a
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numerical example.
3.3.4 Numerical Example: Low-Tech Foreign Firms
This section presents a numerical example to understand the properties of the
model. Numerical example allows us to examine e¤ects of an exogenous increase in
the cost of job creation on the extent of foreign rm activity in the local economy, and
in turn its e¤ects on absolute and relative wages, and unemployment. It furthermore
allows a discussion of the relationship between skill upgrading and technological
progress and absolute and relative wages, and unemployment. The example uses
the matching function, q ({) = 
 
{ and q (s) = 
 
s together with the baseline
parameter values given in Chapter 2. Under this choice of parameters, Table 21
presents the baseline solutions.
< Insert Table 21 >
The examination of the baseline solution for the unskill intensive foreign rm-
where foreign rm creates job opportunities for the unskilled workers- shows that
the share of local vacancies is 59% of the total vacancies. Actually, this means
that di¤erent skill intensities does not matter in terms of job creation since in the
benchmark case of the chapter 2, the share of local vacancies is also 59%. So the skill
intensity of the foreign rm does not change the vacancy creation in the local rm.
On the other hand, as foreign rms o¤er more positions for the unskilled workers, the
overall unemployment rate decreases. The unemployment rate of unskilled workers
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and skilled workers are 10:8% and 0:64%, respectively and the overall unemployment
rate is 9%. Unskilled workers get paid less than skilled workers in the local rm as
skilled workers are more productive than the unskilled workers. Table 21 shows that
the skill premium in the local rm is 1:86.
While these within-group relative values allow for identication of important
di¤erences between labor-types and rms, it is important to talk about an overall
skill and rm premium. The benchmark ndings suggest that economy-wide skill
premium is more than the overall rm premium. One should also note that, at these
parameter values, we nd that the rm premium for the unskilled workers is lower
than one, indicating that the wage of unskilled workers in foreign rms is higher
than the unskilled workers wage in the local rm. Thus, the benchmark case reveals
that regardless of the skill intensity foreign rms pay more than the local rms for
the unskilled workers. The main reason behind this is that unskilled workers are
more productive in the foreign rm. But, in addition to this, the foreign vacancies
constitute the 41% of the total vacancies, and unskilled workers who matched with
the foreign rm ask for a higher wage.
< Insert Table 22 >
Table 22 shows the e¤ects of an exogenous decrease in the job creation cost of
foreign rms on vacancy creation, relative wages and unemployment rate, keeping the
cost incurred by the local rm constant. As the job creation cost of foreign rmsfalls,
the cost gap between local and foreign rms melt down and this stimulates foreign
job creation leading to changes in wages paid by the foreign rm and the local
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rm. Skill intensity of the rms does not matter when we consider the unskilled
workers earnings in the local and in the foreign rm. That is, as a response to
increased foreign rm presence, unskilled workers wage in the foreign rm increases
and unskilled workers wage in the local rm decreases. An increase in the mass of
foreign vacancies for unskilled workers decreases the economy-wide skill premium
and increases the economy-wide rm premium. The premium of doing a foreign job
increases from 0:94 to 1:21, when the foreign job creation costs fall from 0:9 to 0:5.
The mass of vacancies for the unskilled workers in the foreign rm increases the
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the local rm. However, if the
foreign rm creates job for both types of workers, the wage gap between skilled and
unskilled workers in the local rm decreases. Hence, the di¤erent skill requirements
of the rms have di¤erent e¤ects on the skill premium in the local rm.
The results also show supporting evidence for proposition 3. At levels of foreign
vacancy job creation cost exceeds 0.7, the foreign rm pays less than the local rm
for the unskilled workers, i.e. the rm premium is less than 1 for both unskilled
labor. This is reversed when the foreign job creation cost falls to and below 0.7. One
should keep in mind that the threshold level we nd foreign job creation cost, 0.7,
depends on the parameter values.
Panel C in Table 22 shows the e¤ects of an exogenous increase in the share of
foreign rm vacancies on unemployment. Increased availability of foreign vacan-
cies decreases the unemployment rate of unskilled workers from 11% to 10% and
the unemployment rate of skilled workers remain 6%. Overall unemployment rate
decreases from 10% to 8% following the new job opportunities. This result is sugges-
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tive that the increased presence of foreign rms could indeed contribute to reducing
unemployment rates regardless of the di¤erent skill intensities.
< Insert Table 23 >
Table 23 shows the e¤ects of an exogenous decrease in the job creation cost of
both foreign and local vacancies. When the job creation costs of foreign and local
rms fall by the same absolute amount and the cost gap between local and foreign
rms stays same, the share of foreign vacancies in total vacancies does not increase,
it even decreases. The share of local vacancies tends to increase leading to a rise
in local wages paid to the skilled and unskilled workers and a fall in the wages of
the unskilled workers in the foreign rm. Even though economy-wide skill premium
increases in response to an increase in the share of local vacancies in total, economy-
wide rm premium decreases. Actually, Table 22 and Table 23 justies that the
di¤erent reductions in the costs of foreign and local job creation costs have di¤erent
implications.
If the cost of job creation in local and foreign rms becomes 0:3 and 0:5, respec-
tively, then the share of local vacancies form 65% of the total and thereby, local rms
start to pay more than foreign rms. Once again, this is in line with propositon 3
noting that foreign rms do not always pay more as the wage di¤erence between lo-
cal and foreign rms depends on the job opportunities provided by local and foreign
rms, which are extensively determined by the cost of job creation and productivity
of workers.
To sum up, it is clear that the numerical example results supports our theoretical
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Figure 16: Skill Premium
predictions that the response of the economy-wide skill and rm premium as well
as the response of the absolute wages to changes in the extent of labor market
imperfections and foreign presence depends on several conditions in the market.
Figures 16 and 17 reveal the fact that how the mass of local and foreign vacancies
a¤ects the pattern of skill and rm premia.
On the other hand, the pattern of economy-wide skill premium and the economy-
wide rm premium di¤ers depending on the sector foreign rms locate. Even though
non linear response of economy-wide skill premium and the economy-wide rm pre-
mium remains in both high tech and low tech sectors due to the change in the pro-
portion of workers doing local and foreign jobs. If the foreign rm locates in a high
tech sector, economy-wide skill premium increases since the job composition shifts
towards more productive skilled jobs. However, in a low tech sector economy-wide
skill premium decreases as the job composition shifts towards unskilled jobs.
Table 25 presents these elasticities -calculated by the help of the Table 22- with
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Figure 17: Firm Premium
respect to the cost of foreign job creation28. Signs of the elasticities suggest that
increased foreign presence in the economy increases both the skill premium in the
local rm and the premium of working in the foreign rm. Increased foreign presence
increases the economy-wide skill premium and the rm premium. Wages of the
unskilled workers performing local jobs are more sensitive to increased foreign rm
presence while the wages of unskilled workers in the foreign rm are not very sensitive.
When the foreign and local vacancies are posted for both types of workers, i.e. if both
rms have the same skill requirements, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled
workers decrease in the local rm. However, if foreign and local rms have di¤erent
skill requirements, the wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers increase in
the local rm.
< Insert Table 25 >
On the other hand, since the productivity gap between local and foreign rms also
28Elasticity is measured by the percentage change in vacancies (wages, unemployment) divided
by the percentage change in the cost.
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play a crucial role in explaining wage di¤erentials as mentioned in proposition 3, we
next analyze the impact of a rise in the output gap between foreign and local rms.
As the output gap between foreign and local rms increases, foreign rms start to
o¤er more positions for workers, hence, the share of vacancies posted by foreign rms
increase. This leads to a decline in the earnings of the unskilled workers in the local
rm and an increase in the unskilled workers wage in the foreign rm and no change
in the wages of skilled workers in the local rm (The results are compared to our
benchmark case, where the technology gap29 is given as 10%). Panel B in the Table
26 reveals that if the productivity advantage of the foreign rm rises, the premium
of working in the foreign rm for unskilled workers increases. This is due to the fact
that an increase in the productivity advantage of the foreign rms directly generates
an increase in the wages, but also its e¤ect on wages become more powerful since it
increases the jobs created by foreign rms.
Panel B in Table 26 reveals that skill intensity of the rms matter since the skill
premium in the local rm increases if the foreign rms are unskill intensive whereas
the skill premium in the local rm decreases. Note that, regardless of the skill
intensity unskilled wages in the foreign rm is greater than that of the local rms
once we consider the increasing productivity gap between the foreign and local rms.
An increase in the share of foreign vacancies due to the improvement in foreign rm
technology puts an upward pressure on the economy-wide rm premium. But, the
skill intensity matters since the economy-wide skill premium decrease if the vacancies
o¤ered by foreign rms are only for unskilled workers while it increases if both rms
29yFj =y
L
j is technology gap, which is dened as the productivity advantage of the foreign rm.
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have di¤erent skill requirements.
< Insert Table 26 >
According to Panel C in Table 26, overall unemployment decreases in response
to technological progress (technology gap increases from 10% to 25%). This could
be explained by the fact that the technological progress facilitates job creation and
to this end foreign rms provide new job opportunities. An increased foreign rm
presence decreases the overall unemployment rate regardless of the skill intensity.
< Insert Table 27 >
Table 27 re-examines the e¤ects of a fall in the job creation cost of foreign rms on
wages and unemployment by assuming the productivity gap between foreign and local
rms is su¢ ciently large (yFj =y
L
j = 2:00). Similarly, skill intensity matters when we
examine the skill premium in the local rm and economy-wide skill premium. Also,
an increase in the share of foreign jobs due to the widened production di¤erentials
and narrowed cost gap puts an upward pressure on foreign wages while lowering
the wages of the workers in the local rm and also putting a upward pressure on
economy-wide rm premium.
Table 28 test the sensitivity of the results to the skill endowment parameter.
Given the baseline parameter values, we focus on the skill upgrading and the share
of skilled workers increase from 20% to 40%, that is,  = 0:6.
< Insert Table 28 >
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When skilled work force constitutes 40% of the total population, the share of
local vacancies increase. According to the Panel B in Table 28, skill premium in
the local rm decreases and premium of working in the foreign rm decreases due
to the skill upgrading when the results are compared to the benchmark case. Also,
both the economy-wide skill and rm premium decreases due to the skill upgrading
regardless of the skill intensity. Actually, di¤erent skill requirements of the rms do
not create signicant changes in the wage and unemployment patterns.
< Insert Table 29 >
Table 29 examines the e¤ect of a decrease in the cost of foreign job creation when
one considers the skill upgrading. Given the share of skilled workers as 40% of the
population, foreign rms create new job opportunities in response to a fall in the
foreign job creation cost. This leads to a rise in the economy-wide skill premium and
rm premium regardless of the skill requirements of the rms. Particularly, the wage
gap between foreign and local rms has melt down in response to an increase in the
foreign rm presence when both rms have the same skill requirements but the wage
gap between foreign and local rms has increased when the foreign rms activites are
less skill intensive. Table 27 and Table 29 reveal that impact of a decrease in the cost
of foreign job creation on overall relative wages depends on the technology available
in the foreign rm and the share of skilled workers in the local labor market, but
also on the skill intensity of the rms.
In sum, due to the presence of low-tech foreign rms, the composition of vacancies
switch towards unskilled jobs. As the outside option of skilled workers is limited by
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the mass of local vacancies, the earnings of the skilled workers follow a di¤erent
pattern even though they still earn more than the unskilled workers. Earnings of the
unskilled workers in the local rm decrease as the foreign rms create more unskilled
jobs. Greater the share of foreign vacancies, the more likely the worker is matched
with a foreign rm and this raises the outside option of workers and they can ask
for a higher wage. The foreign job creation increases in part due to the lowering
job creation costs or technological upgrading, thus, they start to pay higher wages
to ll the new vacancies. If the local vacancies are scarce, unemployed skilled and
unskilled workers matched with the local rm accept lower wages in the local rm
not to turn back to unemployment pool.
In this context, increased foreign rm presence in an unskill intensive sector
depresses the wages in the local rm and also this widens the wage gap between
skilled and unskilled workers in the local rm. Therefore, we conclude that di¤erent
skill intensities create di¤erent labor market outcomes when we compare the ndings
of this low-tech foreign rms to the gures in high-tech foreign rms.
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Table 21: Baseline Solution for Low-Tech Foreign Firms
Benchmark Parameters
r = 0:05,  = 0:5,  = 0:1, b = 0:1, cL = 0:5, cF = 0:7
 = 0:8,  = 0:5, yF{ = 1:5, y
L
s = 1:7, y
L
l = 1:3
Labor Market: Job Opportunities and Unemployment
vL vF  u u{ us
0:32 0:21 0:59 0:089 0:11 0:006
Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
{
wLs
wL{
wF{
wL{
W sp W fp
0:90 1:68 0:94 1:86 1:04 1:83 0:81
Table 22: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign Firm and its Labor Market
Implications
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:305 0:129 0:70
cF= 0:8 0:308 0:165 0:65
cF= 0:7 0:324 0:219 0:59
cF= 0:6 0:295 0:272 0:51
cF= 0:5 0:272 0:350 0:43
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
{
wLs
wL{
wF{
wL{
W sp W fp
cF= 0:9 0:94 1:684 0:89 1:77 0:94 1:80 0:77
cF= 0:8 0:92 1:684 0:91 1:82 0:99 1:82 0:79
cF= 0:7 0:90 1:685 0:94 1:86 1:04 1:83 0:81
cF= 0:6 0:86 1:684 0:97 1:93 1:12 1:82 0:84
cF= 0:5 0:83 1:682 1:02 2:00 1:22 1:78 0:87
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
cF= 0:9 0:096 0:119 0:0064
cF= 0:8 0:092 0:114 0:0063
cF= 0:7 0:089 0:110 0:0064
cF= 0:6 0:086 0:106 0:0066
cF= 0:5 0:082 0:101 0:0072
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Table 23: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign Firm and its Labor Market
Implications
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:7; cF= 0:9 0:21 0:16 0:55
cL= 0:5; cF= 0:7 0:30 0:21 0:59
cL= 0:3; cF= 0:5 0:52 0:26 0:65
cL= 0:1; cF= 0:3 1:28 0:25 0:83
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
{
wLs
wL{
wF{
wL{
W sp W fp
cL= 0:7; cF= 0:9 0:87 1:67 0:95 1:91 1:08 1:83 0:83
cL= 0:5; cF= 0:7 0:89 1:68 0:94 1:87 1:05 1:83 0:82
cL= 0:3; cF= 0:5 0:94 1:69 0:92 1:79 0:98 1:81 0:79
cL= 0:1; cF= 0:3 1:06 1:69 0:85 1:59 0:80 1:64 0:70
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
cL= 0:7; cF= 0:9 0:097 0:12 0:009
cL= 0:5; cF= 0:7 0:089 0:11 0:006
cL= 0:3; cF= 0:5 0:072 0:09 0:003
cL= 0:1; cF= 0:3 0:048 0:06 0:001
Table 24: Gap Between Job Creation Cost of Foreign and Local Firms and its Labor
Market Implications
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL=cF= 1 1:43 1:84 0:43
cL=cF= 2 1:53 1:62 0:71
cL=cF= 3 1:28 0:25 0:83
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
{
wLs
wL{
wF{
wL{
W sp W fp
cL=cF= 1 0:85 1:696 1:04 1:98 1:22 1:76 0:89
cL=cF= 2 0:99 1:696 0:90 1:71 0:91 1:75 0:76
cL=cF= 3 1:06 1:692 0:85 1:59 0:80 1:64 0:70
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
cL=cF= 1 0:037 0:047 0:0013
cL=cF= 2 0:045 0:057 0:0013
cL=cF= 3 0:053 0:067 0:0015
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Table 25: Cost Elasticity of Vacancies, Wages and Unemployment
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
Baseline cF = 0:9
%11 decrease in cF  0:085  2:49 0:66
%22 decrease in cF  0:002  2:87 0:72
%33 decrease in cF 0:10  3:32 0:78
%44 decrease in cF 0:25  3:84 0:85
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
F
{ w
L
s
wLs
wL{
wF{
wL{
W sp W fp
Baseline cF = 0:9
%11 decrease in cF 0:22  0:0005  0:21  0:22  0:44  0:10  0:25
%22 decrease in cF 0:23 0:00  0:24  0:24  0:49  0:07  0:27
%33 decrease in cF 0:25 0:001  0:27  0:27  0:56  0:03  0:28
%44 decrease in cF 0:26 0:002  0:31  0:29  0:64  0:02  0:29
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
Baseline cF = 0:9
%11 decrease in cF 0:32 0:33 0:14
%22 decrease in cF 0:32 0:33 0:00
%33 decrease in cF 0:31 0:34  0:09
%44 decrease in cF 0:30 0:34  0:28
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Table 26: Technological Upgrading and its impact on the Labor Market
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
Baseline technology gap (%10) 0:30 0:21 0:59
Changes from baseline
technology gap %25 0:30 0:24 0:54
technology gap %50 0:28 0:32 0:46
technology gap %75 0:25 0:39 0:39
technology gap %100 0:23 0:45 0:33
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
{
wLs
wL{
wF{
wL{
W sp W fp
Baseline technology gap (%10) 0:89 1:684 0:945 1:87 1:05 1:83 0:82
Changes from Baseline
technology gap %25 0:88 1:684 1:044 1:90 1:18 1:76 0:90
technology gap %50 0:84 1:683 1:299 1:98 1:53 1:54 1:12
technology gap %75 0:82 1:681 1:575 2:04 1:91 1:31 1:33
technology gap %100 0:80 1:679 1:850 2:09 2:30 1:12 1:54
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
Baseline technology gap (%10) 0:089 0:110 0:0064
Changes from Baseline
technology gap %25 0:086 0:107 0:0065
technology gap %50 0:083 0:103 0:0070
technology gap %75 0:080 0:099 0:0077
technology gap %100 0:080 0:097 0:0085
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Table 27: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign Firm and its Impact on
Vacancies and Wages (Technological Upgrading)
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:27 0:34 0:44
cF= 0:8 0:25 0:39 0:38
cF= 0:7 0:23 0:45 0:33
cF= 0:6 0:20 0:52 0:27
cF= 0:5 0:16 0:59 0:22
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
{
wLs
wL{
wF{
wL{
W sp W fp
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:83 1:68 1:74 2:00 2:07 1:25 1:49
cF= 0:8 0:82 1:68 1:79 2:04 2:18 1:18 1:52
cF= 0:7 0:80 1:67 1:85 2:09 2:30 1:12 1:54
cF= 0:6 0:78 1:67 1:91 2:14 2:44 1:04 1:56
cF= 0:5 0:76 1:67 1:98 2:19 2:60 0:97 1:57
Panel C: Unemployment
cL= 0:5
u ul us
cF= 0:9 0:082 0:101 0:0072
cF= 0:8 0:080 0:099 0:0077
cF= 0:7 0:079 0:097 0:0085
cF= 0:6 0:077 0:094 0:0096
cF= 0:5 0:075 0:092 0:0115
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Table 28: Skill Upgrading and its Impact on Labor Market
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
 = 0:6 0:24 0:15 0:62
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
{
wLs
wL{
wF{
wL{
W sp W fp
 = 0:6 0:91 1:66 0:93 1:82 1:02 1:80 0:70
Panel C: Unemployment
u u{ us
 = 0:6 0:083 0:10 0:015
Panel D: Baseline Solution
Job Opportunities and Unemployment
vL vf  u u{ us
 = 0:8 0:32 0:21 0:59 0:089 0:10 0:006
Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
{
wLs
wL{
wFs
wLs
W sp W fp
 = 0:8 0:90 1:68 0:94 1:86 1:04 1:83 0:81
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Table 29: Decrease in the Job Creation Cost of Foreign Firm and its Impact on
Vacancies and Wages (Skill Upgrading)
Panel A: Vacancies
vl vf 
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:246 0:09 0:72
cF= 0:8 0:247 0:11 0:67
cF= 0:7 0:247 0:15 0:62
cF= 0:6 0:242 0:19 0:55
cF= 0:5 0:230 0:25 0:47
Panel B: Wages
wL{ w
L
s w
F
{
wLs
wL{
wF{
wL{
W sp W fp
cL= 0:5
cF= 0:9 0:96 1:662 0:88 1:72 0:92 1:76 0:67
cF= 0:8 0:93 1:663 0:90 1:77 0:96 1:79 0:69
cF= 0:7 0:91 1:663 0:93 1:82 1:02 1:80 0:70
cF= 0:6 0:88 1:662 0:96 1:88 1:09 1:80 0:72
cF= 0:5 0:85 1:661 1:00 1:94 1:17 1:78 0:74
Panel C: Unemployment
cL= 0:5
u ul us
cF= 0:9 0:097 0:118 0:0159
cF= 0:8 0:093 0:113 0:0156
cF= 0:7 0:090 0:109 0:0156
cF= 0:6 0:086 0:104 0:0159
cF= 0:5 0:083 0:099 0:0167
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3.4 Comparison Across Models
Depending on their activities in the host country, foreign rms create di¤erent
vacancies for di¤erent types of labor. So that one can focus on e¤ects of skill intensive
versus unskill intensive sectors on the wages and the unemployment in the local
market. A part of the literature believes that FDI is attracted to countries where
unskilled labor is cheap, while another strand of the literature notes that foreign rms
generally locate in skill intensive sectors. Actually, the sectoral composition of foreign
rms is di¤erent across countries. In this context, to understand the labor market
implications of the foreign rms, one needs to take account the sectoral di¤erences.
In the second chapter, we consider the case where rms require both types of workers
in the production, but in chapter three, we focus on the corner solutions and try to
understand whether the skill intensity matters in studying wages and unemployment
or not. On the other hand, rather than the sectoral di¤erences, di¤erent technology
intensities of the foreign and local rms within the same sector is also considered.
In the high-tech industries, such as computer or auto, foreign rm o¤ers positions
only for skilled workers, whereas, in the low-tech industries, such as food and bev-
erages and textiles, they create vacant positions for unskilled workers. For instance,
in the most general case, given the benchmark case, the share of foreign vacancies
is 0:29, while it was 0:21 and 0:03, in the low-tech and high-tech sectors, respec-
tively. Since the skilled workers constitute the 20% percent of the population, it is
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hard to match with a skilled worker for the foreign rms in the skill-intensive sector.
When the cost gap between the local and foreign rms has melt down, foreign rms
start to open more vacant positions, economy-wide skill premium records a decline
in all cases. Also, in all sectors, premium of working in the foreign rm and the
economy-wide rm premium increases in response to an increase in the foreign jobs
due to the lowering job creation costs. Overall unemployment rates decrease in the
all sectors as foreign rms create vacancies, but the impact of increased presence of
foreign rms, through foreign job creation, on the unemployment rate of unskilled
and skilled workers depends on the fact that at which sector foreign rms locate.
If we consider the case where the decline in job creation costs takes place in both
rms, thus, the cost gap between the local and foreign rms stays same, leading to a
rise in the share of local vacancies. Within this picture, economy-wide skill premium
increases in the most general case and in the high-tech sector, while decreases in the
low-tech sector. As for the high-tech sector, the path of economy-wide skill premium
follows an ambiguous path. Yet, the response of the economy-wide rm premium
is same for all sectors, that is economy-wide rm premium decreases even the mass
of foreign vacancies increases since the rise in the mass of local vacancies is greater
than the latter which raises the share of local vacancies in total vacancies.
Foreign rms create more jobs due to the technological upgrading. Economy-
wide skill premium increase both in the most general case and the high-tech sector,
but in the low-tech sectors, economy-wide skill premium decreases. In response to
rising presence of foreign rms following the increasing foreign jobs, economy-wide
rm premium increases. The overall unemployment rate decreases in all sectors in
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response to technological uprading. On the other hand, skill upgrading decreases the
economy-wide skill premium both in the high-tech and low-tech sectors. Economy-
wide rm premium increases only in the high-tech sectors and decreases in the low-
tech sector and in the most general case.
More intensive use of skilled workers by the foreign rms decreases the wages
of the unskilled workers and increases the unemployment rate of unskilled workers,
particularly, if the foreign rm has considerable technological advantage. As foreign
rms o¤er positions for only skilled workers as a consequence of an increased spe-
cialization in skill intensive production, the vacancies for the unskilled workers will
be limited and this will deteriorate the position of unskilled workers both in terms of
wages and unemployment. Specically, if there is skill-biased technological change in
the foreign rm which increases the productivity gap between the foreign and local
rms, earnings of the unskilled workers decline and the unemployment rate increases.
As this leads to a decline in the vacant positions o¤ered by unskilled workers, making
tighter labor market for unskilled workers, overall sittuation of unskilled workers de-
teriorate. Actually, this is in the same line with the empirical evidence pointing out
skilled biased technological change emerge as an explanation for declining unskilled
wages.
Even though unskill intensive foreign rm presence leads to an increase in the
wage gap between skilled and unskilled workers in the local rm, it decreases the
wage di¤erential between skilled and unskilled workers in the local rm in Chapter
2, where both rms create vacancies for both type of workers, that is, skill intensity
is not considered. As the job opportunities for the skilled workers is limited since
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the foreign rm specialized on unskill intensive production in the local economy,
increases foreign rm presence has no signicant impact on skilled wages in the local
rm. Also, results of the numerical example says that skilled workers earn more than
unskilled workers in the local rm. However, as the foreign rm presence increases
through the vacancy generation, wages of the unskilled workers in the local rm
decrease and this leads to a rise in the skill premium in the local rm.
To sum up, the impact of MNEs on absolute and relative wages, but also unem-
ployment, varies between sector and depends on the technology intensity of rms.
Allowing di¤erent skill requirements reveals that di¤erent wage and unemployment
e¤ects for both types of workers emerge in response to increased foreign presence.
Therefore, the skill intensity plays a key role in studying the labor market implica-
tions of the MNEs.
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CHAPTER 4
MNEs AND WORKERSMOBILITY: LABOR MARKET
IMPLICATIONS
This chapter considers the di¤usion of knowledge that occurs from Multinational
Enterprises (MNEs) to domestic rms via worker mobility and to a large extent
concentrates on the wage and unemployment implications of this labor mobility in
the local labor market.
4.1 Introduction
Many countries attempt to encourage the entry of MNEs by o¤ering substantial
scal and nancial incentives. The main motivation of these policies stems from
the belief that advanced technologies introduced by the MNEs may spillover to local
rms and increase their productivity. Actually, the existence of spillovers fromMNEs
to local rms is mainly attributed to the multinationals ownership of rm specic
assets implying that they have superior technology and knowledge of marketing and
managerial techniques30. In this context, MNEs are considered to be an important
30The existence of an MNE is based on a rm specic advantage (Dunning 1973, Markusen and
Venables, 1997).
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mechanism for productivity and knowledge di¤usion to local markets.
Although the potential positive spillovers arising from the entry of MNEs to
host countries draw a considerable amount of attention, the main mechanism that
explains the link between the existence of spillovers and the entry of MNEs is not
clear. Within this context, an impressive body of empirical evidence has developed
around the spillover e¤ects of MNEs and aims to identify the potential channels of
spillovers31. Empirical work states that there are three main spillover channels: First,
vertical spillovers, which are created by the backward and forward linkages, take
place between foreign a¢ liates and local rms (Alfaro and Rodriguez-Clare, 2003;
Javorcik, 2003; Lall, 1995; Rodriguez-Clare, 1996; Aitken and Harrison, 1999; Görg
and Greenaway, 2004; and Javorcik, 2004). Second, horizontal spillovers arise as a
result of imitation, demonstration e¤ects, reverse engineering or competitive pressure
exerted by foreign rms (Manseld and Romeo, 1980; Blömstrom, 1986). Third,
spillovers occur through workersmobility whereby workers working in multinationals
join local rms, and take with them all or some part of the technological, marketing,
and managerial knowledge that they have acquired in the foreign rms (Fosfuri et
al., 2001). Thus, local rms may gain access to the multinationals rm specic
knowledge by hiring a former MNE worker with special skills.
In short, labor mobility can serve as a mechanism for a local rm to acquire the
externally-developed knowledge. As workers in foreign rms will be exposed, at least
partially, to the special assets in MNEs, knowledge di¤usion takes place whenever
these workers move to the local rms and manage to bring all or some part of the
31See the literature surveys on spillovers, Saggi, 2002; Blomström and Kokko,1998.
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knowledge acquired in the foreign rm. The application of this valuable knowledge
at local rms may then generate higher productivity. Görg and Greenaway (2001)
suggest that the productivity improvement generated by the movement of labor from
MNEs to local rms can be realized via two mechanisms. First, a direct spillover to
complementary worker is expected, as skilled labor working alongside unskilled labor
tends to raise the productivity of the latter. Second, workers that move carry with
them knowledge of new technology, new management techniques and consequently
can become direct agents of technology transfer. Particularly, when the technology
is tacit or embodied in people who develop and use it, it cannot be transferred
through passive mechanisms like imitation and reverse engineering or other means
and therefore the transfer of workers, formerly employed by foreign rms, could
constitute an important channel for spillovers (Lenger and Taymaz, 2006)32.
Consequences of potential labor mobility could damage the rm specic advan-
tages of the multinationals. Hence, they may try to prevent such knowledge di¤usion
by paying higher wages to the local workers in order to ensure their assets will not
be passed to domestic competitors (Fosfuri et al. 2001, Glass and Saggi 2002). Even
though an increase in the premium paid by the foreign rms could be indirect ev-
idence of a potential for spillovers through labour mobility33, premium paid by the
foreign rms could be eliminated if the labor turnover and knowledge di¤usion raises
wages in domestic rms (Aitken et al. 1996; Barry et al. 2001).
32An extensive literature puts a crucial role on the importance of tacit knowledge in technological
activities (see Cowan et al., 2001).
33However, many factors (e.g. personal reasons) may imply that, even if foreign rms are able to
set wages at an appropriate level, employees would still leave, eventually leading to the generation
of spillovers within domestic rms (Martins, 2005).
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Furthermore the increased mobility might be dampened not only by the higher
wages but also by the existence of binding employment contracts. Many studies
model the contracts as a mechanism that deters transmission of knowledge with the
aim of protecting the rm specic assets (Ethier and Markusen, 1996; Markusen,
2001; Nicholson, 2002; and Dahl, 2002). For example, clauses in the contracts,
health and pension benets could play a signicant role in keeping the workers from
changing to a job in a competitor rm and thus carrying the knowledge and prevent
the knowledge di¤usion (Dahl, 2002)34. Markusen (2001) and Ethier and Markusen
(1996) present a model to improve our understanding of how contract enforcement
and IPP (Intellectual Property Rights) inuence foreign direct investment into host
economies, and host-country welfare. They model a rm whose workers learn all the
knowledge necessary for production and then decide to move to local rms and to
prevent this knowledge di¤usion, multinationals o¤er contracts where existence of
binding contracts makes the multinationals better o¤.
Even though a number of studies have analyzed the spillovers arising from the
entry of MNEs, the impact of spillovers- via labor mobility- on the productivity and
wages in the host countries has hardly been studied. Particularly, theoretical evi-
dence on spillovers due to the workersmobility is scarce and far from conclusive.
Only few theoretical studies have analyzed productivity transfers via worker mobil-
ity. Fosfuri et al. (2001) and Glass and Saggi (2002) develop models of spillovers
from multinationals to domestic rms via workersmobility. They demonstrate that
multinationals can pay a wage premium to prevent technology transfer35. Other
34The e¤ects and extent of this type of clauses is still to be investigated in the literature.
35Fosfuri et al. (2001) also state that the MNEs might prefer to export rather than invest to
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theoretical models Ethier and Markusen (1996) and Markusen (2001) have analyzed
spillovers to foreign markets, although from di¤erent perspectives, and they state
that productivity transfers arise when workers employed by MNEs move to domestic
rms. The recent research on spillovers through labor mobility has provided both
theoretical and empirical evidence (Malchow-Møller et al., 2006 and Markusen and
Tromenko, 2007). In both of these studies the e¤ect of foreign experience on wages
are documented, yet empirically. This channel for spillovers has been investigated
empirically by Gerschenberg (1987), Pack (1993), Görg and Strobl (2005), Martins
(2005), Balsvik (2006), Hale and Long (2006), Lenger and Taymaz (2006), Poole
(2006), and Pesola (2007). These studies document four fundamental issues:
First, productivity or knowledge spillovers arise via labor mobility. In a study of
the Taiwanese economy, Hau and Gee (1993) and Pack (1993) show that labor mo-
bility is the most important channel for technology di¤usion. Tsiang and Wu (1985)
note that as a result of movement of foreign personnel, technological spillovers occur
in Korea, Hong-Kong and Singapore. Lan and Young (1996) and Hale and Long
(2006) provide evidence that labor mobility facilitates multinational productivity
spillovers in China. Blomström and Persson (1983) state that foreign experience in
multinationals play a crucial role in productivity spillovers for Mexico. Lenger and
Taymaz (2006) examine the horizontal, vertical and labor spillover in Turkish manu-
facturing industries and labor turnover is found to be the main channel of spillovers.
Poole (2006) investigates multinational spillovers resulting from worker mobility and
nds evidence that positive spillovers exist through worker mobility in Brazil by us-
avoid di¤usion of superior technology to the local rms or to prevent paying higher wages.
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ing a novel matched establishment-worker database36. Martins (2005) seeks to assess
the magnitude of productivity spillovers that arise from movement of workers from
foreign owned to domestic rms in Portugal and results indicate that there is some
evidence that labour mobility is a source of knowledge transfer.
Second, workers learn from watching (working with) foreign workers with a result-
ing increase in their productivity, or, in other words, workers who have a foreign rm
experience have a productivity advantage. Markusen and Tromenko (2007) assume
that working with foreign experts is an alternative to studying as a means of obtain-
ing skills. They state that the use of foreign experts allows the accumulation of skills
at a lower cost and faster than if they were self-learnt at home. Balsvik (2006) nds
that workers who move from multinational to purely domestically owned rms have
a positive e¤ect on total factor productivity in Norway. The ndings are consistent
with mobility being a channel for knowledge di¤usion and note that these transit
workers contribute 20% more to productivity than workers without experience from
MNEs. Hale and Long (2006) nd evidence that the percentage of managers with
experience in the foreign rm is positively associated with the rms total factor
productivity by using a sample of 1500 rms in China. Görg and Strobl (2005) focus
on the owners of domestic rms who were previously employed in multinationals and
investigate whether domestic rms which have entrepreneurs with foreign experience
have a productivity advantage compared to other rms by using a detailed rm-level
data from a sample of 204 Ghanian manufacturing rms. Their results suggest that
36The main results suggest that the magnitude of wage spillovers from multinational establish-
ments depends on the sector under consideration.
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rms whose owners have foreign experience are more productive than similar domes-
tic rms in the same industry, while rms whose owners worked in MNEs in di¤erent
industries have no productivity advantage. Poole (2006) shows that former multi-
national establishment workers are better able to convey information and suggests
incumbent production workers learn from former multinational managers. The re-
sults are robust to various model specications, including worker and establishment
xed e¤ects.
Third, foreign rms pay a wage premium. Gerschenberg (1987) analyzes MNEs
activity in Kenya with a survey of 72 top- and middle-level manager from 41 manu-
facturing rms and concludes that mobility is lower for managers employed by MNEs
than for those employed by local rms. He attributes this to the wage premium paid
by the MNEs. Yet, Gerschenberg (1987) also notes that the dissemination of man-
agerial know-how is low in Kenya. Malchow-Møller et al. (2006) state that wages in
foreign rms are still greater than in domestic rms when controlling for rm size.
Also, they nd evidence on a signicant wage premium for working in a foreign rm
by using data on individual Danish workers with rm-level information about size,
foreign ownership, and industry.
Fourth, foreign experience is valued in local rms. That is, workers who have
experience in multinationals earn more than their colleagues in local rms. This is
consistent with the view that these workers gain general skills in foreign rms that
are applied in the local rms. Using a matched rm and worker level dataset for
Ghanaian manufacturing rms, Görg, Strobl andWalsh (2002) nd that workers who
are employed by foreign rms experience more rapid wage growth than workers in
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domestic rms. Malchow-Møller et al. (2006) provide evidence on the characteristics
of the learning processes as well as the degree of transferability of the foreign tech-
nology by using data on individual Danish workers with rm-level information about
size, foreign ownership, and industry. They nd that working for a foreign owned
rm signicantly increases the workers wage. So that, current wages are higher for
workers previously employed in foreign rms, which is consistent with their theoreti-
cal assumption that at least part of a workers learning in foreign rms can be carried
to other rms. Markusen and Tromenko (2007) develop a dynamic model in which
knowledge is transmitted when the workers with foreign experience visit the local
rms. Specically, they demonstrate that workers with foreign experience have sub-
stantial positive e¤ects on the wages of domestic workers by using xed e¤ects and
nearest neighbour matching estimators on a panel of plant-level data for Colombia.
They nd that the use of workers with foreign experience raises wages of unskilled
and skilled workers by 5 and 6 percent respectively. For Portugal, Martins (2005)
nds that workers that are hired from foreign rms are paid more than similar work-
ers without such prior foreign experience, but that workers su¤er sizeable pay cuts
when moving from foreign to domestic rms. For Norwegian manufacturing rms,
Balsvik (2006) documents the extent of labor mobility from multinationals to local
domestic rms (non-MNEs) and nds that workers with experience in multinational
rms also earn higher wages than their co-workers. Numerically, in 2000 almost 50%
of the non-MNE workers had previous experience from MNEs. These workers earn a
wage premium of more than 3% compared to their new colleagues in the non-MNEs.
Pesola (2007) shows that prior experience in foreign owned rms has a positive e¤ect
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on earnings of the workers by using Finnish linked employer-employee panel data.
Findings are consistent with models of knowledge di¤usion through labour mobility,
where a domestic rm may bid for a worker at a foreign owned rm in order to gain
access to her knowledge. Moreover, Pesola (2007) notes that if workers with expe-
rience at foreign owned rms have accumulated valuable knowledge, this may show
up in not only wages but also in other labor market outcomes, such as employment
probabilities.
Within this framework, the main purpose of this study is to develop some answers
regarding the functioning of labor markets in response to the knowledge transmission
through workersmobility. What is the impact of increased labor mobility on the
foreign and local wages? What will be the response of unemployment rate when the
mobility of workers from foreign to local rms is permitted? What will be the role
of technological progress in studying labor market implications of labor mobility?
In this context, it is important to analyse what the employment and wage impli-
cations of this knowledge transmission are via worker mobility. The extent of labor
mobility will be modeled via the exibility of binding contracts. As was discussed
above, existence of binding contracts could be used as a way of preventing labor
mobility, therefore knowledge di¤usion. This model considers the restricted access
of foreign workers to the local labor market due to the enforcement of contracts37.
The e¤ect of labor mobility on wages and unemployment is studied by using a search
model where the job to job mobility is allowed for workers, and contract restrictions
may be given in the side of foreign rms. Nevertheless, restrictive contracts are also
37Foreign workers means workers employed in foreign rms.
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provided by the local rms which is also modelled in this study. In the rst step, we
examine the case with the contract restrictions in the foreign rm just to solve the
model explicitly.
Firms post vacancies at a xed cost and workers search for the positions o¤ered by
local and foreign rms. With a Nash bargaining approach wages are determined and
together with the equilibrium conditions, it is convenient to examine the relationship
between worker and job characteristics, labor mobility, wages, and unemployment.
This framework allows for a knowledge spillover analysis that di¤ers from the
previous papers in three important ways. First, this study allows us to study the
absolute and relative wages. Secondly, in contrast to the literature on labor mobil-
ity, this study makes it possible to examine the e¤ect of labor mobility through
the channel of binding contractson unemployment. Together with this, it is also
possible to explore the labor market implications of labor mobility under techno-
logical upgrading. Actually, no study up to date, to the best of our knowledge,
has attempted to determine theoretically the absolute and relative wages and unem-
ployment by considering the potential extent of labor mobility from foreign to local
rms.
The rest of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model,
analyzes the equilibrium outcomes and discusses the results obtained. Section 3
displays the numerical example and the next section concludes.
4.2 The Model
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Workers could be a source of spillovers if they acquire superior knowledge at a
foreign owned rm and bring this knowledge with them to benet the local rm
when they change jobs. However, MNEs may prevent the knowledge di¤usion not
to loose their rm specic advantage by o¤ering restrictive employment contracts.
Thus, existence of such contracts acts as a proxy for labor mobility. This section
develops a search model where the job-to-job movements are allowed for workers.
Within this context, to draw a complete picture on the workersmobility, a search
model with a matching process is provided.
Consider a continuous time model in which workers are innitely lived and risk
neutral. The measure of workers is normalized to one. There are two types of
jobs: local (L) and foreign jobs (F ). Let yi denote the ow output of a job of type
i (= L; F ). Foreign rms are more productive than local rms, which is widely ac-
cepted in the literature as foreign rms act as a source of new technology, production
process, managerial technique or a new organizational form (Dunning, 1993; Caves,
1996; Doms and Jensen, 1998 and Conyon et al., 2002).
yF > yL
Job destruction is exogenous at rate 38. During unemployment workers receive an
unemployment benet b. Denoting the costs of job creation in the local and foreign
rms as cL and cF , respectively, we assume cF > cL.39
The mobility from foreign to local workers is restricted by the parameter g, which
measures the existence of a restrictive employment contract that deters workers from
38This study could be extended by allowing for endogenous job destruction rate.
39For more information on costs, see Chapter 2. Note that this assumption is relaxed in the
numerical example.
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moving to local rms, where g 2 [0; 1]. If employment contracts are binding, g = 0,
on the other hand if contracts are not binding, g = 1. The main interpretation is that
if the contracts are binding, it is di¢ cult for foreign workers to switch into local jobs
and this leads to lower mobility for foreign workers. Thus, there will be less workers
having an experience in the foreign rm. Therefore, the probability of being informed
about the technology in the foreign rm will be low in the local rm. Within this
framework, it is convenient to assume existence of binding contracts as a proxy for
labor mobility, which determines the ow of information between rms. This is due
to the fact that in order to gain access to advanced knowledge in the multinationals,
workers should have experience in multinationals or work with former MNE workers.
Actually, employment contracts control the mobility of workers, particularly, they
are designed to deter workers frommoving and taking information with them40. Non-
portable pension contribution plans and employer provided health insurance coverage
reduce workers incentive to move between jobs (Adnett et al., 2004). In addition,
clauses in the contracts of the workers could keep the workers from changing jobs and
prevent the knowledge di¤usion (Dahl, 2002). Firms try to prevent labor mobility in
some circumstances since innovative ideas can hardly be protected, particularly when
they are at the development stage (Carnoy et al., 1997; Saxenian, 1994; Hyde, 2000;
and Gilson, 2000). The threat of competition due to the information leakage makes
rms to avoid labor mobility (Anton and Yao, 1994; Baccara and Razin, 2004 and
Gaston and Nelson, 2002). For example, MNEs are subject to the exit threat from
40The issue of enforceability of contracts is a common feature of labor markets (Adnett et al.,
2004).
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their workers hence they put a great e¤ort to design contracts that deter workers
from moving to protect their technological advantage over local rms (Markusen,
2001; and Ethier and Markusen, 1996).
The probability of being in the informed state41 for the local worker is denoted
by , where  2 [0; 1]. This depends on the existence of enforcing contracts in
the foreign rm, g. If the contracts are binding, the labor mobility will be limited,
hence the probability of being informed will be low since there will be less interaction
between former foreign rm workers and local workers. Shortly, as it is empirically
supported, workers get access to valuable knowledge on the job and the knowledge
di¤usion occurs when the former MNE workers join local rms. Hence, greater the
mobility from foreign to local rms, that is, more exible contracts, the higher the
probability of being in the informed state.
The link between  and g could be formalized as follows42:
 = 0 if g = 0 and 0 <  < 1 if g = 1 and 
0
(g) > 0 (77)
4.2.1 Matching
Suppose that, the total number of matches between a worker and a rm is deter-
mined by a constant returns to scale matching function:
q [vL + vF ; u+ eL + eF ] = (u+ eL + eF )
p (vL + vF )
1 p
where vL denotes the mass of local vacancies and vF is the mass of foreign vacancies;
41Informed state means the worker is aware of the technology in the foreign rm.
42The rst derivative of  with respect to g is positive.
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u is the mass of unemployed workers; eL stands for the number of workers performing
local jobs, eF is the number of workers in the foreign rm; and p corresponds to the
elasticity of matching with respect to the mass of job seekers. It is assumed that q[:; :]
is strictly increasing in both arguments and  denotes the labour market tightness,
 = vL+vF
u+eL+eF
. Accordingly, the rate at which rms meet a job-seeker is equal to
q () = q
 
1; 1


; similarly, workers may meet a job at rate, q () = q (; 1). The
properties of the matching function imply that the matching rate of workers (rms)
is increasing (decreasing) in . To dene the matching rates of workers, it is also
convenient to dene a variable 

 = vL
vL+vF

, which represents the share of local
vacancies in total vacancies.
The transmission of knowledge occurs through interactions between individual
workers; more precisely, between workers who have an experience in the foreign rm
and the local workers who have no experience. Local workers learn from former
foreign rmsmanagers or technicians and become informed about the technology
available in the foreign rm. The greater the labor turnover from foreign rm to local
rm, the greater the number of possible individual interactions in the local rm and
the greater the potential transfer of knowledge (Glass and Saggi, 2002; Ethier and
Markusen, 1996; Fosfuri et al., 2001; Markusen, 2001; Markusen and Tromenko,
2007; and Poole, 2006).
Depending on the transmission of knowledge through worker mobility, it is ex-
pected that workers who have an experience in the foreign rm or have a interactions
with former foreign rm workers, thus who are informed, will be more productive
and earn higher wages (Görg et al., 2002; Malchow-Møller et al., 2006; Markusen
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and Tromenko, 2007; Martins, 2005; Balsvik, 2006; and Pesola, 2007).
The variables u, eL and eF should satisify the appropriate ow conditions:
1 pu =  (1  u) (78)
where a ow 1 p of unemployed workers nd employment in rms, which equals the
ow of workers into unemployment due to the job destruction,  (1  u). 
1 p

u+
 
1 pg

eF =
 
 + 1 p (1  ) eL (79)
As on-the-job-search is allowed for both workers in the local and foreign rms, we
have equations for local and foreign rms stating that in the steady state the ow of
workers into local rm,
 
1 p

u+
 
1 pg

eF , is equal to the ow of workers out of
local rm,
 
 + 1 p (1  ) eL. The ow 1 p (1  ) (u+ eL) of employed workers
into the foreign rm equals the ow out of foreign rm,
 
 + 1 pg

eF , where g,
existence of restrictive contracts, determines the extent of labor mobility.
1 p (1  ) (u+ eL) =
 
 + 1 pg

eF (80)
Lets consider the problem of workers. The value of unemployment and the value
of being employed in local and foreign rms, respectively, are given as folllows:
rU = b+ 1 p (WL   U) + 1 p (1  ) (WF   U) (81)
where unemployed workers have the unemployment benet and the second and the
third terms capture the fact that they may have an employment opportunity in local
and foreign rms, respectively.
rWL =  (g) (w
F +  (g)) + (1   (g))wL +  (U  WL) + 1 p (1  ) (WF  WL)
(82)
The value of employment in local rm incorporates the assumption that wages
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for the workers who have the knowledge of the foreign rm is wF +  (g), where the
workers, who have no access to available knowledge, earn wL. Actually, to encourage
workers to be in the informed state, the premium at the amount  (g) is paid, which
depends on the restrictions on labor mobility through g43. The third term refers
to the value of job destruction and the fourth term is the value of being successful
on-the-job-search.
rWF = w
F +  (U  WF ) + 1 pg (WL  WF ) (83)
where wF is the wages in the foreign rm and the second term stands for the value of
job destruction and the third term considers the fact that the MNE may prevent the
di¤usion of knowledge by limiting the labor mobility via enforcement of contracts.
Lets consider the problem of rms. The value of employing a worker for a local
rm is JL and for a foreign rm JF . Let VL and VF be the value of a job when
looking for a worker, that is, the value of a vacancy. These values satisfy the following
equations:
rJL =  (g)
 
yF   wF    (g)+(1   (g))  yL   wL+   + 1 p (1  ) (VL   JL)
(84)
where the rst term denotes the benet to the rm of working with informed worker
and second term is the value of working with an uninformed worker. This reveals the
fact that the movement of foreign to local jobsthe existence of restrictive contract
have a key role in the value of employment in the local rm.
rJF = y
F   wF +   + 1 pg (VF   JF ) (85)
43Note that  (g) > 0. That is, if the restrictions on contracts are binding, local rms have to pay
more to attract workers. But, the numerical example is also provided for the case where  (g) < 0.
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where the value of employing a worker is yF   wF and the third term stands for
the job destruction and considers the situation if workers leave the rm to join local
rms, which is extensively determined by g. Thus, the extent of potential labor
mobility denoted by g plays a crucial role in the value of employment in the foreign
rm.
rVL =  cL +  p
 
1 pg + 
  
1 p(1  ) +  
1 pg + 
  
1 p + 1 p( 1 + g) +  (JL   VL) (86)
rVF =  cF +  p
 
1 pg + 
 
1 p + 1 p( 1 + g) +  (JF   VF ) (87)
The values of vacant jobs depend on the job creation costs, cL and cF , labor
market tightness, , job destruction rate, , and the existence of binding contracts,
g, and the value of employing a worker, Ji, where i = L; F .
Wages. The wage is chosen so as to split the total surplus in some proportion
between the rm and the worker, the generalized Nash bargaining solution, where
Si be the total surplus, given as:
Si = Wi + Ji   Vi   U where i = L; F (88)
Then, it is convenient to assume that wage is chosen so that the surplus of a match,
Si, between a job of type i (= L; F ) is given as nonnegative, that is,
Wi + Ji  Vi + U
When a match is formed, the wages are determined by linear sharing rule
Wi   U =  [Wi + Ji   Vi   U ] (89)
where  2 (0; 1) is the exogenous surplus share of workers.
Substituting (80), (81), (83), (85) into (88) and imposing the free-entry condition
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for local vacancies, V (L) = 0, we obtain the uninformed workers wage rate from the
matching of a worker with a local rm:
wL =
$LyL(y
F + (1  )yL) + b$Lb   (wF + )$LwF
(1  )(r + s+ 1 p(1   + )) (90)
where $Lb = (1   )(r + s + 1 p(1   )), $LyL = (r + s + 1 p) and $LwF =
(r + s+ 1 p(1   + )). Uninformed workers wage in the local rm depends on
the bargaining power of workers, , unemployment benet, b, the mass of local and
foreign vacancies, which is captured by the labor market tightness, , and the share
of local vacancies in total vacancies, , the weighted average of the productivity of
informed and uninformed workers, the wages of informed workers in the local rm,
and the existence of binding contracts.
The average wage level in the local rm is also denoted by wL
wL = (1  )wL + (wF + ) = $
L
yL(y
F + (1  )yL) + b$Lb
(r + s+ 1 p(1   + )) (91)
Wages in the local rm depends on whether the worker is in the informed state
or not. Particularly, wage in the local rm is a function of the bargaining power of
workers, the mass of local and foreign vacancies, weighted average of productivity
of informed and uninformed workers, unemployment benet and the existence of
binding contracts. Note that, the weights are implicitly function of costs of job
creation which are captured in the term , the share of local vacancies in total, and
the productivity of the workers.
Substituting (80), (82), (84), (86) into (88) and imposing the free-entry condition
for foreign vacancies, V (F ) = 0, we obtain the wage rate from the matching of a
worker with a foreign rm:
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wF =
$Fw&b +$
F
yF y
F
A
(92)
where A = 1 
1 p(1 )+r+s +

1 pg+r+s   
1 p(1 )
(1 p+r+s)(1 p(1 )+r+s) 
1 pg( 1+)( 1+)
(1 p(1 )+r+s)(1 p+1 p( 1+g)+r+s)
and $Fw&b =
b(1 )
1 p(1 )+r+s +
1 p( 1+)(b+wl( 1+) ))
(1 p+r+s)(1 p(1 )+r+s)  
1 pg( 1+)(wl( 1+) ))
(1 p(1 )+r+s)(1 p+1 p( 1+g)+r+s) ,
$FyF =

1 pg+r+s
Similarly, wages in the foreign rm are also determined by the bargaining power
of workers, the mass of local and foreign vacancies, unemployment benet, potential
labor mobility via the existence of binding contracts and the productivity of informed
worker.
In summary, wages of the workers in the local and foreign rms, equations (89)-
(91), are mainly the weighted average of the workers reservation value (or unem-
ployment benet), b, which is treated as a constant and the productivity in the
current match. To understand the overall story behind the wage determination and
to realize the e¤ect of the labor mobility on wages, the corresponding weights for
wages

$LyL , $
L
b , $
F
w&b, $
F
yF

should be examined. Most importantly, the mass of
vacant positions o¤ered by local and foreign rms, bargaining power of workers, labor
mobility from foreign to local jobs through the existence of binding contracts, un-
employment benet, the productivity of workers play a key role in explaining wages.
Also, wage di¤erentials arise since we assumed an asymmetric technologythe out-
put from a match between a worker and a local job is not the same as the output
that would result from a match between a worker and a foreign job. Furthermore,
the extent of labor mobility is restricted by the value of g and the job creation costs
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also play an important role in the wage gap between workers in the local and foreign
rms through their e¤ect on vacancy creation. However, wages for the uninformed
worker and wages in the foreign rm are jointly determined. In this context, it is
hard to derive analytical solution and to provide comparative statics for these wages.
Therefore, we will provide a numerical example. But, it is convenient to understand
the average wages in the local rm and to examine the gap between foreign and local
rms.
Proposition 4 Workers in the foreign rm are not always paid more than workers
in local rm. The rm premium depends on the mass of vacancies created by the
rms, the labor productivity, the extent of labor mobility.
Proof. Workers in foreign rms may earn more than that of the local rms, that
is, w
F
wL
> 1 depending on the labor market frictions, in terms of posted vacancies,
and the productivity of the workers in di¤erent rms and the existence of binding
contracts.
(yF   b)(1  + )+ (yF   yL)(1 )(r+ s) T ((yL  b)+(yF   yL))(+
g(1  ))
Since yF > yL and yF > b and yL > b it is clear that both sides of the inequality
are positive. Clearly, if the productivity gap between foreign and local rms is
su¢ ciently large, foreign rms end up with higher wages even when labor market
imperfections are taken into account. Nevertheless, the contract enforcement, a
resulting potential labor mobility, and the ow of information from foreign to local
jobs add a di¤erent avor to the discussion of the wage gap between foreign and
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local wages. Since the analytical solution does provide ambiguous results, numerical
solution is needed.
4.2.2 Equilibrium
Equilibrium is determined by two job creation conditions and ow conditions
given by equations (77) and (79). Given exogenous variables that capture the pro-
ductivity of labor (yi), the bargaining power of workers and elasticity of matching
with respect to the mass of job seekers (; p), the job destruction rate () and job
creation cost (cL; cF ), the measure of existence of a restrictive employment contracts
(g) and the interest rate (r), we will solve for the mass of vacancies, vL and vF ; wages,
i.e. wL, wF and  (g); the labor market tightness ; and unemployment rate; u.
We can solve for the unemployment rate u, as a function of labor market tightness
() and the job destruction rate  by the help of equations (77) and (78), which gives,
u =

 + 1 p
(93)
where the unemployment is positively related with the job destruction rate and
negatively with the labor market tightness. In other words, as the local and foreign
rms o¤er more positions for job seekers, the unemployment rate will be lower.
Since equilibrium requires that VL = 0 and VF = 0, equations (85) and (86) could
be written as follows
cL
 p
= E
 
 (g)
 
yF   wF    (g)+ (1   (g))  yL   wL
r +  + 1 p (1  )
!
(94)
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cF
 p
= F

yF   wF
r +  + 1 pg

(95)
where E = (
1 pg+)(1 p(1 )+)
(1 pg+)(1 p+1 p( 1+g)+)and F =
(1 pg+)
(1 p+1 p( 1+g)k+) denoting the
workers who matched with the local and foreign rms, respectively. The total amount
of vacancies is determined by these conditions given above, which are dened as job
creation conditions. These conditions equate the benet to the rm of lling vacant
positions with the suitable candidate and the cost of opening vacancies. In other
words, both equations relate the expected cost of a posted vacancy to the expected
benet of a lled job. For instance, if the left hand side of either equation is smaller
than the right hand side, then entry to labor market by opening a vacant position
is protable, so that the number of vacancies posted increases. This leads to a rise
in the labor market tightness of the workers until the benets of job creation are
consumed.
4.3 Numerical Example
This section provides a numerical example to illustrate the properties of the
model. Numerical example allows us to capture e¤ects of a di¤erent degree of con-
tract enforcement, that is, labor mobility, on the job creation conditions, wages and
unemployment in the local economy. It furthermore allows a discussion of the rela-
tionship between technological progress and wages, and unemployment by allowing
di¤erent degrees of labor mobility through the enforcement of contracts. The ex-
ample uses the matching function, q () =  p together with the baseline parameter
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values, r = 0:05,  = 0:5,  = 0:1, b = 0:1, p = 0:5, cL = 0:5, cF = 0:7, yF = 1:9,
yL = 1:7. All these parameter values are reasonable and in line with the other studies
including Albrecht and Vroman (2002), Gautier (2002) and Dolado et al. (2003)44.
Moreover, we assume that  (g) = 'g1=2 and  (g) = '(1
g
)1=2, where 0 < ' < 1. In
the baseline example, the productivity gap between foreign and local rms, y
F
yL
is
assumed to be 10%. The interest rate is 5 percent and job destruction rate is 0:1.
It seems reasonable to assume that foreign jobs are more costly to create than local
jobs, where cL = 0:5 and cF = 0:7 (Carlson et al., 2006; Faggio and Koning, 2001;
Fonseca, 2001; Hammermesh, 1993; Russo et al., 2005; and Vanhala, 2004). The
unemployment benet level is set at 0:1. Under this choice of parameters, Figure 18
presents the baseline solutions. But, robustness check is also available by considering
di¤erent functional forms of  (g) and  (g), yet there is no considerable change in
the results when we try di¤erent functional forms.
Figure 18 presents the share of local vacancies in total vacancies, wages and
unemployment rate. Baseline solution says that the share of local vacancies increase
as labor becomes more mobile, where the contracts become less binding. The local
rm o¤ers more positions to gain access to rm specic knowledge since less binding
contracts allows workers to move freely between jobs. Increased mobility of workers
leads to a fall in the unemployment rate, approaching to 8%. This is due to the
fact that rms o¤er more positions, thus, labor market becomes more exible, as the
contracts are less binding. On the other hand, when the workers are perfectly mobile,
44Numerical simulation results- given these parameter values- point out data relative wages are
in the same line with the real data (Blasvik, 2006; Malchow-Møller et al., 2006; Markusen and
Tromenko, 2007).
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Figure 18: Labor Market: Job Opportunities, Unemployment and Wages, cL = 0:5;
cF = 0:7
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the rm premium, w
F
wL
, and skill premium, w
F+
wL
decrease from 1:6 to 1 to and 3:5
to 2, respectively. In contrast, as contracts become more binding, as g approaches
to 0, that is labor turnover from foreign to local is restricted, local rm creates less
vacancies. In this case, unemployment will be high, close to 16%, the wage gap
between foreign and local rms, w
F
wL
, increases to 1:9 and relative wages- or skill
premium, in the local rm,w
F+
wL
, is around 3. In this context, one can conclude that
less imperfections in the labor market reduces unemployment rate. As the workers
become more mobile via relaxing employment contracts, unemployment rate declines.
Stated di¤erently, if the MNEs do not o¤er binding contracts to protect their rm
specic advantage, thus, allow for the mobility of workers, unemployment rate will
be low.
Baseline case shows that wages for the informed workers in the local rms decline
as the labor mobility from foreign to local rms increase. In other words, wages in the
foreign rm
 
wF

and wage paid to informed workers in the local rm
 
wF + 

fall
as the contracts o¤ered by foreign rms become less binding, that is labor becomes
perfectly mobile. This could be explained by the fact that rms do not need to pay
more to attract the workers since there is no restriction on the job-to job movement.
Uninformed wages in the local rm also increase which is due to an increase in
vacant positions o¤ered by local rms, so a number of unemployed workers have an
opportunity to work in local rms.
In contrast, since highly restrictive contracts deter the movement of workers from
foreign to local rm, local rms need to pay more to attract those informed workers
in the foreign rm, thereby  increases. On the other hand, average wages
 
wL

in
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Figure 19: Labor Market: Job Opportunities, Unemployment and Wages, cL =
0:5; cF = 0:5
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the local rm increase, even after a threshold level at g = 0:8, average wages in the
local rm may be higher than the wages in the foreign rm. In short, the wage gap
between foreign and local rms, rm premium, decreases due to the existence of less
binding contracts. The wage di¤erence between informed and uninformed workers
in the local rm, skill premium, decreases as the movement of foreign to local jobs
accelerates. On the other hand, restrictions on the labor turnover increases the wage
gap between informed and uninformed workers, and also leads to a rise in the foreign
rm premium.
Figure 19 considers the case where both rms face equal job creation costs. The
share of local vacancies increase while unemployment rate decreases when the re-
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striction on contracts decreases, which is the same as in Figure 18, where cF > cL.
But, due to the low job creation costs, the mass of vacant positions in the foreign
rm also increases. This leads to a sharper fall in the unemployment rates. In the
case of equal job creation costs, foreign rms always pay more than average local
wages, which is the main di¤ference between Figure 18 and Figure 19.
The foreign wages and informed wages fall as g gets higher reecting more labor
turnover from foreign to local rm. Similarly, skill premium and the rm premium
decreases as labor becomes more mobile. As for the absolute wages, earnings of
the uninformed workers in the local rm increases slightly, while there is a more
dramatic rise in the benchmark case. Wages in the local rm increase while wages in
the foreign rm decrease as the restrictions on the movement of labor from foreign
to local rm relieved.
Figure 20 focuses on the case how the e¤ect of labor mobility on local labor mar-
kets changes depending on the technological gap between local and foreign rms. As
the technological gap between local and foreign rms increases, foreign rms create
more jobs whereas the share of local vacancies tend to decline. Unemployment rate
will be higher if the stated gap is 75%. So that, the technological gap between foreign
and local rms a crucial role in examining wage and unemployment implications of
increased labor mobility. Nevertheless, the share of local vacancies and unemploy-
ment rate still follow the same pattern in response to rising mobility through the
non-binding employment contracts. On the other hand, it will be important to note
that an increase in the technological gap between foreign and local rms raises the
unemployment rate and wages in the foreign and local rms, decreases the earnings
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Figure 20: Labor Market: Job Opportunities, Unemployment, Technological Gap
share of local vacancies
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
g
et
a
eta eta if technological gap is %25
eta if  technological gap is %50 eta if technological gap is %75
unemployment rate
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1
g
u u if  technological gap is %25
u if  technological gap is %50 u if  technological gap is %75
159
of the uninformed workers in the local rm. In addition, this also leads to an increase
in the skill premium and rm premium.
Technological progress raising the productivity gap between the foreign and the
local rms leads rms to employ more workers possessing higher skill levels. In this
context, local rms need to pay more to transfer informed workers from the foreign
rms, which leads to a rise in the wages of informed workers. Technological upgrad-
ing, as rms require more informed workers, deteriorates the position of uninformed
workers, by decreasing the earnings of the uninformed workers. Also, the wage gap
between informed and uninformed workers in the local rm increases. Therefore, one
can conclude that technological progress raises the wage inequality and lowers the
wages of less informed workers. Actually, there exists a growing body of research
focusing on the relationship between technology and wage inequality. In particular,
a number of studies has documented that technological change emerges as an expla-
nation for the rise in wage inequality, specically in the US (Card and Dinardo 2002;
Bound and Johnson, 1992; Katz and Murphy, 1992).
Findings of this chapter supports the SBTC hypothesis where new technology,
leading to a rise in the demand for highly skilled workers, increases the wage inequal-
ity.
On the other hand, the sign of the relationship between technical progress and
unemployment is ambiguous. Technological progress reduces unemployment rate in
Pissarides (1990), but increases unemployment in Aghion-Howitt (1994). The main
ndings of this chapter notes that technological progress raising the productivity
gap between the foreign and the local rm leads to an increase in the unemployment
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Figure 21: Labor Market: Job Opportunities, foreign versus average local wages,
Technological Gap
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rate.
According to the Figure 21, wages in the foreign rm is higher than the wages
in the local rm as the technological gap between foreign and local rm gets wider.
Also, foreign wages tend to fall slightly due to the increase labor mobility as the
contracts become less binding. As the technological gap between foreign and local
rms increase, that is the technological gap is 75%, wages in the local rm becomes
higher than the case where the technological gap is 10%. Similarly, wages in the
local rm increase in response to rising mobility from foreign to local rms.
Figure 22 says that earnings of the uninformed workers decrease as the technolog-
ical gap between foreign and local rms gets wider. Also, wages of the uninformed
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Figure 22: Labor Market Opportunities: wages in the local rm, technological gap
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Figure 23: Labor Market Opportunities: relative wages in the local rm, technolog-
ical gap
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workers in the local rm tend to increase as labor becomes more mobile through
the introduction of less binding contracts. The wages o¤ered to informed workers in
the local rm decrease as the contracts become less mobile, that is, increased labor
mobility. Also, note that the wf + " rises as the technological gap between foreign
and local workers increases. This reveals the fact that as the technological gap be-
tween the foreign and local rms is too wide, then local rms have to pay more to
be informed on the technology available in the local rm.
Figure 23 shows the rm premium and skill premium in response to existence
of restrictive contracts and technological gap. As the technological gap between
foreign and local rms increases, both the rm premium and skill premium slightly
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melts down due to the rising labor mobility. Actually, greater the technological gap
between foreign and local rms, the higher will be the rm premium and the skil
premium.
Robustness Check
This section presents the sensitivity of the results to the di¤erent functional forms
and di¤erent contract restriction rates o¤ered by both foreign and local rms.
Di¤erent functional forms
Figure 24 presents the case being a informed workers increasingly increase with
the relaxing contracts, where  (g) = 'g2. Di¤erent functional forms of g leads to a
no change in the pattern of the vacancies and the unemployment rates, conrming
that the share of local vacancies increases and the unemployment rate decreases in
response to an increased labor mobility from foreign to local rms via relaxing of
employment contracts. Also, the new functional form of g does not change the ab-
solute and the relative wage pattern. The informed wages in the local rm
 
wF + 

and average wages
 
wL

in the local rm increase, after a threshold level at g = 0:8,
average wages in the local rm may be higher than the wages in the foreign rm in
response to an increasing labor mobility. Similarly, as it is given in the benchmark
case, wages in the foreign rm falls due to the less binding contracts supporting the
increased mobility of workers from foreign (local) to local (foreign) rms. Increased
164
Figure 24: Labor Market Opportunities: di¤erent functional form for g
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labor turnover ceases the competition on informed wages in the foreign and local
rms, reducing the earnings of the informed workers in both rms. In this context,
wage gap between informed and uninformed workers in the local rm declines and
also rm premium decreases.
Figure 25 presents the case where restrictions on labor mobility decreases the
premium,  (g), where  (g) < 0. This is along the same line with the argument that
voluntary wage cuts are possible when workers move between rms. Yet, this does not
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change the main ndings where increased labor mobility via relaxing of employment
contracts increases the share of local vacancies and decreases the unemployment
rate. As for the absolute wages, average wages in the local rm increases as the
labor becomes more mobile and also we need to note that foreign rms pay more
than local rms regardless of the labor mobility. Even though the share of local
vacancies increases and local rms try to match with the informed workers, the
premium of being informed does not increase. If the voluntary wage cut is possible,
foreign rms always pay more than the local rms. As for the relative wages, skill
premium in the local rm and the foreign rm premium decreases in response to
increasing labor mobility.
Di¤erent contract restriction rates
The Figure 26 examine the case where both rms have labor market restrictions,
where m denotes restrictions on labor mobility in the local rm. Analytical steps
for this model is given in the Appendix. In the above section, we allowed for fully
exible contracts in the local rm, where there were no restrictions on labor moving
from the local rm, in other words, m = 1. That is, labor contracts in the local
rm were kept unchanged where labor could move exibly from them, whereas by
changing "g" we allowed for labor mobility to vary from the foreign rm. Since we
capture the fact that gap between g and m decreases in the benchmark case, now,
in this case we ask the question whether the local and foreign rms have the same
restrictions on the labor mobility, i.e., g = m, and examine the case if both rms
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Figure 25: Labor Market Opportunities: di¤erent functional form for 
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remove the restrictions on labor mobility.
As the labor turnover increases between foreign and local rms, that is perfect
labor mobility, the share of local vacancies increases and the unemployment rate
decreases. In this context, one can say that in the light of the benchmark case,
increasing the gap between g and m or equal restrictions on labor mobility does
not change the pattern of vacancy creation or the unemployment rate. Shortly,
an increase in labor mobility raises the job creation by the local rm and reduces
unemployment rate.
The Figure 26 indicates that uninformed wages in the local rm slightly increase
in response to labor turnover where both rms allow for labor mobility. Wage paid
to the informed workers by the local rm decreases as both rms remove the labor
market restrictions. Most importantly, if both rms give employment contracts that
deter the movement of workers, average wages in the local rmmay exceeds the wages
in the foreign rm. So that, we can not conclude that foreign rms always pay more
than that of the local rms: if there are restrictions on labor mobility also in the local
rm. If both foreign and local rms remove the restrictions on the labor mobility,
the wages in the local rm increases and the wages in the foreign rm decreases. To
this end, while the wage gap between informed and uninformed workers in the local
rm decreases, rm premium does not record a signicant decline.
Further, Figure 27 presents the case where both rms have equal job creation
costs, i.e. cL = 0:5; cF = 0:5. The share of local vacancies increase in response
to increase in labor turnover, but there is no sharp rise in the local vacancies as
the job creation cost between the foreign and local vacancies melt down. Similarly,
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Figure 26: Labor Market Opportunities: restrictions on workersmobility by both
rms, g = m.
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unemployment rate decreases as the workersmobility in both rms increases. Figure
27 shows that wage paid by the foreign rm is greater than the wage paid by the
local rm. The main reason behind this is the reduction in job creation cost of
foreign rms. Neverherless, the main pattern in the foreign wages remains same: it
declines in response to an increase in the job-to job movement of workers as both
rms remove the restrictions on labor mobility. Also, both informed and uninformed
wages in the local rm falls and average wage in the local rm does not record
a signicant rise. The rm premium slightly decrease due to the increasing labor
turnover and there is a negligible reduction in the wage gap between the informed
and uninformed workers in the local rm. Due to the reduction in foreign job creation
cost, the mass of foreign vacancies rises. In this case, regardless of the restrictions
on labor mobility, foreign rms pay more than the local rm. Therefore, in accord
with the ndings of the Chapter 2 and the Chapter 3, job creation costs have a vital
role in the wage determination.
Figure 28 presents the case where the local rm gives restrictive employment
contracts and the foreign rm permits the mobility of workers from foreign to local
rm, g > m. That is, free movement of workers are allowed in the foreign rm but
the mobility of workers from local to foreign rm is restricted. By studying this case
in addition to g < m and g = m, we have examined the e¤ect of di¤erent contracts
o¤ered by foreign and local rms on the labor market. di¤erent cases: g < m, g = m
and g > m. The share of local vacancies slightly increases as the local rm o¤ers less
binding contracts, thus, permitting labor turnover. Similarly, unemployment rate
decreases as the workersmobility from local to foreign rms increases.
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Figure 27: Labor Market: Reduction in the job creation costs, cL = 0:5; cF = 0:5
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Figure 28: Labor Market Opportunities: restrictions on workersmobility by both
rms, g > m.
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On the other hand, informed wages in the foreign and local rms decrease as
restrictions on labor mobility are removed by the local rm. Earnings of the un-
informed workers do not record a signicant change. The rm premium slightly
decrease due to the increasing labor turnover and the wage gap between the in-
formed and uninformed workers in the local rm declines.
Actually, increased labor mobility- it does not matter whether the restrictive
contracts are o¤ered by foreign or local rms, reduces unemployment rate and di-
minishes the wage gap between informed and uninformed workers in the local rm.
Yet, the extent of the e¤ect of labor mobility on labor market depends on the degree
of restrictions of employment contracts given in the foreign and local rms.
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To sum up, we can conclude that restrictions on labor mobility play a crucial
role in examining the e¤ect of foreign presence on wage and unemployment. The
main results point out that increased labor mobility reduces the wage gap between
informed and uninformed workers and also decreases the wage paid by the foreign
rms. Most importantly, unemployment rate falls in response to a rise in the labor
turnover.
4.4 Conclusion
Since MNEs are associated with the rm specic asset in the form of advanced
technology, local rms aim to reap the benets of superior knowledge by hiring
workers from MNEs. When a former MNE worker moves to a local rm, he can
transfer, at least, a part of the technology. Within this context, this chapter focuses
on the labor mobility through the channel of binding contracts and examines the job
creation, wage and unemployment e¤ects of labor mobility.
Results suggest that wages are a weighted average of labor productivity and
the unemployment benet, where the weight depends on the bargaining power of
the workers, labor market tightness, the mass of local and foreign vacancies, the
extent of the labor mobility. In fact, the mass of vacant positions in the foreign rm
depends on the job-creation costs and relative labor productivities. We nd that
labor mobility from foreign to local rms decreases the skill premium in the local rm
and also puts a downward pressure on the rm premium. Increased labor mobility
reduces the unemployment rate. Further, ndings of the model point out that the
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technological gap between foreign and local rms plays a vital role in the job creation
and determination of wages and unemployment. Such that increased technological
gap between foreign and local rms decreases the earnings of the uninformed workers
while raising the skill premium in the local rm. On the other hand, unemployment
rate decreases and rm premium increases in response to widening technological gap
between foreign and local rms.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSION
This dissertation studies the labor market implications of increased foreign rm
activity on local economy by using heterogenous search and matching model. Since
search and matching models have a crucial role in explaining the labor market transi-
tions, they provide a very suitable framework to study the labor market uctuations
following the entry of foreign rms. Particularly, this dissertation examines the role
of foreign rms in job creation as well as their role in changing the structure of
employment and explaining wage inequalities in the local market.
Within this framework, Chapter 2 provides a broad perspective on studying la-
bor market implications of the entry of foreign rms by modeling the foreign rm
working with both skilled and unskilled workers. The model allows us to investigate
not only the wage di¤erences across skilled and unskilled labor, but also wage di¤er-
ences across domestic and foreign rms. The main ndings of this model could be
summarized as follows:
1. Wages are a weighted average of labor productivity and unemployment benet,
where the weight depends on the bargaining power of the workers, labor market
tightness and the mass of local and foreign vacancies.
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2. Foreign rm does not always pay higher wage than that of the local rm.
Particularly, the wage di¤erential between foreign and local rms could be
explained by the technological gap between local and foreign rms, relative job
creation costs and the skill endowment.
3. An increase in the foreign presence has di¤erential wage e¤ects depending
on the cause of an increase in foreign presence (cost reduction, technological
progress and skill upgrading).
Following the ndings of the Chapter 2, Chapter 3 focuses on the di¤erent
technology intensities of the local and the foreign rm and also assess the role of
sectoral location of foreign rm on the wage and unemployment rate in the local
labor market. Results suggest that conrming the above three major ndings of the
chapter 2:
1. In the high-tech sector, skill bias technological progress in the foreign rm,
raising the technological gap between foreign and local rms, decreases the
unskilled workerswage in the local rm, but also increases the unemployment
rate of unskilled workers for a certain threshold value of technology gap between
the foreign rm and the local rm.
2. In the low tech sector, an increase in the foreign presence raises the wage gap
between skilled and unskilled workers in the local rm.
3. Reduction in the job creation costs, skill upgrading and technological progress
a¤ecting the vacancy creation by rms have di¤erent wage and unemployment
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e¤ects if one considers the di¤erent skill intensities of the rms and the sector
at foreign rm locates.
Even the workersmobility is allowed in Chapter 2 and in Chapter 3, rms may
put restrictions on the labor mobility which could be in part due to the protection of
rm specic asset. Chapter 4 examines the e¤ect of labor mobility restrictions from
foreign to local rms on wage and unemployment rate of the workers. Main ndings
could be summarized as follows:
1. Wages are a weighted average of labor productivity and the unemployment
benet, where the weight depends on the bargaining power of the workers,
labor market tightness, the mass of local and foreign vacancies, the extent of
the labor mobility.
2. Increased labor mobility from foreign to local rms decreases the wage gap
between informed and uninformed in the local rm.
3. Increased labor mobility from foreign to local rms leads to a reduction in the
unemployment rates.
4. Technological progress decreases the wage of the uninformed workers while
raising the skill premium in the local rm. The wage gap between foreign and
local rms increases in response to widening technological gap between foreign
and local rms.
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NOTE 1
Table 30: Numerical versus Real Figures
Wage Local Foreign Firm Premium
Sector
Food, Drink & Tobacco 15:8 29 1:82
Textiles & Leather 10:7 14:3 1:33
Wood, Paper & Printing 22:3 23:6 1:05
Chemicals 27:4 28:7 1:04
Rubber & Plastics 16:9 17:9 1:05
Non-metallic minerals 22:5 23:9 1:05
Metals 14:4 20:1 1:39
Non-electrical machinery 14:1 22:1 1:56
Electrical equipment 14:3 22:3 1:55
Transport equipment 19:2 19:3 1:00
Other manufacturing 15:4 17:3 1:12
Total manufacturing 17:5 21:7 1:23
Unemployment rate (annual) 4:4
Source: See Barry et al. (2005)
Table 31: Job Creation and Employmnet by Foreign Firms in Ireland
Domestic Foreign
Employment 120728 97559
Job creation rate 8.8 9.7
Source: See Görg and Strobl (2005b)
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Table 32: Employment of foreign a¢ liates in the host economy, 1980-2004
Countries 2000-2004
Austria 249
China 6565
Czech Republic 597
Finland 219
France 1056
Germany 2142
Hungary 607
Japan 318
Luxembourg 71
Poland 648
Portugal 154
Singapore 164
Sri Lankaa 382
Sweden 514
Switzerland 140
United States 6113
Source: UNCTAD FDI/TNC database.
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APPENDIX
The Appendix considers the case where both rms have some limitations on the
labor mobility. That is, job to job movement between foreign and local rms is
restricted. In this context, "m" denotes the extent of labor mobility in the local
rm.
Flow equations
1 pu =  (1  u) (96)
 
1 p

u+
 
1 pg

eF =
 
 + 1 p (1  )m eL (97)
1 p (1  )u+ 1 p (1  )meL =
 
 + 1 pg

eF (98)
Asset Values
rU = b+ 1 p (WL   U) + 1 p (1  ) (WF   U) (99)
rWL =  (g) (w
F +  (g)) + (1   (g))wL+  (U  WL) + 1 p (1  )m (WF  WL)
(100)
rWF = w
F +  (U  WF ) + 1 pg (WL  WF ) (101)
rJL =  (g)
 
yF   wF    (g)+(1   (g))  yL   wL+  + 1 p (1  )m (VL   JL)
(102)
rJF = y
F   wF +   + 1 pg (VF   JF ) (103)
rVL =  cL+ p
(   1 p2 ( 1 + )m2 +  1 p (g   2( 1 + )m) + 2)
(1 p + )(1 pg + 1 pm  1 pm + ) (JL   VL)
(104)
rVF =  cF +  p
 
1 pg  + =(1 pm+ )
(1 p + )(1 pg + 1 pm  1 pm + ) (JF   VF ) (105)
In this case, the solution for wages are implicit, thus, numerical solution is provided.
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